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The Legislative Council, which is composed of five 
Senators, six Representatives, and the presiding officers 
of the two houses, serves as a continuing research agency 
for the legislature through the maintenance of a trained 
staff. Between sessions, research activities are concen-
trated on the study of relatively broad problems formally 
proposed by legislators, and the publication and distri-
bution of factual reports to aid in their solution. 
During the sessions, the emphasis is on supplying 
legislators, on individual request, with personal memo-
randa, providing them with information needed to handle 
their own legislative problems. Reports and memoranda 
both give pertinent data in the form of facts, figures, 
arguments, and alternatives. 
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December 9, 1968 
To Members of the Forty-seventh General Assembly: 
Under direction of House Joint Resolution No. 
1026, Forty-sixth General Assembly (1968), the Leg-
islative Council appointed the Committee on Appellate 
Courts to make a thorough study of the Supreme Court 
case load problem and possible solutions. The report 
of this committee, which contains the committee's rec-
ommendations and a draft of proposed legislation to 
create an intermediate court of appeals, is submitted 
herewith. 
The committee submitted its report and draft 
of the proposed bill on December 9, 1968, at which 
time the report was accepted by the Legislative Coun-
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December 9, 1968 
Representative C. P. (Doc) Lamb 
Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
341 State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
Your Committee on Appellate Courts appointed 
to study the Supreme Court case load problem and 
possible solutions submits the accompanying report, 
containing a draft of suggested legislation to es-
tablish an intermediate court of Appeals. 
The seriousness of the Supreme Court backlog 
problem indicates that immediate action is necessary. 
The committee considered many proposed solutions to 
the problem and concluded that of all the alterna-
tive solutions considered, the creation of an inter-
mediate Court of Appeals for Colorado offered the 
best solution to the Supreme Court backlog problem 
for now.and for the foreseeable future. The commit-




/s/ Senator James C. Perrill 




The Legislative Council's Committee on Appellate Courts 
was created pursuant to the provisions of House Joint Resolution 
No. 1026, Forty-sixth General Assembly (1968), to study the Su-
preme Court backlog problem and the consequent delay in case 
disposition. The mission of the Committee on Appellate Courts 
was to take cognizance of the backlog problem and attempt to 
arrive at a workable and feasible solution. The members ap-
pointed to the committee were: 
Senator James Perrill, Chairman 
Representative Ronald Strahle, 
Vice Chairman 
Senator Clarence Decker 
Senator Ruth Stockton 
Representative Thomas Dameron 
Representative Barbara Frank 
Representative John Macfarlane 
Representative Harold McCormick 
Representative Clarence Quinlan 
Advisory committee members were: 
Mr. Jim R. Carrigan 
Mr. Bryant O'Donnell 
Mr. Kenneth Wormwood 
Judge Francis W. Jamison 
Judge Robert E. Lee 
Justice R. H. McWilliams 
Justice E. E. Pringle 
The Committee on Appellate Courts held five meetings dur-
ing the study. At these meetings the committee attempted to 
formulate a solution to the backlog problem. Early in its de-
liberations the committee directed the Judicial Administrator, 
with the cooperation of the Legislative Council staff, to con-
duct an analysis of the Supreme Court docket. This information 
was of much assistance to the committee. In addition, the com-
mittee consulted with persons from outside the state in order to 
gain information on how other states are facing the problems of 
court congestion and delay. 
The committee wishes to express its appreciation to the 
Colorado Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Clerk's Office for 
their cooperation and assistance in the conduct of this study. 
Valuable assistance was also given by Mr. Harry Lawson, Colorado 
Judicial Administrator, who was responsible for the Supreme Court 
docket analysis, and who supplied valuable information to the 
committee. The information received from these sources was par-
ticularly beneficial to the committee and their cooperation and 
assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 
vii 
Earl Thaxton, senior research assistant for the Legisla-
tive Council, had the primary responsibility for the staff work 
on this study and Robert Holt of the Legislative Drafting Office 
had primary responsibility for bill drafting services provided 
the committee. 
December 9, 1968 
viii 
Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Delay in the courts is unqualifiedly 
bad. It is bad because it deprives citi-
zens of a basic public service . •. it is 
bad because delay may cause severe hard-
ship to some parties; ••• and it is bad 
because it brings to the entire court 
system a loss of
1
~ublic confidence, re-
spect and pride.!,, 
History records that man has usually had a contempt for 
delayed justice. Thus, it was not surprising that the Founders 
of our nation saw fit constitutionally to grant and protect the 
concept of prompt and just trial and appeal for all. Yet impor-
tant as this concept seems in the constitutions and statutes of 
the nation and the several states, it appears to be one of the 
most frustrating principles of justice to guarantee and secure, 
for the prompt disposition of cases has become almost impossible 
in recent years because of the delay caused by appellate court 
congestion. Not only is the quality of justice important, but 
it is equally important that legal disputes be promptly resolved. 
This delay in justice has in part created the general disrespect 
for law and contempt for our courts with which our country and 
state is faced today. 
In Colorado, our Supreme Court has for several years been 
plagued by an excessive case load, congested docket and burden-
some backlog that impedes its efficiency and creates delay. The 
problem quite simply is that there are too many cases too often, 
for too few judges. The number of cases filed annually in the 
Colorado Supreme Court has increased steadily during the past 
decade, reaching an all time high of 639 in 1967, and is expected 
to approach 700 by 1970. 
There were 861 cases pending in the Supreme Court at the 
end of 1967 even though the court disposed of more cases, 588, 
and produced more written opinions, 378, than in any other year 
in the court's history, such dispositions exceeding those of any 
other seven-judge Supreme Court with no intermediate court of 
appeals. There is presently an average delay of approximately 18 
to 20 months from the date a case is filed in the Supreme Court 
until the date of final disposition. In other words, some liti-
gants now have to wait for a period of approximately two years 
before a final decision is reached in their case. 
Hans Zeise!, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz 1 Deljy !n !!:!.!, Court, p. xxii, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. \1959 • 
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The causes for this increase of cases today continue to 
be many and varied. Among the main causes are population in-
crease, industrial growth, and urbanization. Our society, in · 
general, has become more complex, more mobile and.is today sub-
jected to more governing bodies. The increase of governmental 
regulations, the growing number of automobiles, the abrasion of 
human relationships, particularly in dense urban living, and 
many other factors, all contribute to increased litigation and 
produce more opportunity for potential litigation. New commodi-
ties, new developments in trade, business, sciences, and hous-
ing, have paved the way for more potential suits. 
Another major cause of the increase in case filings is 
the increase in the financial ability of litigants to finance 
appeals. Today, more citizens have the money to turn to the Su-
preme Court in many more civil matters than ever before. In the 
area of criminal law, as well, many more cases of drug addiction, 
liquor, narcotics and gambling come before the courts. The in-
crease in the crime rate will necessarily result in an increase 
of criminal cases. In addition, civil rights litigation has 
opened a whole new horizon in civil jurisdiction. 
In the last 15 years the state has nearly doubled the num-
ber of trial court judges. The increase in district court judges, 
in addition to the increase in the jurisdiction of the district 
courts, has resulted in an increase in the number of dispositions 
at the trial court level. This increase, in turn, has resulted 
in an increase in the number of cases coming to the Supreme Court. 
In the meantime, however, the Supreme Court has had to do an ade-
quate job with substantially the same personnel and structure 
which existed in 1905. As is readily apparent from the figures, 
the court has simply not been able to keep up with the increasing 
number of cases filed, thus creating a backlog. 
There is no reason to believe that Colorado's current 
rate of population and economic growth will diminish appreciably 
in the near future, rather it appears that the converse is more 
likely. Consequently, a continued increase in new matters com-
ing before the Supreme Court can be anticipated. When the fil-
ing rate trend over the past several years is projected into the 
future, it is estimated that the number of cases filed annually 
will approach 700 by 1970 and will be approximatelr 940 by 1980. 
By 1970 the backlog of cases is estimated to be l, 68, and by 
1980 the backlog will approach 3,792 cases. Such a backlog will 
create an estimated delay at between 5 and 5.5 years in 1980. 
In other words, it would take more than five years from filing to 
termination for a case on the civil docket in 1980. It is evi-
dent that additional steps are necessary in order to cope with 
the backlog problem and to prevent further delay. 
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Case Filings and Dispositions 
The 1967 term of the Colorado Supreme Court was signifi-
cant in that it pointed up vividly the extraordinary burdens that 
have been placed upon the Colorado Supreme Court by its ever-ex-
panding case load. Although more cases were disposed of during 
the 1967 term (588) than during any other prior term, the intake 
of 639 cases filed was the highest in the court's history. The 
639 cases filed in 1967 was 83 (or 15 percent) more than the pre-
vious high of 556 in 1966. The figures demonstrate that there 
has been a steady increase in the filing rate over the last sev-
enteen years. 
The previous high for cases closed was 524 in 1961 and 
the five-year average, 1962 through 1966, was 419, demonstrating 
that cases closed in 1967 (588) far exceeded the number closed 
in any previous year. Of the 588 cases that were closed, 378 of 
them were by written opinion. The previous high for written 
opinions was 371 in 1960, and the five-year average, 1962 through 
1966, was 251. The number of cases closed has been less than the 
filing rate in each of the years from 1950 through 1967, with the 
exception of the years 1954, 1960 and 1961, when cases closed ex-
ceeded those cases filed. This situation has created a backlog 
of pending cases which has grown from 319 in 1962 to 861 in 1968. 
As of August 1, 1968, there was a backlog of 913 cases pending 
before the Colorado Supreme Court. 
Other Considerations 
In addition to the record number of appeals filed in 1967, 
the number of original proceedings has also increased. In 1955, 
only 12 original proceedings were filed in the Supreme Court. By 
1965, the number of original proceedings filed in the court had 
grown to 131 and in 1967 there were approximately 150 original 
proceedings, 20 of which were disciplinary proceedings. This 
factor is especially significant because study and action on these 
proceedings often takes as much or more time than the usual ap-
pellate cases. 
To be considered also are the other matters which take up 
a sizable portion of the court's time, because the growing volume 
of work in the court is not reflected entirely by case filings 
and dispositions and the number of written opinions. These other 
matters are requests for extensions of time, motions to dismiss, 
and similar paper work -- all of which have to be received, ex-
amined, stamped, listed and studied and then orders issued. 
In 1966, the Colorado Supreme Court received 1,668 re-
quests for extensions of time and 1,476 other motions of various 
kinds for a total of 3,144 items. As statistics were not kept on 
these matters prior to 1965, a comparison must necessarily be 
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limited; however, the increase of 1,198 or 53.7 percent over the 
1965 total of 2,046 illustrates the increased activity in this 
area. 
Delay 
The backlog of pending cases in the court has necessarily 
resulted in a delay in the time it takes a case to be finally 
disposed of by the court. The committee found that the median 
time lapse from the date a case becomes at issue until the date 
it is orally argued is ten months in civil cases, six months in 
criminal cases, and one month in workmen's compensation cases. 
The committee also determined that the average length of time 
from the date a case if filed until it becomes at issue is ap-
proximately six to eight months. In other words, six to eight 
months precede the date the case becomes at issue. 
It was noted that the court often grants extensions of 
time within which attorneys must file their briefs. All exten-
sions of time, of course, increase the length of time from fil-
ing to issue date. The committee also found that the average 
length of time from oral argument to final disposition is ap-
proximately two months. This means that there is an average 
lapse of approximately 18 to 20 months from the filing date to 
the date of final disposition. Thus some litigants now have to 
wait for a period of approximately two years before a final de-
cision is reached in their case. 
Written Opinions 
The figures show that the judges of the Colorado Supreme 
Court are being called upon to write more opinions than ever be-
fore. In 1967, there was a total of 378 written opinions, a 
figure which has never been exceeded. The previous high was 371 
and occurred during the 1960 term when approximately 70 opinions 
were written by outside judges. In 1967, only 20 opinions were 
written by outside judges. 
Each judge, during the 1967 term, wrote an average of 50 
opinions, not including whatever concurring or dissenting opin-
ions he may have filed. Of those 30 states which do not have an 
intermediate appellate court, only Kentucky, with the equivalent 
of 11 justices, exceeded Colorado in the number of written opin-
ions. 
It is difficult to assess the extraordinary increase of 
cases in terms of the burdens it places upon the individual 
judges of the Supreme Court. Necessarily, a great deal more time 
is consumed by oral arguments and by conference discussing each 
case. And since there is an increase in the total number of 
opinions turned out by the court, each judge must expend more 
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time considering opinions other than those he writes, if the 
opinion is to be a seven-man opinion. Thereby, the judges are 
deprived of time during which they could have been preparing 
opinions in cases assigned to them. 
To expect the present judges to write more opinions ap-
pears to be unreasonable for the quality of judicial opinions 
is more likely to be deficient when a judge is expected· to write 
more than the optimum number of opinions. The effect of poor 
quality opinions is to produce uncertainty in the law • . This un-
certainty usually has the effect of encouraging more appeals. 
It is believed by the committee that the judges of the 
Supreme Court should be afforded sufficient time to study thor-
oughly the cases presented to them so that, while maintaining 
high quality in their work, they can meet their dual responsi-
bility: dispensing justice to individual litigants, and molding 
the body of Colorado law. Because of the important matters com-
ing before the Supreme Court and the effect of the court's de-
cisions on Colorado law, there should be sufficient time for 
consideration of these matters and for each member to review 
carefully the opinions written by his colleagues. 
In this regard it is appropriate to ask how many cases a 
seven-man appellate court can be expected to dispose of annually 
by written opinions consistent with the time needed to give 
proper consideration to important matters and consistent with 
the development of good case law. Verious opinions have been 
expressed on this subject, but generally an average of 50 cases 
per judge is probably the maximum, and 35 to 40 cases is consid-
ered a more satisfactory total. This means that the court can 
be expected under the best of circumstances to dispose of a max-
imum of 350 cases in any one year by written opinion, and the 
total is more likely to fall between 225 and 275. In a survey 
of the 30 states without an intermediate appellate court it was 
shown that the median number of written opinions was 130, with 
an average of 26.2 per judge. 
Court Capability 
Judging from the experience each year from 1960 through 
1967, an annual average of 167 cases are closed without written 
opinion. Assuming that the court could produce from 225 to 350 
written opinions per year, it can be seen that the court may be 
capable of disposing of a total number of cases annually of 392 
to 517 cases. Thus the maximum capability of the Supreme Court 
is about 517 cases per year. As long as the filing rate contin-
ues to exceed this maximum, no reduction in the number of cases 
pending can be anticipated. In fact, the number of pending 
cases is expected to increase, as explained in the next para-
graph. 
Antioipated Cu;e Load 
Assuming that the court could dispose of 550 cases per 
year (a ve~y optimistic assumption), which means that the court 
would have to write approximately 325-335 opinions per year, and 
assuming that there is no reform of some type to ease the contin-
uing backlog, it is anticipated that by 1980 the backlog will be 
at almost 3,800 cases. This figure is based upon a projection 
of the annual filing rate using past population-case filing ra-
tios and population projections. 
It is anticipated that in 1970 there will be a filing rate 
of 679 and a cumulative backlog of 1,168; in 1975 there will be 
a filing rate of 809 and a cumulative backlog of 2,103; in 1980 
there will be a filing rate of 940 and a cumulative backlog of 
3,792. 
The Problem 
When the anticipated case load is compared with court cap-
ability, the staggering, cumulative backlog which will develop is 
obvious. Stated briefly, the seven-man Supreme Court responsible 
for all appellate review cannot hope to keep abreast of the ap-
peals being generated by a growing population and economy. The 
court, already with a delay of approximately two years, is losing 
ground rapidly and by 1980 it is conservatively anticipated that 
it will require more than six years for a case on the civil dock-
et to be finally decided. Without reform of some type to ease 
the increasing backlog and delay, the right of appellate review 
in civil cases may become virtuallr nonexistent in a decade or so. 
Therefore, it is evident that a so ution designed to alleviate 
the increasirtg case load of the_ Supreme Court should be imple-
mented, and that such a solution should be sufficiently flexible 
to serve both present and future needs. 
Alternative Solutions 
The problem of appellate court congestion and delay is not 
limited to the Colorado judiciary but has existed and exists 
presently in varying degrees in most of the judicial systems in 
the United States. The committee found that there are numerous 
ways to reduce appellate court congestion, many of which have 
been tried elsewhere in the United States, and some of which have 
been utilized in Colorado. 
The committee considered and examined these various al-
ternative solutions, both in light of the experience of other 
states with such solutions and in relation to the application of 
such solutions to Colorado. These alternative solutions include: 
(1) increase the number of Supreme Court judges from seven to 
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nine; (2) more extensive use of retired and outside judges; (3) 
some limitations on the right of appeal; (4) a Supreme Court 
Commissioner plan; (5) improvement in the internal efficiency 
of the Supreme Court; (6) creation of a separate Criminal Court 
of Appeals; and (7) the creation of an intermediate Court of 
Appeals. 
The idea of increasing the number of Supreme Court jus-
tices from seven to nine was rejected by the committee. It is 
believed by the committee that a nine-member court would be too 
unwieldy and would not increase the court's production apprecia-
bly, because each member would be required to review the opinions 
of eight other justices instead of six as at present. The extra 
time involved in such a review would probably offset or at least 
minimize the increase in the number of written opinions which 
might be expected from the addition of two justices. Further-
more, an increase in the size of the court would provoke more 
discussion, disagreement and diversity, thus causing a substan-
tial reduction in net gain of judicial time. 
If the court were increased to nine members and coupled 
with the practice of sitting in three-man departments, the likli-
hood of conflicting opinions from the different departments would 
exist. Because it was felt by the committee that increasing the 
court to nine members would provide an excessive and unwieldy 
number, in addition to the concern that dividing the court into 
three-man departments would produce conflicting opinions, this 
solution appeared to the committee to be impractical and probably 
ineffective as a long term solution. 
The committee also concluded that the use of outside 
judges or commissioners to assist the court was not a satisfac-
tory long term solution. The main criticism of this plan is that 
the use of commissioners or other outside help is not really that 
beneficial to the court. Persons who are called to assist the 
court are just not as precise and clear with r~spect to opinion 
writing as are the regular justices who are responsible for their 
opinions and who are familiar with opinion writing techniques. 
The most important challenge which may be leveled at this plan is 
that litigants are entitled to a decision in a case made by 
judges, not by assistants of the court. If the court is to be 
expanded by providing for additional personnel, there is no rea-
son why they should not be full fledged justices, rather than a 
judge in fact but not in name. The same arguments militating 
against the addition of more judges to the Supreme Court apply to 
the employment of commissioners or other outside assistance. The 
use of outside judges or commissioners to assist the court is 
simply not facing the need for a permanent solution. They are 
what their name implies, a temporary expedient. The committee 
concluded that the need is for a more permanent solution to the 
problem which is no longer viewed as a temporary condition. 
The idea of changing the system of appellate re~i~w or 
restricting the right of appeal to the Suprefne Court in at-der to 
curtail the number of cases filed was also considered by the com-
mit tee, However, the corrurd. ttee ruled out serious considetation 
of devices designed to reduce appellate congestion whith would 
preclude in all or some instances one's absolute right to an ap-
peal in every case. The committee believes that ~very litigant 
should be entitled to at least one appeal as a matter of right 
in every case. · 
Other solutions to the backlog problem were considered by 
the committee. These proposals were mainly concerned with i~-
proving the internal efficiency of the Colorado Supreme Court. 
The committee gave consideration to several of these proposals, 
including (1) the use of memorandum opinions, (2) doing away with 
oral argument in some instances, (3) not granting extensions of 
time, and (4) providing for more assistants. 
The committee generally concluded that the Supreme Court 
is already using the memorandum opinion or the per curiam system 
wherever it thinks it possible to do so. At the present rate of 
filing, even more extensive use of the memorandum opinion is not 
likely to be effective in reducing substantially the backlog of 
cases. Therefore, the committee determined that this method 
could not be an effective long term solution. With respect to 
the suggestion that the court abandon the practice of hearing 
oral argument, at least in some cases, the committee believes 
that the hearing of oral argument is very important and valuable 
to the individual justices and that the practice should not be 
abolished. 
In regard to the granting of extensions of time by the 
court, the committee recognized that there is no reason why the 
court should not grant extensions of time given the present de-
lay in the Supreme Court. Nothing would be gained by not grant-
ing extensions of time. It is believed that if other things 
could be done to expedite the process of cases through the court, 
any problems with respect to the granting of extensions will work 
itself out. With respect to the idea of using more assistants, 
it is believed by the committee that the employment of additional 
law clerks for justices of the Supreme Court would not bear ap-
preciably on the workload of the justices. Assistants could not 
help out in many of the time-consuming tasks such as reading 
briefs, hearing arguments, and attending conferences. 
The committee generally concluded that the present case 
load appears to be well beyond what even the most efficient court 
can reasonably be expected to handle with the present number of 
personnel. Thus, even if there should be an increase in the in-
ternal operating efficiency of the court, it would not furnish a 
complete solution to the extsting problem. 
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The committee also considered a proposal to create a sep-
arate Court of Criminal Appeals. A Court of Criminal Appeals 
could be established by any one of the following three alterna-
tive methods: 1) a Court of Criminal Appeals with final juris-
diction; 2) an intermediate appellate Court of Criminal Appeals 
with further appeal to the Supreme Court; and 3) an increase in 
the size of the Supreme Court and establishment of a Criminal 
Appeals Department. 
The major objection to the Court of Criminal Appeals ap-
proach is that the creation of such a court with final jurisdic-
tion would require a constitutional amendment and would be in-
flexible, when the need is for a flexible system. Another 
objection is that the decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals might conflict, and there would be no 
method of resolving differences of opinion. The committee gen-
erally concluded that two courts with final jurisdiction are un-
desirable. 
An intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals, while avoiding 
the objections raised with respect to the establishment of a 
court with final jurisdiction, is subject to criticism because 
it would probably lead to double appeals in many instances. Thus, 
while there might be a considerable saving of judicial time, 
there would, at the same time, be a considerable waste. 
Consideration of the two foregoing alternative approaches 
suggested another alternative approach wherein the Supreme Court 
could be increased in number, with provision that three members 
of the court, on assignment by the Chief Justice, sit as a De-
partment of Criminal Appeals. This approach would require a 
constitutional amendment if the Supreme Court were increased to 
more than nine members. Thus, if more than nine members were 
necessary in order to establish the suggested plan, there would 
be a delay of two or more years before the system could be oper-
ative. The implementation of the plan with just nine members 
(thus obviating the necessity for a constitutional amendment) 
would probably not be effective in reducing the case load. On 
the other hand, it is argued that a Supreme Court with more than 
nine members will be too many. Because the delay inherent in 
obtaining voter approval of a constitutional amendment would 
create further delay, because the problem of the backlog is an 
immediate problem, and because the Court of Criminal Appeals ap-
proach is inflexible, the committee concluded that such a pro-
posal was not desirable. 
All of the measures utilized by the various states have 
been tried in an attempt to bring balance and a semblance of or-
der to appellate procedure. Yet no one of these methods seems 
to be the panacea which will totally alleviate the court conges-
tion problem. While all of these ~ethods aid and assist !n some 
degree in overcoming court congestion and delay, the committee 
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generallr found that none are sufficient measures in thf~6elves 
to be so ely relied upon, with th~ exception of the proposal to 
create an intermediate Court of Appeals. 
The ~omm!ttee found that many of those states which have 
used some of the measures mentioned above still experienced ex-
cessive case loads. As a result many of them turned t~ the in-
termediate appellate court system as a more permanent and long 
lasting solution to their court problems. There are currently 
20 states which use one form or another of the intermediate ap-
pellate court system. The committee concluded that of all the 
alternative solutions considered, the creation of an intermedi-
ate Court of Appeals for Colorado offered the best solution to 
the Supreme Court backlog problem for now and for the foreseea-
ble future. 
Creation of Court of Appeals 
The Committee on Appellate Courts recommends the creation 
of an intermediate appellate court 1 to be known as the Court of Appeals. In recommending such an intermediate court, the com-
mittee was guided by several fundamental pri~ciples which were 
thought to be controlling in the creation of such a new court. 
These guiding principles are as follows: 
1. The committee, in its deliberations, abided by what 
seems to be an unvarying thesis: a litigant is entitled to at 
least one trial on the merits, and one appeal on the law, as a 
matter of right in every case. The principle that there should 
be no limitation on the right to at least one appeal in every 
case is the traditional principle of Anglo-Saxon and Colorado 
jurisprudence, and must be preserved. 
2 As a corollary to the above principle, the committee 
believes that double appeals, as of right, are to be avoided. 
There is no object in having an intermediate court of appeals if 
litigants have an ab~olute right of ~ppeal from the intermediate 
court to the Supreme Court. An absolute right of appeal, as a 
practical matter, would mean two appeals instead of one. Instead 
of dispatch such a system would breed further delay. American 
concepts of justice do not require more than one appeal. There-
fore, it is essential that an appeal from ·the intermediate court 
to the Supreme Court be allowed only at the discretion of the 
Supreme Court. 
3. The Supreme Court must remain the court entrusted with 
final decision in all cases. However, in order to ease the bur-
den on the Supreme Court, certain cases must be left to the de-
termination of the intermediate court, subject to further review 
at the discretion of the Supreme Court. A strictly limited cat-
egory of cases should have direct access to the Supreme Court. 
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Again, the committee believes that the Supreme Court should be 
afforded sufficient time to study thoroughly the cases presented 
to them so as to maintain high quality in their work and to de-
velop those matters of major significance to the state as a 
whole. · 
4. Subject to the principle that matters of major impor-
tance should always have access to the Supreme Court, a fair and 
equitable division of labor must be maintained between the Su-
preme Court and the intermediate court, to the end that all cases 
on appeal are settled without unnecessary delay. To achieve this 
goal, jurisdictional allocation of cases between the two appel-
late courts is to be provided for, subject to the authority of 
the Supreme Court to adjust case loads equitably by exercising 
its discretion. 
5. Any intermediate appellate court system should provide 
a considerable degree of flexibility so that the legislature can 
expand or reduce the court, and change the jurisdiction of the 
court as future experience deems necessary and desirable. This 
is necessary in order to readily resolve any problems that may 
arise in the future. 
6. The intermediate appellate court should be operational 
as soon as practicable, the Supreme Court's need for relief being 
urgent. 
A summary of the salient features of the committee's pro-
posal and recommendation follows: 
1. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals would be: 
(a) civil appeals from judgments of the district courts, superior 
courts, and probate court of the city and county of Denver, and 
the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, except in 
specified cases; and (b) to review awards or actions of the In-
dustrial Commission. All criminal cases tried initially in the 
district courts, writs of habeas corpus, cases in which the con-
stitutionality of a statute, municipal charter provision or an 
ordinance is in question, cases concerned with decisions or ac-
tioni ot th~ Public Utilities Commission, water- cases involving 
priorities or adjudications, and all original proceedings. All 
other cases not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
will continue to be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Ap-
peals. 
2. A petition for a writ of certiorari could be made to 
the Supreme Court in all cases decided on appeal by the Court of 
Appeals. 
3. There would be six judges of the Court of Appeals, 
such judges to have the same qualifications as Justices of the 
Supreme Court, to be appointed for a term of eight years, and to 
receive Jn annual salary equal to a sum halfwa.y between the sal-
aries of the district court judges and the Supreme Court justices. 
4. The Court of Appeals would sit in two divisions of 
three judges ,ach, both divisions to be located in the city and 
county of Denver; however, any division could have authority to 
sit in any county seat for the purpose of hearing oral argument 
in cases before the division. 
5. The Supreme Court would be empowered, prior to final 
determination of any such case by the Court of Appeals, to order 
the case certified for final determination by the Supreme Court. 
( 
6. Opinions would be written by the judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Supreme Court would by rule select opinions to 
be published, and such selected opinions would be published in 
Colorado Reports. 
Organization of the Court of Appeals 
Six judges. A few of the 20 states which have an inter-
mediate court of appeals have only three or six judges; several 
of the most populous states have two dozen or more; the most 
common number is nine. Fourteen of the 20 states have more than 
six judges. Choosing the proper number of Court of Appeals 
judges was considered by the committee to be an important mat-
ter, because the committee wished to avoid providing for more 
judges than was absolutely necessary and at the same time wished 
to provide the number of judges necessary to do an adequate job. 
This matter had to be considered in relation to the prob-
lem of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals -- the answer to 
each problem necessarily influencing the other. Any number less 
than six -- two divisions of three judges each -- was considered 
to be entirely insufficient if adequate relief for the Supreme 
Court was to be realized. Consideration was given to more than 
six judges, but the committee determined that the most prudent 
course would be to hold the membership at six until experience 
clearly demonstrates that a larger number is needed. 
The committee thus recommends that the Court of Appeals 
have six judges, such judges to have the same qualifications as 
the Supreme Court justices. It is further recommended that the 
judges be appointed pursuant to section 20 of article VI of the 
Colorado Constitution for a term of eight years. 
Salary of judges. In the 20 states which have an inter-
mediate appellate court the salaries in 1968 ranged from a high 
of $40,000 in New York to a low of $16,500 in Oklahoma, with 
$25,000 approximately the median state salary. !n the 20 states, 
the intermediate court judges usually receive from $1,000 to 
$3,000 less in salary than do justices of the highest court. 
xxvi 
The committee determined that the simplest and most equi-
table basis upon which to set the salaries of the judges of the 
Court of Appeals is to set them in relation to the salaries of 
the judges of the Supreme Court and district courts. Therefore, 
the committee recommends that the judges of the Court of Appeals 
be paid an amount per annum equal to the sum which is halfway be-
tween the salaries of the Supreme Court justices and the district 
court judges. In addition, the committee recommends that the 
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals be paid an additional amount 
of $500. Based on present judicial salaries, the judges of the 
Court of Appeals would receive $20,000 annually pursuant to the 
committee recommendation. The Chief Judge of the Court of Ap-
peals would receive $20,500. 
The present salary of the Chief Justice of the Colorado 
Supreme Court is $22,500, and the associate justices now receive 
$22,000 annually. The judges of the district courts presently 
receive an annual salary of $18,000. In 1968, the national av-
erage salary for judges of the highest state courts and general 
trial courts was $25,446 and $21,560 respectively. The national 
median salary in 1968 for judges of the highest state courts and 
general trial courts was $24,500 and $21,000 respectively. 
Court to sit in two divisions. The intermediate appellate 
courts of other states almost without exception sit in divisions 
(sometimes also called panels or parts) of three. In some states 
the membership of a division is fixed and unchanging; in other 
states the division membership is changed frequently, and each 
division is assigned business as it arises. In some states the 
divisions have state-wide jurisdiction and in other states the 
divisions sit over particular geographical areas of the state. 
For Colorado, the committee recommends that appellate 
judges sit in the almost universally used grouping -- in divi-
sions of three. With six judges, this means that there will be 
two divisions. The committee further recommends that the compo-
sition of the divisions be changed frequently so that each ap-
pellate judge sits, as nearly as may be, an equal number of times 
with every other appellate judge. This system of rotating divi-
sion membership tends to prevent the growth of diverging bodies 
of case law among various divisions of fixed membership. 
The committee favors assignment of appellate business to 
the various divisions without regard to its geographic origin 
within the state. No advantage is apparent in dividing the state 
into a number of geographic divisions, over each of which a divi-
sion of the Court of Appeals would have exclusive control in ap-
pellate matters. 
This does not mean that a division or divisions could not 
sit in various localities throughout the state. On the contrary, 
when facilities are available and the convenience of the public 
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and the litigants warrants it, the committee sees no reasons why 
divisions could not be scheduled to sit at a location or loca-
tions anywhere in the state. Initially, however, all divisions 
of the court should sit in Denver, and divisions should be sched-
uled to sit in other locations only after the desirability of 
such an arrangement, in terms of convenience and economy, has 
been clearly demonstrated. 
Situs. As already indicated, the committee recommends 
that the two divisions of the Court of Appeals sit in Denver. 
The preeminent factor in determining the place where the Court of 
Appeals will sit is the availability of a complete law library. 
Because the Supreme Court Law Library is located in Denver, and 
because of the expense of establishing another law library else-
where in the state, the committee concluded that the court should 
be located in Denver so as to have easy access to the Supreme 
Court Law Library. 
Chief judge. The committee recommends that the Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court designate one of the Court of Appeals 
judges to serve as the Chief Judge, to serve at his pleasure. 
The Chief Judge in turn should determine the composition of the 
various divisions of the Court of Appeals, have authority to 
transfer cases from one division to another to maintain equal 
case loads or for other appropriate reasons, and to exercise such 
•other admini~trative powers as may be delegated to him by the 
Chief Justice. 
Clerk and staff. The committee recommends that the Court 
of Appeals have its own clerk, deputy clerks, and such other as-
sistants as may be necessary, to be appointed by the Court of Ap-
peals subject to the rules and regulations of the Supreme Court. 
In addition, each judge of the Court of Appeals should have au-
thority to appoint a law clerk and a secretary or stenographer to 
serve at his pleasure. All employees appointed by the court or 
by the judges would be paid such compensation as prescribed by 
the rules and regulations of the Supreme Court. 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
One of the most fundamental questions associated with 
creating an intermediate Court of Appeals is that of jurisdic-
tion. A soundly conceived jurisdictional arrangement is the key 
to a successful appellate court system. This became clear to 
the committee as it studied the great variety of appellate jur-
isdiction arrangements in other states, and became aware of the 
extremely wide range of similar arrangements which could be 
utilized in Colorado. 
Review by Supreme Court. It must be understood that, in 
speaking of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, we are 
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necessarily also dealing with the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court. Article VI, Section 2 (2) of the Colorado Constitution 
provides that "Appellate review by the supreme court of every 
final judgment of the district courts, the probate court of the 
city and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city 
and county of Denver shall be allowed, ••• " It is generally 
the opinion that this section can be interpreted in such a way 
that Supreme Co~rt review to determine whether a case should be 
heard by the court on a writ of certiorari would be sufficient 
to satisfy the appellate review provision. Assuming this to be 
the case, it is possible to establish an intermediate Court of 
Appeals with specific statutory jurisdiction. Cases falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals could be taken 
up to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Cases falling 
outside of the statutory jurisdiction given the Court of Appeals 
would go from the trial court to the Supreme Court on writ of 
error. 
Thus, the only constitutional limitations on the estab-
lishment of a Court of Appeals is that provision has to be made 
for review of the court's decisions by th~ Supreme Court. The 
committee recommends that the Supreme Court be given authority 
to review by writ of certiorari the decisions of the Court of Ap-
peals. It is believed that this procedure will satisfy the re-
quirements of the Constitution with respect to appellate review 
because it, in effect, allows the Supreme Court to decide finally 
essentially all cases litigated in the state. 
Agreement on this aspect of the problem allowed the com-
mittee to approach its task essentially unfettered by any consti-
tutional impediment to devising the best possible jurisdictional 
division between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
committee thus focused its attention on the problem of identify-
ing the principles which should dictate the allocation of juris-
diction between the two courts, and to defining the proper 
functions of each of these courts in a proper system of appeals. 
Division of Functions between Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals. The committee believes that the functions of appellate 
courts are two-fold: First, they correct error committed at the 
trial level which is prejudicial to the litigant, i.e., they at-
tempt to insure justice in the individual case. Second, they 
develop the jurisprudence of the state through their reported de-
cisions, i.e., they serve the precedential function of the common 
law system by declaring, expanding, and clarifying the case law 
of the state. 
These two functions of course are frequently carried on 
simultaneously. In many cases the general law is clarified or 
expanded in the very process of correcting trial court error in 
the individual case. However, there are many cases the determi-
nation of which at the appellate level cannot be said to have 
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any further effect than to correct error by pointing out failure 
of the trial court to make correct application of settled prin-
ciples of law which are neither clarified, expanded, nor changed 
in the process. It is of course no less important to the liti-
gant in the latter case than in the former that error be cor-
rected. However, it is true that in the process the added di-
mension of a general development of the law of the state is not 
present. Obviously, those cases having this added dimension of 
general jurisprudential significance should be assigned to our 
highest court. As a corollary, those cases which, in great num-
bers, tend not to have this added dimension seem the natural ba-
sic material for the intermediate court. 
In view of the fundamental principle that one appeal ra-
ther than two is the ideal, the committee agreed that these two 
different kinds of cases should be identified for what they are, 
and routed as speedily as possible to the appropriate court for 
appellate review. Double appeals ought to be avoided as much as 
possible. If the case has the added dimension of significance 
above described, waste of time and added expense results from 
having such a case heard in the first instance by the intermedi-
ate court. And if the case does not have this added measure of 
general significance, then only waste of time and added expense 
will result from allowing such a case to be subject to a second 
review by the highest court. This last statement of course as-
sumes an intermediate court of first-rate competence which has 
the full respect of bench, bar and public. The committee has 
assumed this in all its deliberations and in its recommendation. 
It is believed that such a basic allocation of primary 
functions, and hence of case load, would considerably reduce the 
burden of the Supreme Court, which now of necessity must handle 
both kinds of cases. This relief of case load alone would serve 
the primary legislative purpose in authorizing the creation of 
the Court of Appeals. But there is more than simply relief of 
the case burden in this idea. There is also allocation to the 
Supreme Court, as its primary case load, of precisely that type 
of case the very nature of which requires the greatest opportun-
ity for deep, reflective and relatively unhurried consideration 
by our highest court. 
Statutory division of jurisdiction. The next problem 
faced by the committee was to devise a system whereby in prac-
tice cases could be readily differentiated and routed to their 
appropriate courts. One way to attempt this is to lay down rigid 
statutory divisions of jurisdiction between the two courts based 
upon the subject matter content of cases. This assumes that the 
subject matter content of a case, "contract", "personal injury", 
"revenue", etc., is itself a likely indicator of whether the case 
has or has not this added dimension of general signi.ficance. 
Many states have used this means and the committee studied the 
statutes of these states and their experience. The clear impres-
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sion gained was that such an approach is largely an ineffectual 
one. 
In the first place. the subject matter content of a case 
is by no means a reliable guide to whether it has this added di-
mension of significance. The "landmark" case is just as likely 
to arise out of simple subject matter involving a small amount 
of money as it is to arise out of a complicated situation in-
volving a fortune. Secondly, it was noted that in some states 
problems of jurisdictional interpretation have led to confusion 
and delay. The variety of subject matter categories utilized by 
different states and the lack of agreement among them as to a 
substantial common core of categories is perhaps the best indi-
cation that attempts to capture the general jurisprudential sig-
nificance of a case by means of its subject matter content are 
essentially off the mark. 
The committee concluded that this quality about a case 
can only be detected with predictable reliability after the case 
has taken shape in litigation -- and that consequently the detec-
tion must be left fundamentally to the highest court itself on a 
case-by-case basis. This approach is the central feature of the 
committee's jurisdictional proposal for the utilization of the 
two courts which is embodied in the draft bill. That proposal 
will now be summarized. 
Committee proposal. With the exception of criminal cases 
tried initially in district courts. and other exceptions (later 
to be discussed), every case appealed from judgments of the dis-
trict courts, superior courts. and probate court of the city and 
county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and county 
of Denver, are to be initially appealed directly to the Court of 
Appeals. So far as the Court of Appeals jurisdiction -- its 
power to decide these cases -- is concerned, it is fully empow-
ered by the proposed bill to decide all cases so appealed. How-
ever, the Supreme Court is empowered, on its own motion prior to 
determination of any case by the Court of Appeals, to call the 
case up (certify it for final determination by the Supreme Court. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals, prior to determination, may 
certify any case before it to the Supreme Court for its review 
and final determination. The Supreme Court is to consider such 
certification in a summary manner and may accept the case for 
final determi"nation or-may remand the case for determination by 
the Court of Appeals. 
The proposed statute lays down specific criteria for the 
guidance of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in deter-
mining whether to certify the case or whether to order the cer-
tification of the case before determination by the Court of 
Appeals. All but one of these criteria are designed to express 
the notion of general jurisprudential significance which, as in-
dicated. provides the basis for the desired fundamental division 
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of labor between the two courts. Thus, the Court of Appeals is 
directed that it should ordinarily certify to the Supreme Court, 
for hearing and final determination, before determination by the 
Court of Appeals, all cases which appear to it to involve: (1) 
subject matter of significant public interest; or (2) legal prin-
ciples of major significance to the state. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals is directed that it 
should certify cases to the Supreme Court when the case load of 
the Court of Appeals is such that the expeditious administration 
of justice requires certification. It should be noted at this 
point that a certification from the Court of Appeals to the Su-
preme Court under these provisions will not necessitate any 
further perfecting of his appeal by a litigant. His appeal is 
considered to have been perfected when either court has juris-
diction to decide it. When the case is certified to the Supreme 
Court prior to determination by the Court of Appeals, counsel for 
the parties simply present themselves for oral argument at the 
appointed place and time before the Supreme Court rather than the 
Court of Appeals. 
The above arrangement for appeals is the basic one in the 
committee's proposal. It is believed that the discretionary . and 
flexible aspects of the arrangement are the best means to accom-
plish the desired ends. However, believing that certain cate-
gories of cases require special attention, a limited number of 
variations to the basic proposal is recommended wherein cases 
are appealed directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court 
of Appeals. 
Criminal cases. The most important variation concerns 
criminal cases. Under the proposal, all criminal cases tried 
initially in district courts would be appealable as of right di-
rectly to the Supreme Court. To provide for direct, by-pass ap-
peal in criminal cases thus departs from the basic principle of 
the over-all proposal because it is obvious that not all such 
cases would qualify for review by the Supreme Court under the 
principle of general jurisprudential significance. However, the 
reason for this exception seems obvious. 
It is thought that having criminal cases go to the Court 
of Appeals would not result in a decision of sufficient finality 
to permit review by the federal courts under recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions. It is believed that any decision of the Court 
of Appeals, were it to have jurisdiction of criminal cases, would 
have to be reviewed by the Supreme Court before federal jurisdic-
tion could be obtained for further review. In addition, many of 
the current criminal cases involve many constitutional issues. 
In this respect, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly review the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals by certiorari. Because of this 
likelihood of double appeals if the intermediate court were to 
have jurisdiction of criminal cases, it was recommended that the 
Supreme Court have jurisdiction over all criminal cases. This 
will avoid double appeals. 
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Other cases appealed directly to Supreme Court. The sec-
ond variation from the basic arrangement involves provisions for 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court in a limited category of 
cases. These are cases: (1) in which the constitutionality of 
a statute, municipal charter, or an ordinance is -in question; 
(2) concerned with decisions or actions of the Colorado Public 
Utilities Commission; (3) involving water priorities and adjud-
ications; and (4) all cases appealed from the county courts to 
the district courts or superior courts. 
All but the last of these classes of cases is thought so 
typically demanding of final adjudication by the Supreme Court 
that the discretionary pattern of routing is varied in favor of 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The reasons are different 
for each. Cases involving a constitutional question with respect 
to a statute, charter, or ordinance will invariably by of major 
public significance which is the key to discretionary review. 
For this reason they would ordinarily be certified to the Supreme 
Court prior to review in the Court of Appeals. Rather than have 
these few cases go to the Court of Appeals initially and then 
certified to the Supreme Court, it was thought desirable to allow 
appeal directly to the Supreme Court. 
The special quality about the Public Utilities Commission 
cases, aside from the almost invariable general state-wide sig-
nificance they will have, is the fact that the litigants in such 
cases usually exhaust all possible remedies. Thus it can be an-
ticipated that the litigants would apply to the Supreme Court for 
a writ of certiorari in most cases, were the Court of Appeals to 
have initial jurisdiction of such cases. To avoid this likeli-
hood of double appeals, it was thought desirable to allow appeal 
directly to the Supreme Court. Similar reasoning was likewise 
applied to cases involving water priorities and adjudications. 
County court appeals. County court cases, both civil and 
criminal, are presently appealed to the district courts or supe-
rior courts for review, with further review possible upon writ 
of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The committee considered a 
suggestion that the present county court appellate procedure be 
changed so that these appeals initially go to the Court of Ap-
peals, thus by-passinq the district courts. This proposal would 
have added approximately 220 cases to the docket of the Court of 
Appeals. This proposal was rejected however because it would 
have required nine judges on the Court .of Appeals to handle the 
increased case load. In addition, county court appeals have not 
yet become a burden on district courts. By handling these ap-
peals in the same way as now provided, litigants would not be 
discouraged from taking appeals in minor cases because of a pos-
sible increase in the cost of perfecting the appeal. Also, the 
pn5sibility of the Court of Appeal's docket becoming clogged with 
r ·· l.:1tively minor matters would be avoided. Thus, the committee 
. ·. •1::.luded that these appeals should continue to go to the dis-
trict courts, rather than to the Court of Appeals. Appeals from 
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the district court judgments in these cases would continue to be 
to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. 
Review of workmen's com1ensation, unemployment compensa-tion cases. At present, judic al review of the decisions of the 
Industrial Commission with respect to workmen's compensation and 
unemployment compensation is initially undertaken by the district 
courts. The committee concluded that judicial review of these 
decisions should be undertaken by the Court of Appeals because of 
the importance of the subject matter and the need for early de-
cision. By taking the workmen's and unemployment compensation 
cases directly to the Court of Appeals, two things would be ac-
complished. First, a certain degree of finality would be accom-
plished and, second, the district courts would be relieved of the 
responsibility for reviewing these decisions. In addition, the 
number of steps necessary to obtain final judgment in such a case 
would be cut down in most instances. The committee believes this 
is desirable since the policy of the law in this area should be 
to afford the claimant relief as soon as possible. 
All other agency or administrative review cases would con-
tinue to be taken to the district courts, with appeal lying to 
the Court of Appeals, except in P.U.C. cases which are to be 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Other administrative re-
view cases involve such things as review of liquor license issu-
ance or denial, zoning orders, etc. In these cases, the district 
courts are usually familiar with the area and environment involved. 
In addition, local philosophy is often involved in these cases 
with which a district court would be more familiar than an inter-
mediate court. On the other hand, workmen's compensation and un-
employment compensation cases usually involve general propositions 
of law without the presence of any local factors. These cases can 
easily be handled by the intermediate courts. 
Administrative review cases appealed from the decisions or 
orders of state licensing boards or departments will continue to 
be within the jursidiction of the district courts. The committee 
found that there are very few of these cases, most of which are 
taken to the Denver District Court, and considered it best to 
leave these cases within the jurisdiction of the district courts, 
with the exception of P.U.C. cases. 
Transfer of cases. One final variation from the basic 
arrangement of the committe~ proposal is important. It proceeds 
upon a different principle than that of insuring a basically 
functional division of the total appellate case load between the 
two appellate courts. It is obvious that such a functional di-
vision of the case load will decrease the present case load of 
the Supreme Court. This is desirable, and is one of the most 
important goals of the proposal. However, there is the possi-
bility that from time to time under the basic arrangement for 




peals may become burdensome at a time when that of the Supreme 
Court is relatively light. In such a situation, there should be 
an opportunity for the Supreme Court, acting as a load balancer, 
to relieve the Court of Appeals by taking a certain number of 
cases in process of appeal without regard to their general jur-
isprudential significance. 
Provision for such a procedure is made in the committee's 
proposal by directing that the Court of Appeals certify cases to 
the Supreme Court when the case load of the Court of Appeals is 
such that the expeditious administration of justice requires 
certification. Likewise, the Supreme Court may order the Court 
of Appeals to certify any case before it to the Supreme Court for 
final determination. 
The committee's proposal necessarily imposes a heavy duty 
and responsibility on the Supreme Court. It must be alert and 
sensitive in fulfilling its duty of selecting for decision the 
''significant" type cases. It must also willingly assume the 
role, when circumstances dictate, as "load balancer." The tra-
dition of our Supreme Court for hard work and a high sense of 
public duty is to the committee an ample guarantee of its effec-
tive administration of the proposed system of appeals. 
Summary. To summarize the committee proposal: (1) all 
civil cases appealed from the district courts, and the probate 
court and the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, 
are initially appealed directly to the Court of Appeals; (2) all 
criminal cases tried initially in the district courts; all writs 
of habeas corpus; cases in which the constitutionality of a stat-
ute, municipal charter provision, or an ordinance is in question; 
cases concerned with decisions or actions of the Public Utilities 
Commission; cases involving water priorities and adjudications; 
and all cases appealed from the county courts to the district 
courts or superior courts, are appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court; (3) while any case is pending on appeal to the Court of 
Appeals, it may be certified to the Supreme Court when (a) the 
subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, (b) 
the case involves legal principles of major significance, or (c) 
the case load of the Court of Appeals is such that the expedi-
tious administration of justice requires certification; (4) the 
Supreme Court may order the Court of Appeals to certify any case 
before the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for final con-
sideration; (5) after any case is determined in the Court of Ap-
peals, and within thirty days after a rehearing has been refused, 
any party in interest who is aggrieved by the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals may appeal by application to the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari; {6) when a case is before the Court of 
Appeals and a party in interest alleges or the court concludes 
that it is properly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
the Court of Appeals can refer the case to the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Court's determination of the question of jurisdiction 






Court of Appeals which is filed erroneously in the Supreme Court 
shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme 
Court; (8) no case filed either in the Supreme Court or the Court 
of Appeals shall be dismissed for having been filed in the wrong 
court, but shall be transferred and considered properly filed in 
the court which the Supreme Court determines has jurisdiction. 
Finally, several features of appellate review are retained 
in the proposal and should be emphasized. First, there is an ab-
solute right of appeal in every case beyond the trial court level 
to one of the appellate courts. Second, double appeals are 
avoided except when the Supreme Court grants a petition for a 
writ of certiorari. Third, the Supreme Court has the power fin-
ally to determine any case tried in any court inferior to it, and 
the means of available to any litigant to seek invocation of that 
power in any case. 
Estimated Case Load 
As of January 1, 1970, it is estimated that the annual 
filing rate in the Colorado Supreme Court will be approximately 
680 cases. The estimated backlog as of that date will be 950 
cases, of which approximately 50 percent, -or 475, will be at is-
sue. Approximately 85 percent, or 400, of the cases at issue 
will be civil cases. 
Assuming that: 1) all civil, mental health, juvenile, 
and probate cases will be taken to the Court of Appeals; and 2) 
initial judicial review of workmen's compensation and unemploy-
ment compensation cases will be in the Court of Appeals, the to-
tal estimated appellate cases which will be filed in 1970 is 780, 
and of these 780 cases, approximately 350 will be in the Supreme 
Court under the committee proposal: 
All criminal and habeas corpus 
arising out of criminal ac-
tions 
Original proceedings 
All cases attacking the consti-
tutionality of a statute or 
ordinance; water cases concern-
ing priorities or adjudications; 
P.U.C. cases (from district 
court); cases certified from 








As 350 of these will be in the Supreme Court, it would 
leave a remainder of approximately 430 cases for the two Courts· 
of Appeals divisions. It should be recognized, however, that · 
the anticipated increase in the annual filing rate will probably 
require one and maybe two additional divisions during the next 
decade to keep up with the workload. 
Space and Facility Needs 
The Committee on Appellate Courts recognizes that adequate 
facilities and sufficient space is necessary to the proper con-
duct of judicial business. The lack of necessary space and fa-
cilities has been a problem for many years and is of considerable 
concern to the committee, as it has been to the Colorado Supreme 
Court and past legislative committees. The lack of adequate 
space for the Supreme Cou1t and all of its adjuncts was recognized 
in 1967 by the Legislative Council Committee on Legislative Pro-
cedures, as follows: 
The Judicial Administrator's Office is 
currently overcrowded, and, should a merit 
system for the courts be established, addi-
tional staff members will b~ needed. Accom-
~~dations for additional staff members will 
also have to be found should the General 
Assembly decide that the state will finance 
the court system of the state. To a lesser 
degree, the Legislative Auditor's Office, 
the Court Reporter, and the Clerk of the 
Court's Office are also in need of more 
space.Y 
The Legislative Council Committee on Legislative Proce-
dures in 1967 thus proposed that the Legislative Reference Office 
be moved to the basement, along with the Legislative Council. 
Under this proposal the Court Administrator will move into the 
space vacated by the Legislative Reference Office. The Court Re-
porter will move from the second floor to the previous quarters 
of the Court Administrator, freeing some additional space on the 
second floor for the Clerk of the Supreme Court. As a result of 
the 1967 proposal some of the Supreme Court's present space needs 
will be met. 
y Legislative Procedures in Colorado, Part II, Colorado Legis-
lative Council Publication No. 128, December 1967, p. 19. 
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Existing space problems. Even though this proposal will 
be of temporary assistance and will alleviate the most immediate 
and pressing space needs of the Supreme Court agencies, the com-
mittee recognizes that there are other existing space problems 
which will not be solved by the 1967 proposal. Some of these 
problems were pointed out by the Chief Justice in his January, 
1968, annual report: 
Currently there is no office space 
available for the retired and active dis-
trict judges called in to assist the Court 
in coping with the current backlog. Fur-
ther, there is no separate office avail-
able for the Chief Justice's law clerk, 
and the Supreme Court conference room is 
less than adequate in size •• • ,;v 
In addition to these existing space problems, the committee rec-
ognizes that there are future space needs which will eventually 
have to be met. These future needs are discussed below. 
Impact of state financial responsibility. The committee 
found that if the General Assembly decides in969 to assume full 
financial responsibility for the judicial system, the Court Ad-
ministrator's Office will require approximately six additional 
staff members. While the new quarters for this office will be 
much more adequate than the present ones for a staff of seven, 
there appears to be no way to accommodate a staff of 13. In ad-
dition to the necessary increase in the Court Administrator's 
staff, if the proposal is adopted, the proposal also calls for 
the creation of a state-wide public defender system. It is es-
timated that 10-12 people will be needed to operate the central 
state office in charge of this function. Thus additional space 
will have to be found for this staff. 
Intermediate court of appeals. All of the above space 
need problems exist aside from those which would result from the 
creation of an intermediate Court of Appeals, as recommended by 
the committee. The additional space requirements which would be 
imposed by the recommended Court of Appeals include: 
1) office space generally equivalent to that now provided 
for Supreme Court Justices to house six judges, six law clerks, 
and six secretaries; 
The State of the Courts, Annual Report of the Chief Justice, 
O.Otto Moore-;--January, 1968, p. 33. 
xxxviii 
and 
2) space to house the Court of Appeals clerk's office; 
3) court room, robing room, conference room, and law 11-
brary. 
The creation of a Court of Appeals will thus require con-
siderable space for the judges of such court, and for secretarial 
and clerical personnel. It appears impossible that these space 
needs can be met through provision of space in the Capitol Build-
ing. Thus the judges, their staff, the clerk's office, etc., 
would have to be located elsewhere. In addition, it would be 
very difficult, if not impossible, for the Court of Appeals to 
use the present Supreme Court chambers for oral argument. Even 
if schedule problems could be worked out so that both the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals could temporarily use the Supreme 
Court chambers, it would be undesirable to separate the judges 
and their law clerks from the Supreme Court Law Library and from 
easy access to chambers. 
Recommendation 
The committee recognizes that the creation of an interme-
diate Court of Appeals will only accentuate, although to a con-
siderable degree, the present space problems of the Supreme Court 
and its related offices and agencies. In addition to the under-
standably greater need for space by the General Assembly and its 
related agencies, so that it can conduct its business more ex-
peditiously, there will be a need for more judicial staff space 
if the General Assembly assumes full financial responsibility for 
the judicial system. The committee finds that these other pres-
ent and future needs cannot be met in the State Capitol Building. 
Therefore, the committee suggests that high priority considera-
tion be given by the Legislative Council Committee on Legislative 
Procedures and by the General Assembly to a separate court build-
ing in the development of long-range capital construction plans. 
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A BILL FOR AN ACT 
CRF.ATING A COURT OF APPF.ALS, AND PROVIDING FOR THE JURISDICTION 
THEREOF AND PROCEDURES IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. 
Beg enacted !?,I.~ General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
SECTION 1. Chapter 37, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as 
amended, is amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW ARTICLE 21, to read: 
ARTICLE 21 
COURT OF APPEALS 
37-21-1. Establishment. There is hereby created the court 
of appeals, pursuant to section 1 of article VI of the state con-
stitution. The court of appeals shall be a court of record. 
37-21-2. Jurisdiction. (1) (a) Any provision of law to 
the contrary notwithstanding, the court of appeals shall have 
initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of the 
district courts, superior courts, ·the probate court of the city 
and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and 
county of Denver, except in: 
(b) Criminal cases tried initially in district court; 
(c) Cases in which the constitutionality of a statute, a 
municipal charter provision, or an ordinance is in question; 
{d) Cases concerned with decisions or actions of the public 
utilities commission; 
(e) Water cases involving priorities or adjudications; 
(f) Writs of habeas corpus; 
(g) Cases appealed from the county court to the district 
court or superior court, as provided in section 37-15-10, C.R.S. 1963j 
(h) Summary proceedings initiated under chapter 49, 
C.R.S. 1963, as amended. 
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(2) The court of appeals shall have initial jurisdiction 
to review awards or actions of the industrial commission, as pro-
vided in article 14 of chapter 81 and article 5 of chapter 82, 
C.R.S. 1963. 
(3) The court of appeals shall have authority to issue any 
writs, directives, orders, and mandates necessary to the deter-
mination of cases within its jurisdiction. 
37-21-3. Number of judges - qualifications. (1) The number 
of judges of the court of appeals shall be six. 
(2) Judges of the court of appeals shall have the same 
qualifications as justices of the Colorado supreme court. 
37-21-4. Term of office - selection and compensation. (1) 
The term of office for a judge of the court of appeals shall be 
eight years. 
(2) Judicial appointments to the court of appeals shall be 
made pursuant to Section 20 of article VI of the state constitution. 
(3) Judges of the court of appeals shall receive an annual 
salary in an amount equal to the annual salary of a district judge 
plus one-half the difference between the annual salary of a dis-
trict judge and the annual salary of a supreme court justice. 
37-21-5. Chief judge. The chief justice of the supreme 
court shall appoint a judge of the court of appeals to serve as 
chief judge at the pleasure of the chief justice. The chief judge 
shall exercise such administrative powers as may be delegated to 
him by the chief justice. 
37-21-6. Divisions. (1) The court of appeals shall sit in 
divisions of three judges each to hear and determine all matters 
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before the court. 
(2) The chief judge, with the approval of the chief justice, 
shall as~ign judges to each division. Such assignments shall be 
changed from time to time as determined by the chief judge, with 
the approval of the chief justice. 
(3) Cases shall be assigned to the divisions of the court 
of appeals in rotation according to the order in which they are 
filed with the clerk of the court of appeals or transferred by 
the supreme court, except that the chief judge shall have the 
authority to transfer cases from one division to another to main-
tain approximately equal caseloads or for any other appropriate 
reason. 
37-21-7. Place of court. The court of appeals shall be 
located in the city and county of Denver, but any division of the 
court of appeals may sit in any county seat for the purpose of 
hearing oral argument in cases before the division. 
\ 
37-21-8. Supreme court review. (1) Before application may 
be made for writ of certiorari, as provided in this section, 
application shall be made to the court of appeals for a rehearing 
as provided by supreme court rule. 
(2) Within thirty days after a rehearing has been refused 
by the court of appeals, any party in interest who is aggrieved 
by the judgment of the court of appeals may appeal by application 
to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari. 
(3) Procedures on writs of certiorari shall be as prescribed 
by rule of the supreme court. 
37-21-9. Certification of cases to the supreme court. 
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(1) (a) The court of appeals, prior to final determination, may 
certify any case before it to the supreme court for its review 
and final determination, if the court of appeals finds: 
(b) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public 
interest; 
(c) The case involves legal principles of major significance; 
or 
(d) The caseload of the court of appeals is such that the 
expeditious administration of justice requires certification. 
(2) The supreme court shall consider such certification and 
may accept the case for final determination or remand it for 
determination by the court of appeals. 
(3) The supreme court may order the court of appeals to 
certify any case before the court of appeals to the supreme court 
for final determination. 
37-21-10. Determination of jurisdiction - transfer of cases. 
(1) When a party in interest alleges, or the court is of the 
opinion, that a case before the court of appeals is not properly 
within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the court of 
appeals shall refer the case to the supreme court. The supreme 
court shall decide the question of jurisdiction in a swmnary man-
ner, and its determination shall be conclusive. 
(2) (a) Any case within the jurisdiction of the court of 
appeals which is filed erroneously in the supreme court shall be 
transferred to the court of appeals by the supreme court. 
(b) Any case within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals 
which was filed in the supreme court prior to the effective date 
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of this article may be transferred to the court of appeals by the 
supreme court. 
(3) No case filed either in the supreme court or the court 
of appeals shall be dismissed for having been filed in the wrong 
court, but shall be transferred and considered properly filed in 
the court which the supreme court determines has jurisdiction. 
37-21-11. Employees - compensation. (1) Subject to the rules 
and regulations of the supreme court, the court of appeals shall 
appoint a clerk, deputy clerks, and such other assistants as may 
be necessary. 
(2) Each judge of the court of appeals may appoint a law 
clerk who shall be learned in the law and one secretary or stenog-
rapher. The persons so employed may be discharged or removed at 
the pleasure of the judge employing them. 
(3) All employees appointed under subsections (1) and (2) 
of this section shall be paid such compensation as shall be pre-
scribed by the rules and regulations of the supreme court. 
37-21-12. Fees of the clerk of court of appeals. (1) The 
fee schedule of the clerk of the court of appeals shall be as 
provided by supreme court rule. 
(2) Fees received by the clerk of the court of appeals 
shall be deposited as p:-ovided in section 37-2-18, C.R.S. 1963, 
and used for the purpose specified in section 37-2-19, C.R.S. 1963. 
37-21-13. Reporter - publication of decisions. (1) The -
reporter of decisions for the supreme court shall also be the 
reporter of decisions for the court of appeals. 
(2) Those court of appeals opinions to be published in full 




37-21·14. Expenses and compensation of judges, retired 
1ustices and judges. (1) When a district, probate, or juvenile 
judge renders service, pursuant to section 5(3) of article VI of 
the state constitution to assist the court of appeals in disposing 
of cases pending before it, he shall be reimbursed for his actual 
and necessary personal maintenance expense while engaged in such 
duties outside of his county or district not to exceed twenty 
dollars per day together with mileage at the rate of eight cents 
for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and 
from the hearing or conference. 
(2) When a retired justice or district, probate-, or juvenile 
judge renders service, pursuant to section 5(3) of article VI of 
the state constitution, to assist the court of appeals 
in disposing of cases pending before it, he shall receive remu-
neration as provided in said section of the state constitution, 
and shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary personal 
maintenance expenses while attending oral argument and confer-
ences, not to exceed twenty dollars per day together with mileage 
at the rate of eight cents per each mile actually and necessarily 
traveled in going to and from the hearing or conference. 
SECTION 2. 37-1-7, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
37-1-7. Certified copy of record in supreme court or court 
of appeals. In all causes which have been removed to the supreme 
court of this state OR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, a duly certified 




OR THE COURT OF APPEALS may be filed in the court from which said 
cause was removed, on motion of any party, person or persons 
claiming to be interested therein, and the copy so filed shall 
have the same effect as the original record would have had if the 
same had not peen lost or destroyed. 
SECTION 3. 37-2-21, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
37-2-21. Supreme court and court of appeals opinions 
published. The opinions of the supreme court of the state of 
Colorado AND OF THE COURT OF APPFALS, shall be published in vol-
umes of the size, as nearly as may be, e£-vellllftes-efte;-~we,-and 
~hree AS PRESENT VOLUMES of THE Colorado reports, and containing 
not less than six hundred and fifty pages each. 
SECTION 4. 37-2-22, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
37-2-22. Duty of reporter. It is here8y-made the duty of 
the reporter of the decisions of said eettr~ COURTS, within four 
months after a sufficient number of opinions to constitute a 
volume of the PRESCRIBED size a£eresaia shall have been delivered 
to him, to compile and prepare the same for publication, together 
with such other proceedings of said supreme court as the justices 
thereof may designate for insertion in such volume, with syllabi, 
title pages, digest, and table of cases reported. 
SECTION 5. 37-2-23, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
37-2-23. Publication of reports. (1) The chief justice 
and reporter of the supreme court are responsible for the 
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publication of the reports of the supreme court, and any repub-
lishing or reproduction of said reports and the EARLIER reports 
of the court of appeals. The specifications, contracts, and 
sales pertaining to all such reports shall be handled in accord-
ance with the provisions of ARTICLE 2 of chapter 109, ar~iele-2; 
C.R.S. 1963, AS AMENDED. 
(2) WHENEVER ANY LAW OF THIS STATE REFERS TO THE REPORTS OF 
,, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, SAID LAW SHALL BE CON-
STRUED AS REFERRING TO THE REPORTS IN WHICH ARE ALSO CONTAINED THE 
\ 
\ REPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CREATED PURSUANT TO 
I 
\ 
ARTICLE 21 OF THIS CHAPTER. 
SECTION 6. 37-2-26, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965 
Supp.), is REPEALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read: 
37-2-26. Method for review. Appellate review by the supreme 
court of any action or proceeding of an inferior tribunal, whether 
such action or proceeding be civil, criminal, special, statutory, 
common law, or otherwise, shall be prescribed by rule of the 
supreme court, except as otherwise provided by law. 
SECTION 7. 37-10-8, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965 
Supp.), is amended to read: 
37-10-8. Appellate review. Appellate review of final judg-
ments of superior courts shall be by the supreme court OR BY THE 
COURT OF APPEALS in such cases and in such manner as may be pre-
scribed by law, the Colorado rules of civil procedure, and the 
Colorado rules of criminal procedure for appellate review of final 
judgments of the district courts. 
SECTION 8. 37-19-26, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1967 
Supp.), is REPEALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read: 
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37-19-26. Appellate review. Appellate review of any order, 
decree, or judgment may be taken to the supreme court or the court 
of appeals, as provided by law and the Colorado rules of civil 
procedure, except that an appeal taken pursuant to section 22-3-10, 
C.R.S. 1963,. as amended, shall be as provided in the Colorado rules 
of criminal procedure. Initials shall appear on the record on 
appeal in place of the name of the child. Appeals from orders or 
decrees concerning legal custody, termination of parental rights, 
and adoptions shall be advanced upon the calendars of the supreme 
court and the court of appeals, and shall be decided at the 
earliest practicable time. 
SECTION 9. 37-20-20, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965 
Supp.), is amended to read: 
37-20-20. Appeals. Appellate review of final judgments of 
the probate court shall be by the supreme court OR BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, and shall be conducted in the same 
manner as prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure for 
review by the supreme court AND THE COURT OF APPEALS of final 
judgments of the district courts. 
SECTION 10. 81-14-8, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
81-14-8. Review of order or award - parties. Any person in 
interest, including the state compensation insurance fund, being 
dissatisfied with any stteh finding, order, or award of the coomis-
sion issued or promulgated by virtue of the authority conferred in 
this chapter, may comnence an action in the eistriet-eettrt-ift-8.lla 
£e~-the-ee1111ty-whereift-the-iftjttry-was-sttstaifted-er-in-~ke-dis~rie~ 
eettrt-ift-afta-fer-the-eity-aftd-eel1ftty-e£-Benver COURT OF APPEALS 
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against the commission as defendant, to modify or vacate the-same 
en-tne-gr8lffla-herein-speeified ANY SUCH FINDING, ORDER, OR AWARD 
ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN SECTION 81-14-12. in-whieh-aetien-any 
adverse-~arty-ehall-alse-he-made-a-de£endan~~ IN ANY SUCH ACTION 
AN ADVERSE PARTY SHALL ALSO BE MADE A DEFENDANT. previded;-that-said 
IF THE state compensation insurance fund has the consent of one or 
more of the members of said THE conmission fer-the-pttrpese-e£-hring-
ing-said-aetien TO COMMENCE SUCH AN ACTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, 
il'l-whien-ease THEN the state compensation insurance fund, by that 
name and title, may commence and prosecute, acting through its 
manager, such suit to modify or vacate the finding, order, or award 
of the commission, and shall be authorized to employ an attorney to 
represent stteh THE state compensation insurance fund. in-s~eh-litigatien~ 
SECTION 11. 81-14-9, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is amended 
to read: 
81-14-9. Precedence of action. All such actions shall have 
precedence over any civil cause of a different nature pending in 
such court, and the district court OF APPEALS shall always be deemed 
open for the trial thereof, and the-s8.l'lle SUCH ACTION shall be tried 
and determined by the dist~ie~ court OF APPEALS in THE manner as-
provided for other civil actions. 
SECTION 12. 81-14-10(2), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
81-14-10. Complaint - hearing - change of venue - records. 
(2) The record of said conmission so filed in said court shall be 
returned to said THE commission after the final disposition ef-said 
ease by the eis~~iet court OF APPEALS or THE supreme court. 
1 
SECTION 13. 81-14-15, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
81-14-15. Court record transmitted to connnission - when. It 
shall be the duty of the clerk of the eis~~ie~ court OF APPF.ALS, 
without o~der of court or application of the conmdssion,'to trans-
mit the record in any case to the commission, within twenty-five 
days after the order or judgment of the court unless in the mean-
time, a-lf'l'ite-ei-errer-addressed-te-tne-disEriet-eeurt-snall-he 
ehtained-£rem-the-sttpreme-eettrt-£er-tne-reviewing-e£-suen-eraer-er 
jttagm.ent FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW IS GRANTED BY THE SUPREME COURT. 
ln-tkat-event;-ne-skall-se-retttrn-it IF THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS 
FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW, THE CLERK SHALL RETURN THE RECORD upon 
receipt of remittitur from the supreme court, unless the order of 
the supreme court requires further action by the district court OF 
APPF.ALS, and then within twenty-five days after such further action. 
SECTION 14. 81-14-7, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
REPFALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read: 
81-14-17. Sunmary review by supreme court. If the supreme 
court reviews the judgment of the court of appeals, such review 
shall be limited to a summary review of questions of law. Any such 
action shall be advanced upon the calendar of the supreme court, and 
a final decision shall be rendered within sixty days after the date 
the supreme court grants further appellate review. The coomission 
or any other aggrieved party shall not be required to file any 
undertaking or other security upon review by the supreme court. 
SECTION 15. 82-5-11, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is 
amended to read: 
li 
82-5-11. Court review. Such action, proceeding, or suit 
must be commenced within twenty days after the final findings or 
decision of the commission, and any party aggrieved thereby may 
secure judicial review thereof by commencing an action in the 
diserie~ court OF APPEALS where-the-elaim-£er-eeae£its-was-£iled; 
er-ia-the-eity-aad-eettl'ley-e£-Beaver for the review of the commis-
sion's findings or decision in the same manner as reviews are now 
provided by law in workmen's compensation cases. The coD1I1ission, 
in its discretion, may also certify _to such court questions of 
law involved in any decisions by it. In any judicial proceeding 
under sections 82-5-1 to 82-5-11, the findings of the commission 
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence and in 
absence of fraud, shall be conclusive. Such actions, and the 
questions so certified shall be heard in a swmnary manner and shall 
be given precedence over all other civil cases except cases arising 
under the workmen's compensation laws of this state. Writs-ef 
errer-may-ee-takea-te-the-sttpreme-eettre-£rem-the-deeisiea-e£-a--
distriet-eettrt-reviewing-any-stteh-preeeediags-in-the-same-manner 
as-aew-previded-ey-law-in-werkmea1 s-eempensatien-eases~ IF THE 
SUPREME COURT REVIEWS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, SUCH 
REVIEW SHALL BE LIMITED TO A SUMMARY REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF LAW. 
ANY SUCH ACTION SHALL BE ADVANCED UPON THE CALENDAR OF THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND A FINAL DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED WITHIN SIXTY DAYS 
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW. 
SECTION 16. Severab~lity clause. If any provision of this 
act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is 
held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions 
lii 
or applications of the act which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions 
of this act are declared to be severable. 
SECTION 17. Effective date. This act shall take effect 
January 1, 1970. 
SECTION 18. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby 
finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the 
iumediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. 
liii 
SUPREME COURT BACKLOG PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Colorado has long been recognized as a leader among the 
several states in the administration of justice. Colorado's 
judicial system has achieved national recognition as one of the 
most progressive as a consequence of the adoption of two judicial 
reform constitutional amendments, Amendment No. 1 in 1962 and 
Amendment No. 3 in 1966, and their implementation by law.]/ In 
addition to the extensive constitutional modification, legisla-
tion designed to modify and improve the judicial system has been 
adopted with increasing frequency over the past decade. 
The stature of Colorado as a progressive leader in judi-
cial reform is primarily the result of continuous study of the 
various phases of court organization and procedure by various 
interested groups and legislative committees. These studies have 
achieved many positive results and served to focus attention on 
judicial problems, even though many of the recommendations made 
were rejected or deferred for further study.y 
One of the problems which has received considerable atten-
tion in past studies is the problem of the backlog of cases in 
the Supreme Court due to the continued increase in the annual 
filing rate. Several solutions to the problem hav~ been proposed 
and adopted, i.e., the employment of law clerks for research as-
sistance; the use of oral argument in all cases; and the use of 
district and retired Supreme Court judges to assist in opinion 
writing.~ Several other solutions have been proposed and re-
jected or deferreq for further study, i.e., the establishment of 
an intermediate appellate court; the submission of fewer cases on 
oral argument; and changes in the prevailing method of appellate 
review.,4/ 
V Shannon, Judicial Reform for Colorado Courts of Special Jur-
isdiction, 50 Judicature 16 (June-July 1966); Clark, Colorado 
at the Judicial Crossroads, 50 Judicature 118 (December 1966). 
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative 
Council, Research Publication No. 49, p. 34 (December 1960). 
Doyle, The Battle of the Backlog in the Supreme Court, 33 
Rocky Mountain Law Review 489 (June 1961) (Symposium on the 
Judicial Administration in Colorado). 
Id. at 496. 
Despite these proposals, the backlog of cases continues 
to exist and a further increase can be expected in the future.~ 
In light of this problem, the General Assembly expressed its 
interest in continued study by the introduction of Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 12. The content of this resolution (S.J.R. No. 
12) was adopted in House Joint Resolution No. 1026. Pursuant to 
House Joint Resolution No. 1026, Forty-sixth General Assembly 
(1968), the Legislative Council was directed to appoint a commit-
tee to make a thorough stu.dy of appellate case load problems and 
possible solutions, including, but not limited to, the following; 
{l) the creation of an intennediate court of appeals, (2) more 
extensive use of outside and retired judges (3) changes in the 
prevailing method of appellate review, and (4) improvement in the 
physical facilities of the Supreme Court4 
The mission of the Committee on Appellate Courts was thus 
to take cognizance of the backlog problem in the Supreme Court 
of Colorado and attempt to arrive at a workable and politically 
feasible solution to the problem. 
A Look at the Backlog Problem 
Cases filed. In 1950, 218 cases were filed in the Supreme 
Court. This annual filing rate almost doubled by 1959 when 407 
cases were filed. In 1967, the number of cases filed reached an 
all-time high of 639. The 639 cases filed in 1967 was 83 (or 15 
percent) more than the previous high of 556 in 1966. More than 
twice as many cases were filed in 1967 as in 1955. These figures 
demonstrate that the. Supreme Court's annual intake has increased 
steadily during the past 17 years.f1/ (See Table I.) 
In 1950, 167 cases were pending before the court. The 
nu~ber of pending cases more than tripled by 1960 when there were 
548'. Of course, a large proportion of pending cases are not at 
issue (ready for final disposition): however, the proportion of 
pending cases at issue has increased steadily. For example, in 
1956 there were 90 of the 201 cases pending which were at issue, 
or 45 percent.Y In 1960, there were 318 of the 548 pending 
cases at issue, or 58 percent • .§/ In 1967, there were 521 of the 
W' The State of the Courts, Annual Report of the Chief Justice 
Mthe Colorado Supreme Court (1968) .(Submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly pursuant to 37-11-2 (3), C.R.S. 1963, as 
amended). · 
21. Id. at p. 5. y Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative 




Cases Before the Colorado Supreme Court 
1950 Through 1967 
Cases Number of 
Pending Cases Written Cases 
Yea, Jan. 1 Filed Total 012inions Closed 
1950 167 218 385 154 204 
1951 181 188 131 ---
1952 a 199 568a 138 399 
1953 169 330 499 175 284 
1954 215 252 467 162 269 
1955 198 287 485 184 284 
1956 201 301 502 161 261 
1957 241 345 586 197 230 
1958 356 412 768 159 285 
1959 483 407 890 250 342 
1960 548 364 912 371 489 
1961 423 420 843 355 524 
1962 319 486 805 238 378 
1963 427 505 932 255 424 
1964 508 490 998 239 385 
1965 613 550 1163 264 464 
1966 699 556 1255 260 445 
1967 810 639 1449 378 588 
1968 861 




The 861 cases pending at the end of 1967 consisted of 
the following& 
Source: 
Cases at Issue Awaiting Oral 
Argument 446 
Cases Orally Argued Awaiting 
Opinion 39 
Cases Submitted .Without Oral 
Argument 15 
Opinions Announced Awaiting 
Action on Rehearin~ 17 
Cases Reopened 1 
Cases Reopened and at Issue 2 
Cases a.t Issue on Rehearing 1 
Total Cases at Issue 521 
Cases Not at Issue 340 
Total Cases Pending 861 
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legisla-
tive Council, Res. Pub. Jro. 49, p. 100 (Dec. 1960); 
and lb!, State of t~e Courts, Annual Report of the 
Chief Justice oft e Colorado Supreme Court, p. 5 
(Jan. 1968). 
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861 pending cases at issue, or 60 percent • .2/ Thus the proportion 
of cases at issue to the total number of cases pending has in-
creased from 45 percent in 1950 to 60 percent in 1967. 
In addition, the number of original proceedings has also 
increased. In 1955, only 12 original proceedings were filed in 
the Supreme Court. By 1965, the number of original proceedings 
filed in the Court had grown to 131. This factor is especially 
significant because study and action on these proceedings often 
takes as much or more time than the usual appellate cases.!.Q/ 
Case dispositions. The Colorado Supreme Court disposed 
of more cases, 588 in 1967, than in any previous year in the 
court's history. At the same time, however, the court's intake 
of 639 cases filed was also the highest in the court's history. 
Of the 588 cases that were closed, 378 of these were by written 
opinion. The previous high for cases closed was 524 in 1961, 
and the five-year average, 1962 through 1966, was 419. The pre-
vious high for written opinions was 371 in 1960, and the five-
year average, 1962 through 1966, was 251.W The number of 
cases closed has been less than the filing rate in each of the 
years from 1950 through 1967, with the exception of the years 
1954, 1960 and 1961, when cases closed exceeded those cases 
filed. (See Table I.) 
Several reasons are attributable to the court's signifi-
cant increase in case dispositions in the years 1960 and 1961. 
First, all judges for the first time employed law clerks for 
research and analysis assignments. Appropriations for this pur-
pose were made in 1959oW Second, the court required oral ar-
gument in all matters except those waived by the court. In this 
way the aid of c~~')sel was obtained in the pinpointing of issues 
and authorities.11! Third, in early 1960 the court began call-
ing selected district court judges, county court judges and re-
tired Supreme Court judges to assist it in opinion writing. 
Senate Bill No. 28 of the 1960 General Assembly authorized the 
court to pay expen~es and supplemental remuneration to visiting 
judges who perform these services. The visiting judges hear 
oral argument, confer with the court without voice or vote and 
prepare opinions in line with the tentative decision of the 
court. The court then reviews, modifies as necessary, and ap-
proves these opinions as per curiam decisions of the court.W 
The State .2.i the Courts, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 6. 
Ya: at p .. 4. 
Ibid. 
ruaTcial Business of Colorado Courts, Annual Report of the 




In 1960 and 1961, approximately 70 opinions were written 
by outside judges. One retired Supreme Court judge, 24 district 
judges, and four county court judges assisted the court in 
1960.W This explains why the number of written opinions in 
1960 was high. 
During 1967, four retired judges and four active district 
judges were assigned to assist the Supreme Court pursuant to 
Article VI, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution. These as-
signments resulted- in 20 written opinions. This assistance was 
of considerable help to the court in achieving its record pro-
ductivity in 1967 • .!.2/ 
Other considerations. To be considered also are the oth-
er matters which take up a sizable portion of the court's time, 
because the growing volume of work in the court is not reflected 
entirely be case filings and dispositions and the number of writ-
ten opinions. These other matters are requests for extensions 
of time, motions to dismiss, and similar paper work -- all of 
which have to be received, examined, stamped, listed and studied 
and then orders issued and the papers filed, microfilmed, and 
stored.11./ 
In 1966, the Supreme Court received 1,668 requests for ex-
tensions of time and 1,476 other motions of various"kinds for a 
total of 3,144 items. As statistics were not kept on these mat-
ters prior to 1965, a comparison must necessarily be limited; 
however, the in6rease of 1,198 or 53.7 percent· over the 1965 to-
tal of 2,046 illustrates the increased activity in this area. 
It also demonstrates that delay begets delay, because it appears 
that the more cases that are not disposed of, the more requests 
that are made to the court for extensions of time and the more 
motions that are filed to dismiss. It should be note~ that these 
totals do not include orders transferring trial judges and other 
administrative
1
gStions taken through the office of the Judicial 
Administrator • .!!Y . . 
It should also be remembered that in the last 15 years 
the state has nearly doubled the number of trial court judges. 
This increase in trial court judges has resulted in an increase 
in the number of dispositions at the trial court level. This 
increase, in turn, has resulted in an increase in the number of 
cases coming to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Supreme 
Judicial Administration !.o Colorado, op. cit. supra note 7. 
The State of the Courts, Annual Report of the Chief Justice 




Court has had to do an adequate job with the same personnel and 
structure which existed in 1905. As is readily· apparent from a 
look at the figures in Table I, the court has not been able to 
keep up with the number of cases filed, thus creating a backlog. 
Considerations relevant to written opinions. Even if the 
number of written opinions and case dispositions continue at the 
all-time high rate set in 1967, it does not appear that the court 
will be able to reduce the backlog substantially in the foresee-
able future. In this regard it is appropriate to ask ·how many 
cases a seven man appellate court can be expetted to dispose of 
annually by written opinions consistent with the time needed to 
give proper consideration to impo.rtant matters and co.nsistent 
with the development.of good case law. Various opinions have 
been expressed on this subject, but generally an average of 50 
cases per judge is probably the maximum, and 35 to 40 cases is 
considered a more satisfactory total~ This means that the court 
can be expected under the best of.circumstances to dispose of a 
maximum of 350 cases in any one year by written op!qion, and the 
total i's more likely to fall between 225 and 275~.!2/ 
The written opinions per judge averages cited above are 
guide posts at best, because the number of written opinions in 
any given period will fluctuate considerably according to the 
type of case before the court •. Many c~ses are relatively minor 
and may be disposed of in a short·period of time. Others are 
extremely complicated and technical.and may involve statutory 
and/or constitutional construction. During a period when a 
large proportion of the cases before the court fall in this lat-
ter category, the number of written opinions will naturally be 
fewer. 
While productions expressed in the number of written opin-
ions and cases closed is important, it is only one factor to be 
considered. Because of the important matters coming before the 
court and the effect of the court's decisions on Colorado law, 
there should be sufficient time for consideration of these mat-
ters and for each member to review carefully the opinions writ-
ten by his colleagues. For this reason, the opinion has been 
expressed that only the most important cases should come before 
the Supreme Court, and the court should have the right to deter-
mine whether it wishes to review less important cases. Consist-
ent with this point of view is the position that if only the 
most important cases are considered, then the average number of 
opinions written annually per judge should be from 25 to 30. 
This discussion and the following discussion is based upon 
a 1963 Legislative Council staff memorandum to the Legisla-
tive Council Committee on Amendment No. l on the subject of 
appellate procedure and the need for an intermediate court 
of appeals. 
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Dispositions without written o~inion. Judging from the 
experience each year from 1960 throug 1967, an annual average 
of 167 cases are closed without written opinions. Therefore 
the court may be expected to dispose of a total number of cases 
annually of 392 to 517 cases. As long as the filing rate con-
tinues to exceed this maximum, no reduction in the number of 
cases pending can be anticipated. In fact, the number of pend-
ing cases can be expected to increase. 
Delay from issue to disposition. In 1960 the Legislative 
Council Committee on Judiciaf Administration conducted a docket 
analysis of cases filed in the Supreme Court in 1959 to deter-
mine the kind of cases and the origin of cases before the court. 
The analysis also sought to determine the delay in the court. 
It was demonstrated that the average delay between the time a 
case became at issue before the Supreme Court and was disposed 
of was 20 months. Half of the cases were disposed of more quick-
ly and half took longer. At the time the analysis was made, 
September 1959, there were 311 pending cases at issue before the 
court. Of these cases, the earliest had come of issue in the 
third quarter of 1957. Only 21 cases, less than seven percent, 
were at issue prior to 1958, and almost half of the 311 cases 
became at issue in 1958.~ This information is shown in Table 
II. 
Time lag -- filin6 to issue. Another factor in the delay in disposition of casesefore the Supreme Court is the length 
of time it takes for cases to be ready for trial (at issue). At 
the time the 1959 analysis was made, half of the cases took more 
than 5 .2 months from filing to issue, .with the average for all 
cases, 6.3 months.· Forty-eight· cases or 15.4 percent of the to-
tal took three months or less from filing to issue; 144 cases or 
46.3 percent took from three to six months; 106 cases or 34 per-
cent took from six to 12 months; and only 13 cases or 4.2 percent 
took more than one year. Of these latter~~~ three cases took 
two years or more from filing until issue.~ 
When the delay from filing to issue is added to the time 
from issue to disposition, it shows that the average case dis-
posed of by the Supreme Court by ·the e~~/of 1959 had probably 
been filed 25 to 26 months previously.~ 
Present delay~ The committee directed that a similar 
analrsis be made of the Supreme Court docket in an attempt to 
disc ose the present delay. An analysis was thus made of the 
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative 
Council, Research Publication No. 49, p. 102 (Dec. 1960). 






Cases At Issue Pending Before the Co1orado Supreme Court 
By Type of Case, As of September 30, 1959 
Time When Cases Became At Issue 
1957 1958 1959 
3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 
TJ'.:oe of Case .JL .JL Total __Q_ __g_ .JL __Q_ Total __Q_ _g_ __Q_ Total 
Pers9nal Injurya 4 4 3 5 5 5 18 4 6 7 17 
To:rt 0 1 l l l 3 2 7 2 l 2 5 
Money Demand l l 3 7 8 8 26 10 5 8 23 
Contract 3 4 3 3 13 4 2 5 11 
l,iunicipal and 
Local Gcv't.c 3 l 4 2 2 3 l 8 4 2 6 12 
Water hights l 2 3 2 l 2 l 6 l 2 3 
State Agenciesd l 2 3 2 l 3 6 
Property l l 3 5 l 3 12 3 3 4 10 
Domestic Relationse l l l 6 3 l 11 5 l l 7 
Frobaie 4 2 2 l 9 3 ·3 6 12 
Otherr l l 2 2 4 4 11 21 5 5 13 23 
Not 3hown9 l 3 4 7 7 l 2 17 5 2 3 10 







All cases involving municipal, county, school districts and special districts. 
All cases involving the state of Colorado and its agencies. 
Includes divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, custody, dependency, etc. 
Includes the few criminal cases not disposed of. 
e. 
f. 
g. Not indicated in docket book. 
1957- Per Cent 
1959 Of Cases 














Source: Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council, Research Publication 
No. 49 (Dec. 1960). 
civil{ cri. minal. and workmen's compensation cases at issue and 
await ng oral argument in the court as of June 1. 1968. This 
analysis determined the time lapse from the date a case becomes 
at issue until the date it is orally argued. The median time 
from issue date to oral argument is 10 months in civil cases. 
six months in criminal cases. and one month in workmen's compen-
sation cases. This information is set forth in Tables III, IV, 
and V. · 
The convnittee also determined that the average length of 
time from the date a case is filed until it becomes at issue is 
approximately six to eight months. In other words, six to eight 
months precede the date the case becomes at issue. It was noted 
that the court often grants extensions of time within which the 
attorneys must file their briefs. All extensions of time, of 
course, increase the length of time from filing to issue date. 
The average length of time from oral argument to final decision 
is approximately two months. This means that there is a lapse 
of approximately 18 to 20 months from the filing date to the 
date of final disposition; some litigants now'have to wait for 
a period of approximately two years before a final decision is 
reached in their case. 
table III 
Workmen's Compensation Cases at Issue 
Awaiting Oral Argument 
Colorado Supreme Court, 
As of June 1, 1968 
Time at I§sue No, 








Median 1 mo. 
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Table IV 
Criminal Cases at Issue Awaiting 
Oral Argument 
Colorado Supreme Court, 
As of June 1, 1968 
Timg a.t Issue No, 











Median 6 mo. 














Civil ea, .. at IHue Awaiting Onl A~nt- -
Colorado Supreme Court, .A• of June 1. 1968 
Total Per,onal Real Agencx and1 Money Breach rifrt Water All Jin at JHY• i:11.'ffl! ga. Bd, _io;r fror. LR!il l szxli • ~- 0t 'l!,r•ct Bimdil .2l!m IL ua.. IL 1ma 




2 ., l l 23 
22 8 2.1 l l 2 l 2 1 
21 13 3.4 l 3 2 2 2 l 2 
20 14 3.7 l 6 2 l 2 2 
19 11 2.9 3 2 l 3 2 
18 16 4.2 2 3 
, l 3 2 
17 10 2.6 l 2 3 l l 2 
16 26 6.8 l 6 l l 4 ~ 8 
~ 20 ,.3 l 6 3 2 2 l ~ 
14 13 3.4 2 2 l 2 l 2 3 
13 19 ,.0 4 
, l l 2 6 
12 13 3.4 l 2 ·2 
, 2 l 
I 8 2.1 2 l 2 2 l .... 11 
I,) 10 24 6.3 l 4 7 2 2 2 6 I 
9 23 6.1 3 8 l 2 4 2 3 
8 17 . 4., 3 2 l 
, l 2 3 
7 ~ 3.9 l l l 3 2 l l 2 3 
6 24 6.3 2 3 7 3 2 2 1 4 , 23 6.1 3 , 2 2 3 3 2 3 
4 23 6.1 l 7 2 3 2 3 ,l.. 4 
3 l~ 3.9 l ~ 2 7 
2 17 4., l 4 l 3 4 l 3 
l 23 6.1 3 3 l 6 3 l 6 
0 2 -~ l 1 
Total 380 99.CJJ'b 32 80 29 48 ~ 22 41 9 67 
Median 10 mo. -u mo. 10 mo. l~ mo. 8 mo. 10 mo. 9 IIOo 14 ao. 6 ao. 8 mo. 
a. DoH not include Worlcaen•• CompenaaUon. 
b. DoH not equal lOQC becau,e of rounding. 
C9mparison With Other States 
That a serious backlog problem exists in the Colorado 
Supreme Court is demonstrated by the above data. It may be rel-
evant at this point to ask how the record in Colorado compares 
with the record in other states. An analysis conducted by the 
Office of Judicial Administration shows that in 1967 the Colora-
do Supreme Court had one of the best records in the country, 
both in the number of cases closed and in the number of written_ 
opinions. Table VI shows the number of justices, appeals ac-
cepted, and the number of written opinions in 1967 for the 30 
states which do not have an intermediate appellate court. Only 
Kentucky, with the equivalent of 11 justices, exceeded Colorado 
in the number of written opinions, and only Kentucky and Wash-
ington exceeded Colorado in the number of appeals accepted. 
Table VI 
States Without Intermediate Appellate Courts 
Number of Justices, Appeals Accepted, and 
Written Opinions in 1967* 
Written 
No. of Appeals Written Opinions 
State Justices Acceeted Opinions Per Justice8 
Alaska 5 105 61 12.2 
Arkansas 1 342 35_0 50.0 
COLORADO 1 639 m 54.0 
Connecticut 6 141 127 25.4b 
Delaware 3 126 80 26.7 
Hawaii 5 102 42 8.4 
Idaho 5 190 96 19.2 
Iowa 9 395 230 25.6 
Kansas 1 312 234 33.4 
KentuckyC 11 803 637 57.9 
Maine 6 87 72 12.0 
Massachusetts 7 320 232 33.1 
Minnesota 1 430 245 35.0 
Mississippi 9 367 267 29.7 
Montana 5 172 105 21.0 
Nebraska 7 321 257 36.7 
Nevada 5 157 67 i3.4 
New Hampshire 5 124 95 19.0 
North Dakota 5 102 96 19.2 
Oregon 7 612 305 43.5 
Rhode Island 5 244 182 36.4 
South Carolina 5 143 143 28.6 
South Dakota 5 105 45 9.0 
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Table VI (Continued) 
Written 
No. of Appeals Written Opinions 
State Justices Accepted Opinions Per Justicea 
Utah 5 333 170 34.0 
Vermont 5 137 70 14.0 
Virginia 7 260 133 19.0 
Washington 9 734 350 38.9 
West Virginia 5 53 57 11.4 
Wisconsin 7 347 275 39.3 
Wyoming 4 75 71 17.8 
MEAN 6 276 182 27.5 
MEDIAN 5 217 130 26.2 
*This table was taken from a memorandum "An Intermediate Appel-
late Court: A Proposal and Alternative," prepared at the request 
of the Legislative Council Committee on Appellate Courts, pre-
sented by the Colorado Supreme Court, Aug. 30, 1968. 
a. Computed for actual number of justices, even though several 
states (including Colorado) had some assistance from retired 
and trial court judges. 
b. Computed for five justices; the sixth justice has administra-
tive duties only. 
c. Seven justices and four full-time commissioners. 
SOURCE: Workload of State Courts of Last Resort - 1965-67, a 
compilation prepared for The Conference of Chief Jus-
tices, The Council of State Governments, Chicago, Il-
linois 1967. 
A Look at the Future 
Without reform of some type to ease the continuing back-
log of cases in the Supreme Court, it is anticipated that by 
1980 the backlog will be at almost 3,800 cases. The anticipated 
backlog by 1980 is based upon a projection of the annual filing 
rate using past population-case filing ratios and population pro-
jections. This projection was made by Mrs. Winifred Lewis, Judi-
cial Department Statistical Analyst. The assumption was made 
that the court would close 550 cases per year, which means that 
the court would have to write approximately 325-335 opinions. 
This assumption is very optimistic, but even if the court could 
close an average of 550 cases per year, the backlog as of the 
end of 1980 is estimated at almost 3,800 cases. (See Table VII.) 
The time lag between issue and oral argument in civil 
cases in 1980 is estimated at between 5 and 5.5 years. In other 
words it would take more than six years from filing to termina-
tion for a case on the civil docket. 
-14-
Table VII 
Estimated Annual Number of Cases Filed and Backlog, 
Colorado Supreme Court, 1968-198()1-
New Cases Cases Yearly 
Year Filed Closed· Remainder Bac~l52g 
861 8 
1968 626 550 76 937 
1969 652 550 102 1039 
1970 679 550 129 1168 
1971 705 550 155 1223 
1972 731 550 181 1404 
1973 757 550 207 1611 
1974 783 550 233 1844 
1975 809 550 259 2103 
1976 835 550 285 2388 
1977 862 550 312 2700 
1978 888 550 338 3038 
1979 914 550 364 3402 
. 1980 940 550 390 3792 
a, As of December 31, 1967. 
*This table was taken from a memorandum "An Inter-
·mediate Appellate Court: A Proposal and Alterna-
tive," prepared at the request of the Legislative 
Council Committee on Appellate Courts, presented 
by the Colorado Supreme Court, Aug, 30, 1968, 
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SUPREME COURT OOCXET ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
At the request of the committee, the Judicial Administra-
tor, with the assistance and cooperation of the Legislative Coun-
cil staff, was directed to conduct an analysis of the Supreme 
Court docket. The committee believed that such an analysis would 
be helpful in pointing toward what kind of action is necessary to 
solve the backlog problem. In terms of the possible creation of 
an intermediate court as a solution to the backlog problem, such 
an analysis was felt necessary in order to determine the size of 
the caseload that could be expected in such an intermediate court. 
It was felt that the analysis might also suggest several appro-
priate ways in which the intermediate court could be structured 
and organized. The analysis thus prepared was primarily concerned 
with the kinds of cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court and 
the origin of these cases. 
Period covered and data base. Cases filed in the Supreme 
Court in 1966 and 1967 were ttsed as the data base for the anal-
ysis, regardless of the current status or prior disposition of 
those cases. It was felt that an examination of cases filed 
would provide a more accurate analysis of the types and origin of 
cases than would pending cases, because the composition of the 
latter is affected by the advancement of certain kinds of cases 
on the docket (e.g., criminal and workmen's compensation). Orig-
inal proceedings, including disciplinary actions, filed in 1966 
and 1967 were excluded, leaving 922 cases during the two-year 
period which were brought on writ of error Q~ .in three instances 
(county court cases) by writ of certiorari.W 
Origin of Cases Filed 
The oriqin of cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court 
in 1966 and 1967 is presented in Tables VIII and IX. Table VIII 
shows this information bra straight numerical listing of judi• 
cial districts. Judicia districts have been grouped geograph-
ically in Table IX. A judicial district boundary map has been· 
included (Figure A) to identify the counties in each district.W 
Table IX shows that 71 percent of the cases came from the 
Denver metropolitan area, with 44 percent being from Denver•it-
self. Table IX shows that 6.2 percent of the cases came from the 
W' Supreme Court Docket Analysis, Memorandum from State Court 
Administrator, p. 1 (June 6, 1968). w ill£!. 
-16-
Table VIII 
Origin of Cases Filed 
Colorado Supreme Court 
By Judicial District 1966-67a 
Judicial District !2~ Pct. 
lstb 84 i-1~ 2ndc 405 4 .o 
~~ 6 .6 41 7.7 5th .4 
6th 11 1.2 
7th 18 2.0 
8th 24 2.6 
9th 11 1.2 
10th 31 3.4 
11th 15 1.6 
12th 9 1.0 
l~th 14 1.5 
1th 2 .2 
15th 14 
1:i 16th 4 
lithd 42 4.6 
1th 78 8.5 
19th ii 2.1 20th 4.8 
21st 9 1.0 
22nd 6 .6 
a. Writs of error only, does not include original 
proceedings, and disciplinary proceedings. 
b. Includes one county court case (Gilpin}. 
c. Includes 24 Superior Court, 11 Probate Court, 
2 Juvenile Court. 
d. Includes one county court case (Arapahoe}. 
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Table IX 
Origin of Cases Filed, Colorado Supreme Court 
By Region and Judicial District 
Region and District No. Pct. 
Denver Metro 
1st 84 9-1~ 
2nd 4o6 44.o 
lith 42 4.6 
1th .4~ 8.5 20th 4.8. 
Total oslf n:o 
North East 
8th 24 2.6 
13th 14 1.5 
19th ~ 2.1 Total o.2 
Western Slopea 
5th 4 .4 
6th 11 1.2 
7th 18 2.0 
9th 11 1.2 
12th 9 1.0 
14th 2 .2 
21st 9 1.0 
22nd 6 .6 
Total 7o "r.o 
South Eastern 
3rd 6 .6 
10th 31 3.4 
15th 14 1.5 
16th 4 .4 
Total 5S" 5-9 
Central 
4th 71 7.7 
11th ti 1.6 Total 9-3 
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Northeast region of the state, 7.6 percent from the Western Slope, 
5.9 percent fro~ the Southeast region and 9.3 percent from the 
Central region of the state. 
The 1959 docket analysis disclosed that 87.5 percent of 
the cases originated in the district courts, and almost nine per-
cent of the cases originated in the county courts. Almost four 
percent of the cases were original proceedings. In 1959, 35 per-
cent of the cases filed originated from the Denver district, as 
compared with 44 percent in 1966 and 1967. Table X sho_ws · the _ 
source and type of cases filed in the Supreme Court in 1959 and 
is included so that this information may be compar~d with infor-
mation in Tables VIII and IX from the 1966-1967 docket analysis. 
Origin of cases in relation to creation of intermediate 
court. Assuming that an intermediate appellate court is to be 
created~ it can readily be seen from Tables VIII and IX that it 
would not be a simple matter-to divide the state geographically, 
Because 44 percent of all cases filed during 1966 and 1967 were 
generated from the Denver district and 71 percent came from-the 
Denver metropolitan area (including Boulder), it would be diffi-
cult to equalize case loads and travel time if two or more divi-
sions or circuits are considered. 
It was. suggested that one possible division might be be- . 
tween the 2nd, 17th, and 18th judicial districts (57.l percent) 
· and the rest of the state. Under this division considerable time 
would be required in travel in the second circuit to cover 42.9 
percent of.the case load. If three divisions are considered, it 
appears that the Denver case load would have to be divided in 
some way between two of them, and perhaps, the metropolitan area 
divided among all three so_tnat the division would be a pie shape. 
with Denver in the middle.W 
Types of·Cases Fil~d 
. ,.•,·., 
The kinds of cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court are 
analyzed in Tables XI, XII. and XIII. Table XI shows the number 
of cases by major type and judicial district of origin. During 
1966 and 1967, criminal cases accounted for 23 percent of the 
filings, exclusive of original proceedings. The next largest 
category was administrative (agency) revfew and local government 
cases, 13.3 percent, followed by personal injury (9.7 percent) 
and money demand (9.3 percent). 







Source and Type of Cases Docketed in Supreme Court During 1959 
Cases Appealed 
Metropolitan District Courts 
1st Dist. !Golden) 
2nd Dist. Denver) 
4th Dist. Colorado Springs) 
8th Dist. Boulder, Greeley, 
Fort Collins) 
10th Dist •. ,Pueblo) 
17th Dist. Brighton) 
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other - Original 



























Crim. Proc, Total 
4 2 29 
21 10 144 
4 0 20 
3 5 35 
9 0 18 
0 2 9 
3 6 26 











































































a. Writs of error from denials of habeas corpus from state penitentiary. 
























· Table XI 
cases Filed in Colorado Supreme court / 
By Judicial District and Major Type 
; _ 1966 • 67 
Judicial Districts 
MaJor !Z,ee ot Case ,!!! 2nda 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th.™ 11th~ 13th ,!ilh 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th rn ~ 22nd 
Domestic Relations 3 12 ~ l l l l Personal Injury 11 31 l l l 6 l l 
Real Property 6 4 6 l l 2 2 l 
Agency &: Local Govt •. 8 65 8 l l l 
' 
4 3 
Money Demand 8 41 l 5 l 2 2 2 
Breach ot Contract ~ 11 l 2 Damages ( Other) 15 l 2 2 2 l 2 
Water Rights 2 l l 2 3 l 
Injunction l ' 2 
1 l 
Specific Performance l 2 
Repleven 2 
FED l 
Recission ot Contract l 4 l l 
Construction ot Contract 4 2 
Declaratory- Judgment 3 l l 
Habeas Corpus 1 l 
Extradition l 3 l 
Probate 2 10 3 l l l 
Juvenile ·2 l 
Mental Health l l 
Criminal 12114 2 16 4 2 3 2 11 5 5 2 
Other and N.I. 15 70 10 l 2 6 3 2 5 7 2 1 
County Court l 1 
Total 84 406 6 71 4 11. 18 24 11 31 15 9- 14 
Includes Probate, Juvenile, and Superior-Courts 
All personal inJuey actions, such as motor vehicle accidents, .malpractice suits etc. 
Includes quiet titles, condemnations, mechanics liens, boundary- questions, etc. 
2 2 4 2 3 
l 5 10 3 8 2 
2 l 4 2 2 
3 3 17 5 l 
3 8 l 6 2 
l l l 








2 l 2 
l 
l l 8 5 5 9 4 l 
2 16 18 2 7 l 2 
1 







~ 13.3 9-~ 22 2. 
46 5.0 
10 1.1 















·1 Includes contested divorces, property settlement, alimony, child support and custody. 
Includes workmen•s camp., unemployment comp., P.U.c. orders and rate decisions, liquor anC: beer licenses, zoning, annexattons, bank charters, 
special district formation and elections, etc. 
5) Includes contracts, promissory- notes, attorney•s tees, etc. ' 
7) Includes all damage cases, not covered in personal injury and breach of contract (or otherwise identified), such as property ~amage, false 
arrest, libel, etc. i 
12 Forcible entry and detainer 
18 All probate matters 
19 All juvenile cases 
20 All mental health cases 
21 All criminal cases 
22 Includes cases for which case files not available tor identification, contempt proceedings, partnership accounting, receivership, stockholders• 
derivative suits, and other cases not classified above. 
Approximately 19 percent of the cases were in the "other 
or not identified" category. Approximately one-half of the cases 
shown in this category were civil cases for which the files were 
not readily available, i.e., they were either checked out or in-
complete (active cases) or in•the archives (closed cases). If 
this category is apportioned according to the distribution shown 
in Table XI, agency and local government cases would be almost 
15 percent of the total number filed; personal injury, 11 per-
cent; and money demand, 10 percent. · · 
For comparative purposes, the 1959 docket analysis dis-
closed that money demand cases constituted the greatest percent-
age of cases filed (16 percent). Thirty-nine or 12.5 percent 
were personal injury cases, as compared with 9.7 percent in 1966-
1967. Cases involving local governmental units totaled 24 cases 
or almost eight percent, as compared with almost 13.3 percent in 
1966-1967. In 1959, property, probate,. and domestic relations 
cases each accounted for more than six percent of the total. 
(see Table II.) · · · 
Dollar amounts. Considerable committee interest has been 
indicated in the monetary value of cases filed in the Colorado 
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the amounts involved were analyzed 
for four different kinds of cases (personal injury, money demand, 
breach of contract, and other damages) in Table XII. 
Table XII .indicates that 55 percent of all cases in these 
four categories filed in 1966 and 1967 involved $10,000 or less. 
This figure should be used with caution, however, because a num-
ber of cases in the "not identified" category are likely to have 
involved more than $10,000 initially, even if the amount was not 
an issue ~2
1
the appeal. Therefore, the 55 percent figure may be 
inf lated .621 
A enc and local overnment cases. Because the category 
of administrative agency review and ocal government cases ac-
counted for more than 13 percent of all the cases filed in 1966 
and 1967 (the second largest category), a separate analysis was 
made of this category. This analysis is contained in Table XIII. 
Workmen's compensation cases accounted for the largest propor-
tion in this category, 39 percent, followed by liquor and beer 
licenses (11.4 percent), and Public Utilities Commission cases 
(10.6 percent). Altogether, workmen's compensation, unemployment 
compensation, and P.U.C. cases comprised slightly~~~re than 55 
percent of the agency and local government cases.llt 
W Supreme Court Docket Analysis, Memorandum from State Court 




Dollar Amount; ea ... Jliled 
Colorado Supreme Court, 1966-67 
l'enonal lloney Breach of Dama, .. Cumulative 
Ifljfrv Dtmand!d ~n1;1st (gther·,t Tq: l &:hi!l !ti:.::. m•ot ~ Percent ·~•rs•ot r!2.a. Percent· IL ercerif rtt 
Not Indicated Jl/ 5 5.6 13 15.l 5 22.7 5 10.9 28 11.5 
Under Sl,000 2 2.3 11 12.8 3 6.5 16 6.6 44 18.l 
Sl ,OOO-S2,500 l 1.1 9 10.5 3 13.6 8 17.4 21 8.6 65 'l:1.7 
S2,500-S5,000 . 9 10.1 18 20.9 2 9.1 3 6.5 32 13.2 tr,. 40.9 
S5,000-Sl0,OOO 10 11.2 13 15.l - 4 18.2 8 17.4 35 14.4. 132 55.3 
Sl0,000-Sl5,000 7 7.9 3 3.5 2 9.1 1 2.2 13 5.3 145 60.6 
S15,000-S~,OOO 14 15.7 9 10.5 3 13.6 6 13.0 32 13.2 177 73.8 
I S25,000-S35,000 9 10.1 5 5.8 · l 4.5 2 4.3 17 -1:0 194 ao.8 
~ S35,000•S50,000 4 4.5 2 2.3 1 4.5 2 4.3 9 3.7 203 84.5 I 
S50,000-S100,000 14 15.7 l 1.2 3 6.5 18 7.4 221 · 91.9 
Over s100,000 li lla1 ...a .....1J ~ ~ ~ 19.&2 ..l2 --2..tl 243 100.0 
Total 89 99.9 ~ 86. 100.0 22 99.8 ~ 46 99.9 ~. 243 100.0 · 
includes aii damage ca••• mt covered in personal injury and breach of contract (or otherwise identified) such as property damage, false 
arrest, libel, etc. . 
Either amount not indicated or not an iHue in th• case. · 
Total doH not equal 100,C becauH of rounding. 
Table XIII 
State Agency and Local Governnent 




Public Utilities Commission 
Liquor and Beer Licenses 
Taxation and Assessment 
Civil Service !I 
Bank Charters 
Zoning Ordinances and Orders 

























County Court Appeals 
Appeals from the county court presently lie to the dis-
trict court, with further review possible upon writ of certiora-
ri to the Supreme. Court. It was felt that information concern-
ing county court appeals should be available to the committee in 
case it determined to establish an intermediate appellate court. 
In determining the jurisdiction of an intermediate appellate 
court (should. one be recomm~nded), conf?ideration perhaps should 
be given to changing county court appellate procedure, so that 
county court appeals would lie to the intermediate court rather 
than the district court. It was felt by some that this procedure 
might possibly help eliminate any diversity which exists between 
districts in construing the validity of county court practices, 
such as the verification of traffic tickets. 
The quantitative impact of this possibility can be seen 
from Table XIV. The proportion of county court appeals from 
each area varies somewhat from the distribution shown in Table 
XI for appeals to the Supreme Court, but the differences are 
slight. In other words, the addition of county court appeals to 
an intermediate court of appeals case load woul5:Lqot have much 
effect on the geographic distribution of cases.~ 
Administrative Review and Local Government Cases 
Another possibility in designing the jurisdiction of· an 
intermediate appellate court (should one be recormnended) might 
·be to have the initial review of workmen's compensation, unem-
ployment compensation, and similar cases made by the intermedi-
ate court rather than the district court, as presently provided 
by law. Several other jurisdictions with.an intermediate court 
follow this procedure. With respect to workmen's compensation 
cases, some states grant direct.appeal only to the highest court 
(New Jersey), while others vest appellate jurisdiction in this 
class of cases in both the intermediate and highest appellate 
courts. In New Mexico and North Carolina, appeal as of right 
lies to thE, intermediate court to review decisions of workmen's 
compensation cases. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court may review 
by certiorari the decision of the intermediate court in a work-
men's compensation case, but in North Carolina no appeal from 
the decision of the court is allowed to the Supreme Court. In 
Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania, the intermediate court has 
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to review awards of 
workmen's compensation. 
W' id. at p. 9. 
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Table XIV 
County Court Appeals Filed 1n District Court, 1967 
By Region and Judicial District 
Region a.nd District No. Pct. 
Denver Metro 
1st 7 s·2-2nd 85 3 ·i 17th 12 5. 
18th 16 i-2 20th 19 .6 
Total ng "62:-9 
North East 
8th 7 3.2 
13th .6 2.7 
19th 7 3.2 
Total N)" p 
Western Slope8· 
5th 6 2.7 
6th 0 -
7th 4 1.8 
9th 3 1.4 
12th 9 4.1 
14th 2 .9 
21st 2 
1:4 22nd 3 
Total "29 ~ 
South Eastern 
3rd 1 .4 
10th i 3.2 15th 2.7 
16th 0 
Total IT o.3 
Central 
4th 12 5.4 
11th 7 H Total "I9 
Grand Total 221 100.lb 
a. Includes San Juan Basin & San Luis Valley. 
b. Does not equal 100 percent because of rounding. 
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Table x-/ is included to demonstrate the possible impact 
of the addition of these matters to an intermediate appellate 
court, should one be established. Table x-/ divides agency re-
view and local government cases into three categories and is 
derived from information supplied to the Judicial Administra-
tor's Office under the district court statistical reporting 
system. The three categories are workmen's compensation, other 
administrative review cases, and local government. The last 
category is not really important for this purpose, because most 
local government actions (annexation, incorporation, etc.) must 
start in the trial court. It is included only to show a com-
parison with the administrative review cases. · 
Table XV shows that there were 108 workmen's compensa-
tion cases filed in the district courts in 1967. Table XIII 
shows that there were 48 workmen's compensation cases filed in 
the Supreme Court in the years 1966 and 1967. Assuming that 
half of these (24) were filed in 1967, it means that approxi-
mately 25 percent of the workmen's compensation cases filed in 
the district courts are coming to the Supreme Court for review 
(24 of 108 cases). 
As more than 90 percent of the workmen's compensation and 
other administrative review cases are filed in the Denver metro-
politan area (more than 50 percent in Denver), inclusion in the 
intermediate court case load of these cases would further un-
equalize the potential case load between Denver and the rest of 
the state. This is important to keep in mind if an intermediate 
court is established and if the court is to sit in geographical 
subdivisions of the state. 
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Table >N 
Agency Review and Local Government Cases 
Filed in District Court, 1967 
By Region and Judicial District 
Workmen's Other Admin. Local 
Com:e. Review Government Total 
~egion a.nd District No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct. 
Denver Metro 
1st 5 6.6% 3 4.2% 8 ~ .1 
2nd 60 55.6% 38 50.0 15 20.8 113 4 .1 
17th 1 1.3 2 2.8 3 1.2 
18th 41 38.0 14 18.4 10 1~-9 ~~ 25.3 20th 11 #H 3 .2 5.ij Total 101 93-o 09 9 ·33 45.9 203 79-T 
North East 
8th 1 .9 1 1.4 2 .8 
13th 1 .9 1 1.3 2 2.7 4 1.6 
19th 1 .9 1 H 1 1.4 3 1.2 Tota.I 1 2--:7 "2" . 1f 5-"5 -g T:15 
Western SloEe 
a 
5th 7 9.7 7 2.7 
6th 1 .9 1 1.4 2 .8 
7th 1 .9 1 1.4 2 .8 
9th 4 5.5 4 1.6 
12th 1 .9 1 1.3 3 4.2 5 2.0 
14th 2 2.8 2 .8 
21st 4 5.5 4 1.6 
22nd 
Total 3 2.7 1.3 22 10:5 N> T0:1 
South Ea.stern 
3rd 3 4.2 3 1.2 
10th 1 .9 3 3.9 2 2.8 6 2.3 
15th 
16th 
Total ~ 3 3.9 5 ;:o 9 1:5 
Central 
4th 1 1.3 5 6.9 6 2.3 
11th ~ 4.2 3 1.2 Tota.I T 1.3 "IT.T 9 T.""5 
Grand Total 108 99.9b 76 99.9b 72 100.00 256 100.( 
a. Includes San Juan Basin and San Luis Valley. 
b. Does not equal 100 percent because of rounding. 
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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN COLORADO · 
Introduction 
Judicial reformers for many years have sought for solu-
tions to overcome the delay in the courts from the backlog of 
cases. Current approaches and means that have been tried are 
many and varied. The judges themselves have been shifted about, 
have been added to appellate benches, have been divided into 
panels, have been assisted by court commissioners and have been 
restricted in the cases they could hear. Temporary "stop-gap" 
measures designed to overcome court congestion suggested by re-
formers include assigning of court commissioners to aid appel-
late judges, employing law clerks to assist in legal research, 
using Bar Association members to function as part-time arbitra-
tors and referees. In addition, there are those who suggest 
solutions to court congestion which tend to reduce the amount of 
judicial time spent on cases. These measures include appealable 
cases through certiorari, writs of error or certification from 
the lower courts, and reducing the number of written opinions 
through memorandum and per curiam opinions. 
In handling excessive case loads, many states have found 
that their first basic need has been to recruit additional qual-
ified appellate judges. It was found that any workable solution 
must in some way provide for more judges. Adding judges to the 
high court has been done through the selection of new judges and/ 
or by following a similar pattern executed by Colorado in 1960 
wherein district court and retired supreme court judges were 
temporarily called back intg07ervice to help reduce the case load on the Supreme Court level • .6.Zt 
All of these measures have been tried in an attempt to 
bring balance and a semblance of order to appellate procedure. 
Yet no one of these methods seem~ to be the panacea which will 
totally alleviate the problem. While all of these methods aid 
and assist in overcoming court congestion and delay, it is gen-
erally felt that none are sufficient measures in themselves to 
be solely relied upon. 
Probably the most controversial of all approaches tried 
has been the creation of an intermediate appellate court system. 
Many of those states which have used some of the "stop-gap" mea-
sures mentioned above still experienced excessive case loads. 
As a result many of them turned to the intermediate appellate 
court system as a more permanent and long lasting solution to 
their court problems. There are currently 20 states which use 
one form or another of the intermediate appellate court system. 
w Brown, Solutions for the Backlog of the Supreme Court of Col-orado, 36 Univ. of Colo. L. Rev. 554 (1964). 
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Approaches in Colorado. There is no reason to believe 
that Colorado's current ra-Ee of population and economic growth 
will diminish appreciably in the near future, rather it appears 
that the converse is more likely. Consequently, a continued in-
crease in new matters coming before the Supreme Court can be 
anticipated. When the filing rate trend over the past several 
years is projected into the future, it is estimated that the 
number of cases filed annually will approach 700 by 1970 and will 
be approximately 940 by 1980. By 1970 the backlog ·of cases in 
the Supreme Court is estimated to be 1,168. By 1980 the backlog 
will approach 3,792 cases. (See Table VII.) Thus, it is becom-
ing more and more evident from the continuing increase in the 
annual filing rate that additional steps are necessary to cope 
with the backlog problem. · 
There have been several alternative solutions proposed 
and considered by various study committees and groups to ease 
the burden upon the court caused by the continued high filing 
rate. The Committee on Appellate Courts also considered these 
suggested proposals in an attempt to arrive at a workable solu-
tion to the problem. These alternative~ are: .(1) increase the 
number of Supreme Court judges from seven to nine; (2) more ex-
tensive use of retired and outside judges; (3) some limitations 
on the right of appeal; (4) a Supreme Court Commissioner plan, 
such as the one used in Kentucky; (5) improvement in the inter-
nal efficiency of the court; (6} creation of a separate Criminal 
Court of Appeals; and (7) the creation of an intermediate court 
of appeals. 
Increase in the Number of Supreme Court Justices 
The 1959 Legislative Council Committee on Judicial Admin-
istration considered incre~§~ng the number of Supreme Court 
judges from seven to nine • .;m/ It was felt that this increase 
would allow the court to sit in three departments instead of two 
(as at present), and thus increase the court's productivity. 
The idea was rejected as a short-term means of providing assist-
ance to the court, partially because it would have required· a 
constitutional amendment. Consequently, it would have been at 
least 1961, and possibly 1963, before the additional judges 
could be appointed. In addition, the idea was opposed by some 
on the grounds that the nine-member court would be cumbersome 
and would so complicate administration and procedure that the 
efficiency of the court would not be improved. 
Even though this proposal was rejected as an immediate 
method of assisting the court in 1Q59, the committee inc~uded a 
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative 
Council, Research Publication No. 49, p. xi (Dec. 1960). 
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possible future increase in the number of Supreme Court judges 
in its proposed constitutional amendment (Amendment No. 1, 1962) 
to the judicial article. This amendment was adopted in 1962. 
Section 5 of the judicial article (Article VI) in part provides 
the following: "Upon request of the supreme court, the number 
of justices may be increased to no more than nine members when-
ever two-thirds of the members of each house of the General As-
sembly concur therein." This provision was included as a possi-
ble solution to problems which might arise in the future from 
increased case loads. To avoid any possibility or suggestion of 
court packing on the part of the General Assembly, such increase 
would be possible only if requested by the court itself. 
It is argued on the one hand that increasing the number 
of judges would preclude the necessity of creating an interme-
diate appellate court to handle the increased case load. On the 
other hand, it is argued that a nine-member court would be too 
unwieldy and would not increase the court's production appreci-
ably, because·each member would be required to review the opin-
ions of eight other justices instead of six as at present. 
Consequently, the extra time involved in such a review might 
offset or at least minimize the increase in the number of writ-
ten opinions which might be expected from the addition of two 
justices. 
Only four states (Iowa, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington) 
currently have nine-member Supreme Courts; most states of Colo-
rado's size have Supreme Courts with either five or seven mem-
bers. None of these states, however, have a filing rate as 
great as Colorado's. 
Because of the constitutional provision, the possibility 
of adding two justices cannot be considered by the General As-
sembly unless the court so requests. However, there appears to 
be some resistence within the court to such an increase. This 
resistance is based upon the proposition that an increase in the 
size of the Court, while it would provide more judges to write 
opinions, would also provoke more discussion, disagreement and 
diversity within the court, thus causing a substantial reduction 
in net gain of judicial time. 
The only hope for a solution to the problem along these 
lines is by an increase in the size of the court to nine members, 
coupled with a practice of sitting in three-man departments. This 
was the recommendation of the 1959 Legislative Council Committee 
on Judicial Administration. Several states, including Colorado, 
presently have their highest courts sitting in divisions. Gener-
ally, there are three judges to each division who make the deci-
sions, but considerations by the whole bench are infrequently re-
quired. Proponents of this system claim it saves time and money 
and is far less complicated than instituting an additional appe -
late level. Those who favor divisional sitting also point out 
that under normal condi~ions each judge would not be required to 
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make an investigation of all cases coming before the court, and 
thus fewer judges would normally be required to participate. 
The criticism of sitting in divisions or departments of 
three has many facets. One obvious concern is the liklihood of 
conflicting opinions from the different divisions. With the 
court seated in divisions, there seems to be no single authori-
tative determiner of the law which would seem to make uniformity 
of law impossible. Another criticism is the fact that all three 
judges would probably have to concur in order to render a judg-
ment. Thus, any dissent would require a reargument, with a con-
sequent waste of judicial time. Another criticism is that there 
is too much "luck of the draw'' involved in which judges sit on 
which cases. If the divisions are permanent the result, in ef-
fect, could be two or three supreme courts. Finally, there is a 
feeling that a Supreme Court should sit en bane as much as pos-
sible. 
As indicated above, there are some advantages to an in-
crease in the size of the court to nine members, provided that 
it is coupled with a practice of sitting in three departments of 
three judges each. For whatever reasons, however, the court has 
not chosen to request an increase in the size of the court. For 
this reason, and because it was felt by the committee that in-
creasing the court to nine members would provide an excessive 
and unwieldy number, this solution appeared to the committee to 
be impractical and probably ineffective. 
Use of Outside Judges to Assist the Supreme Court 
The use of outside judges was first advocated by members 
of the court in 1960 as a temporary expedient to reduce the num-
ber of pending cases. The Legislative Council Committee on Ju-
dicial Administration ultimately adopted this proposal as being 
the best of several alternatives considered by it. It decided 
that the immediate need to reduce the cases pending before the 
Supreme Court outweighed the proposal's drawbacks. Thus in 1960, 
the General Assembly appropriated $15,000 to the court to be ex-
pended to pay honorariums and expenses to judges assisting the 
court. During 1960 and early 1961, outside judges accounted for 
approximately 70 written opinions. 
At the time the proposal was adopted there were some res-
ervations expressed by some committee members and others. Oppo-
sition was based upon the following three reasons: 
1) Opinions would be written by judges who did not par-
ticipate in making the decision. 
2) There was a possibility that a backlog could develop 
in the courts of those district judges called up to assist the 
Supreme Court. 
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3) There was a question as to whether it was desirable 
to have such a close relationship between active trial court 
judges and the highest appellate court. 
Because of these reservations the court was careful to 
avoid the possibility of backlogs developing at the trial court 
level by not inviting trial judges to assist the court unless 
they could provide assistance without jeopardizing their own 
dockets. 
During 1967, four retired judges and four active district 
judges were assigned to assist the court. These assignments re-
sulted in 20 written opinions. This assistance was of consider-
able help to the court in achieving its record productivity in 
1967. 
It was noted by the committee that Chief Justice Moore 
will retire the second Tuesday in January, 1969, and will be 
available to assist the court after his retirement, if neces-
sary. In addition to the assistance of Chief Justice Moore af-
ter retirement, it was noted that Justice Edward Day will also 
soon retire and that his assistance could be anticipated. How-
ever, even with the assistance of Chief Justice Moore and Jus-
tice Day and other district court judges, it is anticipated that 
the court still will not be able to keep up with the case load. 
This program of using active district court judges and 
retired Supreme Court judges was first adopted as a temporary 
solution to the immediate backlog problem in 1960 and received 
legislative approval on that basis. At present, the committee 
agreed that the use of outside judges to assist the court is 
simply not facing the problem. They are what their name implies, 
a temporary expedient. The committee concluded that the need is 
for a more permanent solution to the problems caused by the in-
creased filing rate, which is no longer viewed as a temporary 
condition. Any solution to the problem of appellate congestion 
should look to a gradual phasing out of temporary solutions, 
rather than an ~~5rease, as permanent solutions replace tempor-
ary expedients.~ ·Therefore, the committee concluded that the 
visiting judges' program is not a satisfactory long term solu-
tion. 
Pro tempore judge system. At the July 26, 1968 meeting, 
the committee heard from Mr. William M. Lowry, Clerk of the Su-
preme Court of Washington, who explained to the committee the 
operation of the pro tempore judge system in the state of Wash-
W Doyle, Battle of the Backlog in the Supreme Court, 33 Rocky 
Mountain Law Review 494 (June 1961). 
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ington. This system was created in 1962 when a constitutional 
amendment was adopted and implemented by legislation in 1963 
which empowered a majority of the regular members of the Supreme 
Court to authorize judges or retired judges of courts of record 
to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court. Under this system 
the judge pro tempore has the same power and authority as a judge 
of the Supreme Court, except he is not allowed to function on 
opinions written by members of a department of the court of which 
he was not a member, did not hear oral argument, or did not par-
ticipate in departmental conference discussion of the case. Not 
more than one judge pro tempore is to sit with a department at 
any one time. A judge pro tempore writes opinions for the court 
that have been assigned to him and when these opinions become 
the opinion of the court they are published in regular fo:rrn, ex-
cept that a reference symbol is placed after the name of the pro 
tempore judge, directing att~qtion to the fact that he is serv-
ing as a judge pro tempore._g, 
It was reported by Mr. Lowry that the pro tempore judge 
system.was commenced in 1963 and that maximum use has been made 
of it since 1965. While the additional manpower of the pro tern-
pore judge system has been eno:rrnously helpful, increasing the 
number of decided cases by approximately 90 per year, it has not 
been capable of stemming the growth of the backlog •. Mr. Lowry 
reported that the average time required for the regufarjudges 
to write an opinion is 12 days while the average time required 
for a pro tempore judge is 8.4 days. One limitation on the use 
of active judges is that they cannot hear appeals from their own 
districts. With respect to cost, Mr. Lowry reported that it 
averages out to a cost of $672.18 per case for the pro tempore 
judges. 
Mr. Lowry reported that three of the regular members of 
the Supreme Court feel that the use of pro tempore judges results 
in a looseness in the definition and clarification of issues. 
More revisions of opinions are required for opinions wtitten by 
pro tempore judges (3.03 percent) as compared with opinions writ-
ten by regular judges (2.9 percent). In addition, Mr. Lowry re-
ported that the Court Reporter has stated that the opinions of 
the pro tempore judges are more difficult to h.ea~~<}te because 
they usually lack experience in opinion writing.~ 
Limitations on the Right of Appeal 
Changes in the prevailing method of appellate review, or 
restrictions on the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, have 
See note 36, infra, at p. 12. 
Id., at p. 13 
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also been suggested as methods for curtailing the number of 
cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court. There are two gener-
al methods of cutting down the input of appeals by restricting 
the right of appeal. The first is by increasing the jurisdic-
tional limits, or by making certain types of cases non-appeal-
able. A system of permitting at least one appeal, however, is 
deeply ingrained in the Colorado judicial system, as in the 
American procedure generally. In almost no jurisdiction has it 
been found acceptable to eliminate the right of appeal in cer-
tain types of cases. 
It was also suggested that a monetary limit could be 
placed on cases appealed to the Supreme Court. For example, it 
could be provided that cases wherein the amount in controversy 
was less than $20,000 are not appealable. It was felt, however, 
that it is the issues of law in the case which are important and 
not necessarily the dollar amount. A monetary limit on the 
amount involved in an appeal not only would eliminate too few 
appeals to make any great difference, but would probably elimi-
nate the wrong ones. It is most unusual for a $2,500 case to be 
appealed, unless there is an important legal question involved, 
justifying consideration by the Supreme Court; a $25,000 case, 
on the other hand, is likely to be appealed simply because of 
the amount involved, irrespective of the importance of the ques-
tions involved. 
The other way of eliminating appeals is by permitting dis-
cretionary review of at least certain types of cases, as in the 
certiorari practice of the United States Supreme Court. The 
term "certiorari" means a discretionary appellate proceeding for 
review and re-examination of the action of an inferior court or 
tribunal. Once again, however, the tradition has been to permit 
at least one appeal as of right in practically every American 
jurisdiction. Almost the only states having courts with certio-
rari powers are those which provide an appeal as of right to an 
intermediate appellate court. 
The committee, in its deliberations, has abided by what 
seems to be an unvarying thesis: a litigant is entitled to at 
least one appeal as a matter of right in every case. The thesis 
that there should be nti limitation on the right to at least one 
appeal in every case still persists. Therefore, the committee 
ruled out serious consideration of devices designed to reduce 
appellate congestion which would preclude in all or some in-
stances one's absolute right to an appeal in every case. 
Supreme Court Commissioner System 
Several jurisdictions have commissioners to assist the 
judges of their highest courts in the performance of their du-
ties. A recent survey of the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion indicates that eight states utilize commissioners in their 
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highest courts, and Missouri has two commissioners in each of 
its intennediate appellate courts. The duties relegated to these 
commissioners vary vastly.l1/ 
In Michigan the commissioners are older and experienced 
lawyers. Everything addressed to the Supreme Court, after being 
docketed by the clerk, is assigned to one of the commissioners. 
He studies the application for leave to appeal, the motion, or 
whatever it is, and the briefs in opposition and prepares a 
written report stating: (1) the subject: (2j the facts and pro-
ceedings below; and (3) the issues. The commissioner then ana-
lyzes the law of the case and concludes with a fonnal recommended 
order. If it be a denial of the appeal, the reasons are brieflr 
stated. If an appeal is granted, the order may limit the appea 
to certain issues. Copies of the commissioner's report are 
placed in the hands of each member of the court. If there is no 
objection from any justice within a certain period of time the 
chief justice signs the order. If any justice dissents or wants 
to discuss the matter with his colleagues, he advises the com-
missioner's office and the matter is held. for the next conference 
of the justices.~ 
In Kentucky the commissioners are elected by majority vote 
of the justices of the Supreme Court. These commissioners are 
lawyers who have had considerable legal experience and meet the 
same qualifications as the regular members of the court. The 
commissioners are given the same power as a regular justice, ex-
cept the power to vote. The commissioners are directed to write 
opinions for the court and these opinions, if approved by a ma-
jority vote of the Supreme Court, are adopted by the court as 
their opinions. In addition, each District Court judge is des-
ignated as an ex-officio commissioner and can be called upon to 
assist the court as a commissioner. For this service they are 
paid an additional $2,400. The justices of the Supreme Court re-
ceive an annual salary of $26,000 and the commissioners are paid 
a salary of $22,500.W 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in 1964, adopted a rule au-
thorizing panels of three attorneys, recommended by the Oklahoma 
Bar Association, to prepare advisory opinions for the court. 
Several panels were established and cases were assigned to the 
panels for advisory opinions. Justice Pat Irwin of the Oklahoma 
Special Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration 
of the Maryland State Bar Association, 1 Md. App. Rep. XVIII 
(1965-66). 
A Report of the Judicial Council of Virginia to the General 
Assembly and Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1966 and 
1967, p. 15. 
Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1968, p. 2. 
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Supreme Court reported to the committee that this system did not 
prove to be ~uccessful and.the plan has now been abandoned._/ 
The main criticism of this plan or suggested solution is 
that the use of commissioners or other outside help is not really 
that beneficial to the court. Persons who are called to assist 
the court are just not as precise and clear with respect to opin-
ion writing as are the regular judges who are responsible for 
their opinions and who are familiar with opinion writing tech-
niques. The most important challenge which may be leveled at 
this plan is that litigants are entitled to a decision in a case 
made by judges, not by assistants of the court. If the court is 
to be expanded by providing for additional personnel, there is 
no reason why they should not be full fledged justices, rather 
than a judge in fact but not in name. The same arguments mili-
tating against the addition of additional judges to the Supreme 
Co~rt apply to the employment of commissioners. 
Improvement of the Efficiency of the Supreme Court's Operations 
Other solutions to the backlog problem have been proposed 
in the past. These proposals are mainly concerned with improv-
ing the internal efficiency of the Colorado Supreme Court. The 
committee, during i.ts deliberations 1 9ave consideration to sev-eral of these proposals, including \1) the use of memorandum 
opinions, (2) doing away with oral _argument in some instances, 
(3) not granting extensions of time. and (4) providing for more 
assistants. 
Memorandum oginions. There are two approaches to writing 
an opinion •. One approach is tenned "result opinion writing," 
i.e., an opinion that merely decides the ca~e without setting 
forth any reasons why the v.articular result was reached. The 
second approach is t_ermed 'legal opinion writing," i.e.,. an ap-
proach that sets forth the legal reasoning behind a particular 
result or decision.. In this approach, an opportunity is afforded 
the bench to set down legal principles that will serve to guide 
others in their actions. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado tried to gain on the backlog 
several years ago by not writing a full detailed opinion for 
every case. In other words, some cases were disposed of by a 
memorandum opinion which merely announced the decision of the 
court without the statement of reasons therefor. However, this 
procedure did not meet with the favor of the bar and has practi-
cally been discontinued. Nevertheless, the court began using the 
memorandum opinion again in 1967. 
Memorandum No. 5, Olclahoma Appellate Court System, p. 7 
(July 25/, 1968) • 
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The past court procedure of not utilizing the memorandum 
opinion was criticized because, when one case is governed by a 
prior decision, the extensive written opinion often adds nothing 
to the body of law and sometimes proves detrimental to discover-
ing the true rules of decision. In addition, it takes a great 
deal of time, study and effort to prepare a full dressed, de-
tailed opinion and/or to study an opinion submitted by another 
judge. The time and effort expended in preparing an opinion by 
the judge to whom it is assigned and consideration of the same 
by the other judges are not always devoted to the results to be 
obtained, but to the verbage employed and what should be and 
should not be in the opinion. 
It is argued that if no new legal issue is presented, and 
only one or two decisive issues are presented, and the court is 
of the view that the case should be either affirmed or reversed, 
and a detailed opinion is not necessary to avoid errors on re-
trial if reversed, there is very little reason to promulgate a 
detailed written opinion under such circumstances. For these 
reasons, it is suggested that it would be-preferable for the 
court merely to write a memorandum decision declaring that the 
case is governed by a prior decision or the result that was 
reached by the court when circumstances permit. This tech-
nique, it is hoped, will reduce the work of the court to some 
degree. 
The committee generally concluded that the Supreme Crurt 
is already using the memorandum opinion or the per curiam system 
wherever it thinks it possible to do so. At the present rate of 
filing, even more extensive use of the memorandum opinion is not 
likely to be effective in reducing substantially the backlog of 
cases. Therefore, the committee determined that this method 
could not be an effective long term solution. The committee also 
noted that the Supreme Court has considered the practice of af-
firming the judgment of the trial court without written opinions 
and decided not to implement the practice -because of various 
policy reasons. 
Less use of oral argument. It has been suggested.in the 
past that the court abandon the practice of hearing oral argu-
ment, at least in some cases. The court now hears oral argument 
in almost all cases. Pursuant to Rule 117 of the Colorado Rules 
of Civil Procedure either party may request an oral argument or 
the court may, of its own motion, order oral argument at any 
time. Oral argument is limited to 30 minutes to a side unless 
the court, by order, extends the time thereof. It is felt by 
some that if the court did not hear oral argument in most cases 
it could devote that time to the writing of opinions and other 
duties. However, the hearing of oral argument is very important 
and valuable to the individual judges and the court presently has 
no inclination to abolish the practice~ · 
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Extensi9ns of time. Th~ committee recognized that the 
court has often been criticized for and accused of not accom-
plishing more work because of its liberal attitude toward the 
granting of extensions of time within which to file briefs and 
records •.. That the court could adopt a get tough attitude and 
stop granting extensions is admitted; however, the committee 
considerQd that one _should not forget the litigant in this mat-
ter and that th·e litigant should not be penalized because of the 
delay of his attorney. Because of the present delay in the court, 
there is no sound reason for not granting extensions of time as 
it· would not aid the court in any event. It was noted that if 
other things could be done to expedite the process of cases 
through the_ courts, any problems with respect to the granting of 
extensi·Qn.S· wi-ll work itself out . ... ,, . 
Use of more assistants. Some of the states authorize the 
appointment of more than one assistant for the judges on their 
appellate courts. For example, each judge of the California 
Supreme Co~~~ employs two research attorneys and one research 
assistant.2§/ . 
It is believed by some that the employment of additional 
law clerks for the judges of the Supreme Court would not bear ap-
preciably on the workload of the judges. Assistants could not 
help out in many of the time-consuming tasks such as reading 
briefs, hearing arguments, and attending conferences. 
Summary. The committee generally concluded that the pres-
ent case load appears to be well beyond what even the most effi-
cient court can reasonably be expected to handle with the present 
number of personnel. To expect the present judges to write more 
opinions appears to be unreasonable for the quality of judicial 
opinions is more likely to be deficient when a judge is expected 
to write more than the optimum number of opinions. The effect 
of poor quality opinions is to produce uncertainty in the law. 
This uncertainty has the effect of encouraging more appeals.W 
Thus, even if there should be an increase in the internal oper-
ating efficiency of the court, it would not furnish a complete 
solution to the existing problem. 
A Separate Court of Criminal Appeals 
The committee expressed some interest in the possible 
creation of a separate Court of Criminal Appeals. The docket 
Special Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration 
of the Maryland State Bar Association, 1 Md. App. ·Rep. XVIII 
(1965-66). 
Minutes of Meeting, June 14, 1968, p. 8. 
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analysis disclosed that 23 percent of the cases before the court 
· were criminal cases. The total of all criminal, habeas corpus, 
extradition, and juvenile cases amounts to approximately 2o per-
cent of the total case load. For this reason, the suggestion 
was made that the creation of a separate Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, with jurisdiction to hear all criminal cases, would help 
alleviate the backlog problem in the Colorado Supreme Court. 
A Court of Criminal Appeals could be established by any 
one of the following three alternative methods: 1) a Court of 
Criminal Appeals with final jurisdiction; 2) an intermediate ap-
pellate Court of Criminal Appeals with further appeal to the Su-
preme Court; and 3) an increase in the size of the Supreme Court 
and establishment of a Criminal Appeals Department. 
Separate court of criminal ap~eals. Only Oklahoma has a 
separate court of criminal appeals with final jurisdiction. 
Thus, there is little precedent for dividing the appellate busi-
ness between civil and criminal courts. In addition, the crea-
tion of such a court would require a con~titutional amendment. 
In Oklahoma, appellate jurisdiction is divided between 
two courts: the Supreme Court (nine members) has appellate jur-
isdiction in all civil cases at laws and equity; the Criminal 
Court of Appeals (three members) has exclusive jurisdiction over 
all criminal cases appealed from courts of record.iQ/ The Crim-
inal Court of Appeals is composed of three judges elected for 
six-year terms and who receive the same annual salary as Supreme 
Court Justices ($22,500).~ The court may issue writs of habe-
ea corpus and other writs as may be necessary to exercise its 
jurisdiction. In addition, the court may pre·scribe its own rules, 
and ascertain matters of fact upon affidavit or o~h~rwise as may 
be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.W 
Until July 1, 1968, the Court of Criminal Appeals operated 
with only three judges, each of whom is provided with one secre-
tary. Commencing July 1, 1968, the court has employed one ref-
eree. It is the plan to utilize the referee to meet the deluge 
of original proceedings, especially the petitions for issuance 
of the writ of habeas corpus filed prose by inmates in one of 
the penal institutions. 
It is argued that the greatest single advantage found in 
having a separate court for criminal appeals with exclusive jur-
isdiction in all criminal appeals lies in the relief provided 
k a. on st. rt. 7, § • 
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 31, § 285 (1962); Okla. Session Laws 
1967, ch. 128; Senate Bill 351, 1968 Session. 
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 41, 42 \1962). 
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the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the urgency attached to 
criminal processes, there are many instances when civil matters 
require the same urgent attention. The Oklahoma system, it is 
argued, prevents any interference in this respect because the 
Court of Criminal.~ppeals makes a final determination of all 
criminal appeals.~ 
Intermediate appellate court of criminal appeals. Three 
states, Texas, Tennessee, and Maryland, have created an intenne-
diate appellate court with exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The 
decisions of these courts are not final and are subject to furth-
er review, by certiorari or otherwise, by the Supreme Court in 
that state. 
Texas has two intermediate appellate courts, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals and the Courts of Civil Appeals. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals consists of three judges elected for six-year 
te:rms. The current annual salary for the judges of the Court of 
Criminal ~peals is the same as for Supreme Court justices, 
$27,000.~ There are 14 separate Courts.of Criil Appeals, and 
each court is composed of three judges elected for six-year terms 
and who receive an annual salary of $24,000.~ 
The Constitution of Texas grants the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals appellate jurisdiction over all criminal causes with the 
proviso that exceptions and regulations may be prescribed by law. 
The court and the judges have the power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus and other writs necessary to enforce the court's jurisdic-
tion. The court also has the power, by affidavit or oth~r1ise, 
to ascertain matters of fact in cases pending before it.W' 
Tennessee presently has a Supreme Court (five members), 
and an intermediate Court of Appeals (nine members) which was 
created in 1925. In addition, in 1967, the state established a 
Court of Criminal Appeals, wbLch is an intermediate court with 
criminal jurisdiction only.W The Court of Criminal Appeals is 
composed of three.jqdges who, after 1968, will be elected for 
eight-year terms.1§/ Salaries of judges of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals are to be the same as the judges of the Court of Appeals, 
$17,500.~ 
Letter from Vice Chief Justice Pat Irwin of the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court ;to Colorado Legislative Council Committee on 
Appellate Courts, dated July 16, 1968. 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1801 (1964); Texas Const. Art. 
5, § 4. 
Vernons Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1817 (1964). 
Texas Const. Art. 5, § 5. 
Public Acts of Tenn. 1967, ch. 226. 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 442{ 443 (1956, Supp. 1967) •. 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 445 1956, Supp. 1967); $20,000 as of 
1970. 
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The jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals is ap-
pellate only and extends to all criminal cases, both felony and 
misdemeanor. The court also has jurisdiction over all cases 
arising under any post conviction procedure statute and cases 
involving or attacking the validity of a final conviction or 
judgment in a criminal case. The court does not have jurisdic-
tion of ony case in which the sole question for determination 
involv£~
1
the constitutionality of a statute or municipal ordi-
nance.~ Before the court was created the Supreme Court heard 
all criminal cases. Now, however, they go to the new interme-
diate Court of Criminal Appeals and to the Supreme Court on pe-
tition for writ of certiorari. During the first year of opera-
tion over 400 cases were filed in the new court. This has 
created a heavy case problem and consider2t~on is now being 
given to increasing the number of judges.W 
In 1966, the Maryland legislature created an intei~7diate court of appeals, known as the Court of Special Appeals.g By 
these acts, the court's jurisdiction was prescribed to include, 
inter alia, ( a) appeals of criminal convi_ctions where the death 
sentence had not been imposed, and (b) applications for leave to 
appeal under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, where 
the sentence was other than death, and (c) applications for 
leave to appeal from determinations and redeterminations of de-
fective delinquency under the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act. 
The court is composed of five judges, elected to serve a term of 
15 years. They currently receive an annual salary of $27,500. 
The concurrence of a majority of the entire court is necessary 
for the decision of any cause and the c9~~t is not allowed to 
sit in one or more panels or divisions.W 
A similar proposal to create a three-man intermediate ap-
pellate court with criminal jurisdiction only was considered and 
recommended in Oregon in 1966. The court was to have final jur-
isdiction subject to further appeal at the discretion of the~~/ 
preme Court. However, this recommendation was never adopted.~ 
Advantages and disadvantages of a court of criminal ap-
peals. The number of criminal cases being appealed continues to 
increase. The large number of crimes being committed will gen-
erate inevitably a greater number of criminal appeals. Often 
groundless appeals are taken because an individual convicted of 
a crime feels that he has nothing to lose by appealing. Also, 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 448 (1956, Supp. 1967). 
Letter from Mr. T. Mack Blackburn, Exec. Secretary to Supreme 
Court of Tennessee, to Legislative Council, dated August 5, 
1968. . 
Acts of Maryland 1966 1 ch. 11 and 12. Md. Code Ann. 26-130 ~1957, Rep. Vol. 1966). 
Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1968, p. 25. 
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counsel is provided by the state for a large percentage of all 
criminal appellants. In addition, recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States have contributed in large part 
to the increasingly dominant role of criminal cases on the dock-
et of the Supreme Court. Also, new trials often result from a 
finding that such U.S. Supreme Court cases must be given retro-
spective application. All of these factors, it is believed, will 
result in a continued increase in the number of criminal cases 
before the Colorado Supreme Court. 
It is claimed that the major advantage to the creation of 
a separate court of criminal appeals, whether final or interme-
diate, is that it will greatly alleviate the burden on the Su-
preme Court. It is believed that it would be of material benefit 
to the administration of justice to have an appellate court spe-
cializing primarily in criminal law. This area of law has been 
developing in recent years as rapidly as any and probably more 
rapidly than most. With the criminal law in a state of change, 
it seems desirable to establish a court with expertise in this 
critical area. 
If it is desirable that the business of the Supreme Court 
be divided between it and another court, whether final or inter-
mediate, it is argued that the division between civil and crim-
inal cases is as simple and convenient as any other. It is felt 
that this division will avoid any conflicts of jurisdiction or 
vague categorization of classes of cases. 
The objections to the court of criminal appeals approach 
have principally been along the line that judges should not be 
specialists.· Another area of criticism of the idea, at least 
the idea of having a court of criminal appeals with final juris-
diction, is that the decisions between the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals might conflict, and there would be no 
method of resolving differences of opinion regarding, for exam-
ple, the law of evidence. On the other hand, it is argued that 
this is a criticism of little merit, because in different con-
texts the same question may well lead to different answers, and 
there appears to be no reason why evidence which is admissible 
for the purpose of a ci"vil trial may not be admissible for pur-
poses of a criminal trial, and vice versa. 
In any event, if a separate court of criminal appeals is 
to be established, a decision has to be made whether the court 
is to be intermediate or final. Arguments in favor of having a 
court with final jurisdiction are that it would avoid double ap-
peals and relieve the Supreme ~ourt of all responsibility for 
hearing criminal cases. This approach is criticized because it 
would create two Supreme Courts, one with civil and one with 
criminal jurisdiction. It is felt that two courts with final 
jurisdiction is undesirable •. 
Advantages to an intermediate court of criminal appeals 
are that it would relieve the Supreme Court of its criminal case 
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load while at the same time avoiding the objections raised with 
respect to the·establishment of a court with final jurisdiction. 
This approach is criticized because it would probably lead to 
double appeals in many instances. Because many litigants in 
criminal cases have their appeals financed by the state, it is 
presumed that virtually all of them will petition the Supreme 
Court for review of any intermediate decision. For example, if 
it is assumed that there would be 90 such petitions, and the Su-
preme Court deems one out of six worthy of its consideration, 
there would be some 75 cases which the Supreme Court would have 
to discuss, study, consider, and vote on, which would neverthe-
less be finally determined in the court of criminal appeals. 
Thus, while there might be a considerable saving of judicial time, 
there would, at the same time, be a considerable waste. 
Increase size of Supreme Court and provide for criminal 
tlpeals department. Consideration of the two foregoing alterna-
ve approaches suggested another alternative approach. Assum-
ing that it is desirable that a court of criminal appeals have 
final jurisdiction and to have it utilize the same facilities as 
the Supreme Court, a question was raised as to why it is neces-
sary to have a separate court at all. It was thus suggested 
that perhaps the Supreme Court could be increased in number, with 
the provision that three members of the court, on assignment by 
the Chief Justice, sit as a Department of Criminal Appeals. It 
is argued that this approach would achieve every advantage of a 
separate court of criminal appeals without the necessity of an 
actual separate court. This approach, however, would require a 
constitutional amendment if the Supreme Court were increased to 
more than nine members. Thus, if more than nine members were 
necessary in order to establish the suggested plan, there would 
be a delay of two or more years before the system could be oper-
ative. On the other hand, it is arguable whether the implemen-
tation of the plan with just nine members (thus obviating the 
necessity for a constitutional amendment) would be effective in 
reducing the case load. 
The advantages to the approach are that a statutory 
structure necessary to establish a new court would be eliminated 
and it would not be necessary to establish new budgetary provi-
sions, new administrative provisions, and new procedural provi-
sions. Moreover, the objection of specialization could be 
avoided by permitting the judges of the criminal department to 
serve terms of one, two or three years, on a rotating basis, de-
pending upon the preference of the individual judge and the needs 
of the court as determined by the Chief Justice. 
The primary objection to this proposal is that it will re-
quire a constitutional amendment if more than nine judges are 
necessary. The problem of the backlog is an immediate problem. 
The delay inherent in obtaining voter approval of a constitutional 
amendment will create further delay in the court. Furthermore, 
it is argued that more than nine judges will be too many for the 
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Supreme Court. If an intermediate appellate court is eventually 
established, the Supreme Court would be larger than nec;essary to 
handle its case load. 
Creation of Intermediate Appellate Court 
l 
As indicated previously, many states which have used some 
of the methods discussed above for reducing court congestion have 
eventually turned as well to the intermediate appellate court 
system as a mo:re permanent and long lasting solution -to their 
court problems. The creation of an intermediate court of appeals 
on a temporary basis and/or on a permanent basis has_ also been 
considered several times in the past as a solution to the Supreme 
Court backlog problem in Colorado. Many are of.the opinion that 
the creation of an intermediate court of'appeals would provide 
the best solution to the appellate case load problem. Others feel 
that the problems can be solved without creating another appel-
late court. 
Prior courts of appeal in Colorado. An intermediate ap-
pellate. court has been established twice before in Colorado · 
(1891-1904 and 1911-1915) to assist the cou~t in disposing of a 
large number of pending cases. On both occasions, the Court of 
Appeals was created by statute. · 
Th_e Colorado Court of Appeal~ ( 1891-1904) was created by 
Senate Bill 98, adopted at the 1891 legislative session. The 
Court of Appeals was grante~ appellate jurisdiction· only. The 
legislation provided for thre~ judges to be appointed by the Gov-_ 
ernor. The first appointment& were to be made for staggered 
terms of two, four, and six years. Subsequent appointments were 
to be made for six .. year terms. The appointed judges were to pos-
sess the same .qualifications required of Supreme Court judges and 
they received an annual salary of $5,000. · 
The Court of Appeals was granted final jurisdiction to re-
view the final judgments of-inferior courts in all civil cases 
where the amount involved in the judgment, or in replevin, was 
$2,500 or leSSi It also had -jurisdiction; not final, to review 
all criminal cases, except capital criminal cases. This final 
jurisdiction was subject ·to the limitation that it was not final 
in cases where the controversy involved a franchise or freehold, 
or where the construction of a provision of the constitution of 
Colorado or the United States was necessary to a decision in the 
case. Thus, no writ of error from, or appeal to, the Supreme 
Court would lie to review the final judgment of any inferio~ 
court, unless the judgment exceeded $2,500, except when the mat-
ter in controversy related to a franchise or freehold or where 
the construction of·a constitutional provision was involved. How-
ever, none of the foregoing limitations applied to writs of error 
to county courts. 
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Writs of error from, or appeals to, the Court of Appeals 
to review final judgments were. to be made within the same time 
and in the same manner as was provided by law for_such ~eviews by 
the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals was given authority sim-:.· 
ilar to that of the Supreme Court to issue all necessary and proper 
writs and other processes on causes within its jurisdiction. The 
statute also provided that any cases pending before the Supreme 
Court which were within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
could, by order of the Supreme Court, be transferred to the Court 
of Appeals for determination. Every final judgment of the Court 
of Appeals, in cases which could have been taken to the Supreme. 
Court in the first instance, could be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Cases filed in the Court of Appeals which were not within 
the final jurisdiction thereof could, before decision, be trans-
ferred to the Supreme Court upon motion of any party. 
The Court of Appeals was a court of record and its opinions 
were to be delivered as required by the Supreme Court and published 
in a like manner. That the Court of Appeals did a vast amount of 
work was shown in the 20 volumes of its reports. However, the 
existence of two appellate courts apparently created a certain de-
gree of friction, so that in 1904 the Court of Appeals was abol- · 
ished and a constitutional amendment was adopted increasing the 
number of Supreme Court judges from three to seven and terms from 
nine to ten years. 
In 1911, the Colorado General Assembly again created an in-
termediate court of appeals by the adoption of Senate Bill No. 
351, 1911 session. This court was created for a four-year period. 
The courl was composed of five judqes. not more than three of whom 
could belong to the same political-party. These judges were to · 
have the same qualifications and were to receive the same salary 
as Supreme Court judges. The judges where to be appointed by the 
Governor, with the approval of the Senate, to serve during the 
existence of the court. 
The Court of Appeals was given the jurisdiction to review 
and determine all judgments in civil cases pending before the Su-
preme Court and all cases that could thereafter and during the 
life of the Court of Appeals be taken to the Supreme Court for 
review, except in those cases from county courts on writs of er-
ror. The legislation provided that the Supreme Court should 
transfer to the Court of Appeals, for hearing and determination, 
as many civil causes, then or thereafter pending before the Su-
preme Court, as it deemed advisable. All jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court on appeal was repealed. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals in all such cases was 
final and conclusive, except in causes wherein the decision nec-
essarily involved the construction of a provision of the Colorado 
or United States constitution, or related to a franchise or free-
hold, or involved a judgment for more than $5,000. Such cases 
could be reheard in the Supreme Court by writ of error from the 
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Court of Appeals. Or if, before any hearing in any case, either 
party thereto advised the Court of Appeals that the case belonged 
to one of the classes of cases above, and if the court upon in-
vestigation so found, it was at once and without further proceed-
ings remanded to the Supreme Court for determination. 
The Court of Appeals was given the power to issue all nec-
essary and proper writs and processes in aid of its jurisdiction, 
in the same manner and with the same effect as the Supreme Court. 
The court was created as a court of record and its opinions were 
required to be published in the same manner as were the opinions 
of the Supreme Court. However, the preparation of written opin-
ions giving reasons for the conclusion reached, especially in the 
affirmance of judgments, was discretionary, anq the court could· 
at its option dispense therewith in such cases as it desired. 
The statute provided that the Court of Appeals would ter-
minate and cease to exist at the end of four years from the tak-
ing effect of the act. The General Assembly did not re-enact the 
statute in 1915 at the expiration of the four-year period and 
Colorado has not had an intermediate court of appeals since that 
time. 
Possibility of intermediate court in Colorado. As indi-
cated before, many feel that the creation of a permanent interme-
diate appellate court is the best long-run solution to Colorado's 
backlog problem. If an intermediate court of appeals were to be 
of immediate help to the court, it.would have to be provided for 
by statute rather than by the more time-consuming process of con-
stitutional amendment. One possible disadvantage of creating 
this court by statute is that its jurisdiction might be limited 
by the provisions of the judicial article concerning appeals. 
These limitations would probably require the Supreme Court to re-
view certain decisions made by the intermediate appellate court 
or at least consider their review on writ of certiorari. At· 
least the question has been raised as to whether the new judicial 
article permits the creation of an intermediate appellate court 
whose decisions would be final unless the Supreme Court granted a 
writ of certiorari. Unless cases could be terminated at the in-
termediate appellate level, the addition of such a court would 
probably only add to the problem; the cost involved and the com-
plications arising out of double appellate review might offset 
the advantages to be gained from having two appeals courts. 
Article VI, Section 2 (2) of the judicial article provides 
the following: 
(2) Appellate review by the supreme court of 
every final judgment of the district courts, 
the probate court of the city and county of 
Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and 
county of Denver shall be allowed, and the 
supreme court shall have such other appellate 
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review as may be provided by law. There shall 
be no appellate review by the district court 
of any final judgment of the probate court of 
the city and county of Denver or of the juve-
nile court of the city and county of Denver •. 
It has been the opinion of some that the above section 
makes it mandatory for the Supreme Court to allow all appeals 
from district court and from the Denver juvenile and probate 
courts. Therefore, an intermediate court would be of little 
value because all of its decisions could be appealed as a matter 
of right to the Supreme Court. Others have been of the opinion 
that the section can be interpreted in such a way that Supreme 
Court review to determine whether a case should be heard by the 
court on a writ of certiorari would be sufficient to satisfy the 
appellate review provision. If this is the case, it would be 
possible to establish an intermediate Court of Appeals with 
specific statutory jurisdiction. Cases falling within the juris-
diction of the intermediate court could be taken up to the Su-
preme Court on a writ of certiorari. Cases falling outside of 
the statutory jurisdiction given the intermediate appellate 
court would go from the trial court to the Supreme Court on ap-
peal as a matter of right. 
Assuming that the creation of an intermediate appellate 
court is feasible, many problems arise as to the court's struc-
ture, composition and jurisdiction. It has been suggested that 
an intermediate appellate court would not be effective unless 
there were at least two divisions of three judges each,with these 
divisions established geographically so that they would in effect 
be circuit courts of appeal. Indeed, most of the states which 
utilize an intermediate appellate court system-have either (1) a 
single court with several divisions thereof,each division serv-
ing a different region of the state, or (2) several district 
courts of appeal, each district serving a different region of the 
state. It is• felt by some that an intermediate appellate court 
with only one division -- even one with more than three judges --
would very rapidly build up a backlog. of pending cases, so that 
the problem would merely be transferred from one appellate level 
to the other. 
Arguments for and against intermediate court system. 
Those who favor an intermediate court maintain that its creation 
has dramatically reduced the case load at the highest appellate 
level in most states, and has thus enabled the highest appellate 
court to take more time to deliberate cases and in this way has 
improved the complexion of appellate jurisdiction overall. 
Others, in favor of the system, emphasize that the intermedi·ate 
appellate system increases the capacity of the court system to 
accommodate-more litigants. Defenders of the srstem suggest, as 
well, that the intermediate court's main virtue s its flexibility 
in organization which allows it to counter excessive case loads 
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in many different areasdepending_on the area most burdened.W 
·, . 
; 
Opponents of ·the system disagree that the advantages of 
an intermediate system outweigh its disadvantages and suggest 
that separation of ·appellate Jurisdic:tion breeds confusion in 
rules and procedure and makes uniformity impossible. Those who 
are against the system maintain that adding an inferior appellate 
structure decreases the quality of the state's appellate judiciary 
and weakens the re_spectabili ty ·. of precedent law. Others in op-
position argue that an intermedia·te appellate system encourages 
double appeals •. Still others are in opposition to_tl\e plan be-
cause of the expense to establish and maintain it.2.2/ 
Intermediate courts in o her ·urisdictions. A summary of 
the organizat on, power, and jur sd ction oft e intermediate 
appellate courts in the 20 states which have such a court is con-
tained in the next ~ectipn of this report. 
Questionnai-re to Dis.trict and County Court Judges 
At the June 14, 1968 meeting, the committee directed that 
a questionnaire be !;ent to district and county court judges in an 
attempt to solicit comments and suggestions on various methods to 
alleviate the backlog problem. The judges were.asked to answer 
specific que~tions -·· Qn the questionnaire and these replies were 
compiled by the staff. (See Appendix B for copy of questionnaire.) 
Forty-severi·of 70 dj,,stric:t judges and 42 of 94 county judges com-
pleted the question~ai;re~ _The. compilation. of · these replies, in 
relation to the spec.ific questions·. asked, follows: 
1. D.o you think that more extensive use of outside 
and retired judges would aid the Supreme Court 
in its attempt ·to reduce-the current. backlog of 









w Intermediate Appellate Coµrts, American Judicature Society, 
Report No. 20, p. 9 (Aug. l967). e 
a§/ ill.q. ' 
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2. Do you think that increasing the number of 
judges in the Supreme Court from seven to 










3. Do you think that an enlarged court. with 
possibly 12 judges. sitting in separate crim-










4. Do you think that the prevailing method of 
appellate review should be changed, such as by 
limiting the right of appeal or by changing 










5. Do you think that an intermediate appellate 
court between the trial courts and the Supreme 









6. Assuming that an intermediate court of appeals 
is established, do you think the intermediate 
court should be (1) one court with jurisdiction 
coextensive with the entire state, l2) one 
court with several separate divisions. each di-
vision having jurisdiction over a particular 
geographical region of the state, or (3) two 
or more se~arate courts of appeal, each court 
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having jurisdiction over a particular district 
of the state? 
District judges Counti judges 
t 21 13 ~l 10 11 4 5 
7. Assuming that an intermediate appellate court 
is established, do you think that county court 
appeals should go (1) to the intermediate 








8. Assuming that an intermediate appellate court 
is established, do you think that it should be 
granted jurisdiction to review administrative 
decisions (workmen's compensation, unemployment 
compensation, Public Utilities orders and de-
cisions, etc.) rather than having the district 









Summary. It appears that most of those who replied to the 
questionnaire favor the establishment of an intermediate appel-
late court as the best solution to the Supreme Court backlog 
problem. A majority of those responding apparently thought that 
none of the first four proposed solutions {the first four ques-
tions) was the best answer or solution. Questions six through 
eight relate to specific problems involved in the establishment 
of an intermediate court. The majority of those responding to 
question six believed that the intermediate court should be one 
court with jurisdiction coextensive with the state. Question 
seven demonstrates that the majority believe that county court 
appeals should continue to go to the district courts rather· than 
the intermediate court, should one be established. Question 
eight shows that there is a split of opinion by those responding 
as to whether administrative review cases should go to the inter-
mediate court or the district courts, should an intermediate 
court be established. 
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INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS 
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Twenty states (and the federal government) now have tri-
bunals or intermediate appellate courts betwf~en the trial courts 





















The jurisdiction of these intermediate bodies is primarily 
appellate. Some have no original jurisdiction whatsoever; others 
have limited original jurisdiction. These intermediate courts 
purportedly serve two main purposes. They relieve the state 
pUpreme court of its caseload, while at the same time giving lit-
igants at least one appeal, and they.provide for specific dispo-
sition of appeals in certain classes of cases. 
The constitutions of eight of these states provide for an 
intermediate court. In Illinois, the creation of such courts is 
discretionary. The legislatures of Alabama, Indiana, Pennsylva-
nia, and Tennessee have established intermediate courts under 
general powers to create additional tribunals. Three states have 
abandoned the plan -- Colorado (1915), Kansas (1901) and Kentucky 
( 1894) • 
Court Structure 
Intermediate appellate courts are of two organizational 
types: a central court serving the entire state, or a regional 
system with a number of courts, each covering a judicial dis-
trict. The first form is in operation in Alabama, Arizona, Geor-
gia, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Regional courts are used 
in California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, 
Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. Table I outlines the structure of 
these courts. 
The number of judges in states having one central body 
ranges from three (Alabama and Oklahoma) to twelve (New Jersey). 
Judges are elected in all but one of these eleven states, with 
terms varying from four to fifteen years. In New Jersey, the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court assigns Superior Court judges 
to the Appellate Division for a one-year period. New Jersey's 
Appellate Division may be, and has been, enlarged by· the addi-






















































Elected -- four $22.500 




Supreior court $27.000 
judges are as-
signed to appel-






Type of Court 
One central body. Located in Montgomery. 
One court -- two ·divisions of thrn judges 
each. Division 1 at Phoenix and Division 
2 at Tucson. 
One court -- three divisions of three judges 
each. All divisions located at Atlanta. 
One court -- two divisions of four judges 
each. Both divisions located at Indianap-
olis. 
One central body. Criminal jurisdiction 
only. 
One court-· three divisions of three judges 
each. Divisions located at Detroit, Lans-
ing. and Grand Rapids. 
One court -- separate divisions established 
as necessary. Four divisions in 1967. Are 
appellate divisions of superior courts. 
Located at Trenton and Newark. 
One court. Located at Santa Fe. 
One court. Located at Raleigh. Court to 
have 9 judges by 1969. 
One court -- two divisions of three judges 
each in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. 
One court -- sits at three different dis-





























by a committee on 
qualifications. 
Run for re-elec-













Appointed by gov- $25,000 
er nor from list 
submitted by nomi-
nating commission. 
Run for re-election 
upon record. 
Type of Court 
Five appellate districts, with four 
divisions in first district. five 
divisions in second district, two 
divisions in fourth district, and 
one division in each of the third 
and fifth districts. Each division 
has three judges each. 
Four appellate districts, each with 
a District Court of Appeal. Five 
judges in three districts and four 
judges in one district. 
Five judicial districts, each with an 
appellate court. There are four di• 
visions in the first district, with 
three judges in each division, and one 
division in each of the other four 
districts, with three· judges to a. di· 
vision. 
Four appellate circuits, each with a· 
Court of Appeals. Six judges in First 
Circuit, three judges in Second Cir• 
cult, five judges in Third Circuit, 
and eight judges in Fourth Circuit. 
Three courts, one in each of three 
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Council of State Governments, Sat Curt S stems Revised 
and Appellate Courts," 51 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240, 241 uly 
Vol. V; Constitutions and Statutes of the various states. 
Type of Court 
Appellate divisions in each of four 
judicial departments of state. Seven 
judges in two departments, five judges 
in other two. Additional judges may 
be assigned. Appellate terms may be 
established in first and second de-
partment. 
Separate court of appeals in each of 
ten judicial districts. Eight dis-
tricts have three judges, two districts 
have six and four judges respectively. 
Court of Appeals. 
Court of Criminal Appeals. 
Two separate intermediate appellate 
courts. Court of Appeals sits in 
three divisions of three judges each. 
Court of Criminal Appeals is one court. 
Court of Civil Appeals. 
Court of Criminal Appeals. 
Two separate intermediate appellate 
courts. There are fourteen separate 
judicial districts, each with a Court 
of Civil Appeals composed of three 
judges. Court of Criminal Appeals is 
one court. 
1968; "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial 
968 ; Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, 
\ 
The nine jurisdictions having regional courts present a 
variety of forms. The number of separate intermediate courts 
ranges from a low of three (Missouri) to a high of fourteen 
(Texas). In addition, New York authorizes appellate terms of the 
trial court (Supreme Court), Illinois permits creation of branch 
appellate courts, and divisions in Missouri may be created by 
having pro tempore judges sit with one or more regular judges. 
The number of judges on the intermediate courts of these nine 
states is as high as 42 (Texas with 14 courts). Usually there 
are three judges for each court or division thereof. 
In New Jersey and New York, judges of the intermediate 
appellate courts are appointed by the Chief Justice and Governor, 
respectively, from among the judges of the trial court. In Cal-
ifornia and Missouri, judges are appointed or nominated by the 
Governor and approved by a commission and run for re-election on 
their record. The other states elect their judges, either on a 
district basis or on a state-wide basis. 
Each court or division usually has a presiding judge des-
ignated variously as Presiding Judge, Chief Judge, Chief Justice, 
Presiding Justice or President. Presiding judges are generally 
selected by the court or division thereof. The office rotates in 
Indiana. The Governor of New York designates the presiding jus-
tice in each department and he acts as such during his time in 
office. In Ohio, the chief justice for all ten Courts of Appeals 
is chosen annually by the membership of the court. Tennessee has 
a presiding judge for the whole court as well as for each divi-
sion. 
Most of the larger states use regional courts -- Califor-
nia, Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Texas; howevef, Florida, 
Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee also have regional courts. 
Michigan and Pennsylvania, both with large populations, utilize 
a central court. All of these variations are designed to meet 
the particular needs of each state. 
A state's size and location may make one appellate system 
more preferable for one jusisdiction than for another. Since 
New Jersey is a small Eastern Coast state, for example, a state-
wide central court system is easily adaptable to its needs with-
out inconveniencing its lawyers who must travel to Trenton to try 
their cases. California, on the other hand, because of its size, 
has found it impossible to establish the same type of appellate 
system, preferring to set its courts in several convenient geo-
graphic locations throughout the state. 
Expense -- Salaries 
The most obvious direct cost of an intermediate appellate 
court is the salaries and expenses of the judges and staff. Sal-
aries of intermediate appellate court judges in 1968 ranged from 
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a high of $40,000 in New York to a low of $16 1 500 in Oklahoma~ 
with $26.500 approximately the median state salary. Intermediate 
court judges usually receive from $1,000 -- $3,000 less in salary 
than do justices of the highest court. 
Double Appeals - Jurisdiction 
Finality of decision is one of the most vital problems in 
a court system having an intermediate appellate court. A balance 
should be maintained between limiting review in order to curtail 
double appealsj while at the same time giving the highest court 
enough authority to assure uniformity of decision and granting 
review by the highest court on questions of general interest and 
importance. It appears that in the twenty states surveyed there 
is a tendency toward giving finality to the intermediate courts 
in increasing classes of cases. 
The state-by-state survey indicates the broad division of 
appeals assigned to the supreme court and to the intermediate 
court and the method used in each state for granting double re-
view. Appellate jurisdiction of intermediate courts in some of 
the states is residual, after specific grants of appeals to the 
supreme court. In the other states, the classes of cases ap-
pealable to the intermediate court are specifically set forth by 
constitution or statute. 
Direct appeal to the supreme court, by-passing the inter-
mediate body, is generally to be had in criminal causes, espe-
cially capital cases and felonies, and those cases involving a. · 
constitutional question. Other direct appeals as of right to the· 
highest court are not uniform from state to state and include: 
all equity cases; land title or homestead cases; revenue matters; 
condemnation proceedings; divorce or alimony; probate or matters 
concerning wills; election contests or right to public office; 
annexation and zoning; workmen's compensation; public utilities 
decisions and orders; quiet title actions; etc.· Some states 
grant direct appeal only to the highest court in workmen's com-
pensation cases (New Jersey), while others vest appellate juris-
diction in this class of cases in both the intermediate and 
highest appellate courts. In New Mexico and North Carolina, ap-
peal as of right lies to the intermediate court to review deci-
sions of workmen's compensation cases. In New Mexico, the Supreme 
Court may review by certiorari the decision of the intermediate 
court in a workmen's compensation case, but in North Carolina no 
appeal from the decision of the court is allowed to the Supr~me 
Court. In Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania, the intermediate 
court has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to review 
awards of workmen's compensation. 
Some states place a monetary limit on civil appeals. For 
example, in Alabama the intermediate court has final appellate 
Jurisdiction of all suits at law where the amount involved does 
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not exceed $1,000. For there to be jurisdiction in the interme-
diate courts of Indiana and Louisiana the amount in controversy 
must exceed $50 and $100 respectively.· In Missouri, the inter-
mediate court has appellate jurisdiction in civil causes where 
the amount involved is less than- $7,500. If the amount involved 
is over $7,500 the highest court has sole appellate jurisdiction. 
Appeals from the intermediate court to the highest court 
may be taken either as a matter of right or by leave. Another 
pronounced tendency has been to cut down appeal as of right and 
to provide some form of discretionary review, usually by supreme 
court certiorari or intermediate court certification or both. 
Some states either allow or require review by the highest court 
on the basis of some objective standard in addition to discre-
tionary review. These criteria include conflict with a prior 
decision, lack of unanimity in the intermediate court, and re-
versal or modification of the trial court. 
Most of the intermediate courts in addition to the highest 
appellate courts, have power and authority to issue various writs. 
In Ohio the intermediate court has original jurisdiction in is-
suing writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition and quo war-
ranto. In Pennsylvania, the intermediate court has no original 
jurisdiction except when issuing writs of habeas corpus. Be-
sides these variations, grounds for judicial decisions often dif-
fer. Certain intermediate courts, for instance, have jurisdic-
tion .to decide appeals on the grounds of facts as well as law as 
in the case of Louisiana's intermediate court. In California, 
however, the intermediate court must decide questions only on the 
basis of law. 
Divergency of Rules of Law 
Conflicting interpretations among courts in states with 
one central intermediate body may not present too many problems. 
However, the possibility of conflicting decisions exists in re-
gional intermediate court systems. This possibility is enhanced 
when there are as many as nine or fourteen such courts. In all 
of the states having regional intermediate courts, some provision 
is made for discretionary review by the highest tribunal. This 
serves as a means of maintaining uniformity of jurisprudence. In 
addition, the intermediate court in some jurisdictions has the 
power to certify cases to the supreme court because of conflict 
with prior decisions. 
Jurisdiction of Intermediate Appellate Courts 
Jurisdictional delineation between the intermediate and 
highest courts is as varied as the number of states with inter-
mediate courts. Summaries of the major provisions for each state 
are included in Appendix A. 
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_/ 
States Currently Consideri09 Establishment of Intermediate Ap-
pellate Cour_i 
In addition to the 20 states which currently have an in-
termediate appellate court, there are three states wi Uf 'Supreme 
Court filings and backlog problems somewhat similar to Colora-
do's which are considering the creation of an inte!~~diate ap-
pellate court: Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.a7./ At-the 
July 26, 1968 meeting, the committee consulted with Mr. William 
M. Lowry, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Washington, and Justice 
Ralph Mo Holman, Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon, who 
reported on their respective state appellate court systems, prob-
lems, and proposed solutions. 
In Washington, there is currently a proposed constitution-
al amendment providing for the creation of a court of appeals. 
This constitutional amendment is to be submitted to the voters in 
November. The implementing legislation has been drafted and 
there is an extensive campaign being conducted to obtain passage 
of the amendment. In Oregon, a proposed bill to create an in-
termediate court of appeals is to be introduced in the 1969 leg-
islative session. This bill apparently has the support of most 
interested groups or bodies in the state.2.§./ 
Memorandum from State Court Administrator, July 8, 1968, p. 
11. 
Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1968, pp. 14, 25. 
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COLORADO SUPREME COURT PROPOSAL FOR 
AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 
On July 26, 1968, the committee requested that the Colo-
rado Supreme Court present to the committee its proposed solu-
tions to the backlog problem. The committee determined that 
since this study uniquely involves the Supreme Court it should 
be given an opportunity to present any recommendations it may 
have with regard to proposed solutions and alternatives. Pur-
suant to this request, the Supreme Court submitted its report 
and recommendation~ to the committee on August 30, 1968. The 
~eport sets forth a proposal for the creation of an int~rmedi-
ate appellate court to meet the ever growing appellate backlog 
~n Colorado. This proposal was approved in principle br the 
Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en bane, on August 15, 968. 
The report by the Colorado Supreme Court discusses two 
different ways in which an intermediate court might be organized 
and function. These two proposals, as recommended by the Supreme 
Court, are set forth below exactly as they appear in the report, 
except for the renumbering of pages, figures, and footnotes. 
Plan A: Organization and Jurisdiction 
Organization 
The intermediate court of appeals would comprise three 
circuits of three judges each. The boundaries of the three cir-
cuits are shown in Figure B. Because 71 percent of all Supreme 
Court appeals (1966-67) are filed from the Denver metropolitan 
area (including Boulder)f caseloads can be equalized among cir-
cuits most easily by: lJ dividing Denver between two circuits; 
and 2) dividing the Denver metropolitan area among all three. 
As can be seen from Figure B, one-half of Denver and the 
1st District would be combined with the 1st Circuit: the other 
half of Denver plus the 17th District (Adams) and the 20th Dis-
trict (Boulderf would comprise the 2nd Circuit, with the addition 
of the 8th District (Larimer). The remaining judicial districts, 
including the 18th (Arapahoe) would comprise the 3rd Circuit. 
It is necessary to divide Denver, because 44 percent of 
all Supreme Court appeals originate in the Denver Courts. The 
division of Denver could be accomplished in t~e enabling legis-
lation by providing that appeals originating from Divisions 1, 
3, 5, 7, and 13 of the Denver District Court and from the Denver 
Superior Court will lie to the 1st Circuit, and appeals from Di-
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the Denver Probate and Juvenile Courts shall lie to the 2nd Cir-
cuit, except as otherwise provided.~ 
Court Location. Two of the three circuits would head-
quarter in Denver, and the 3rd Circuit would headquarter in Col-
orado Springs. Each circuit, however, would be permitted to sit 
anywhere within its boundaries. Although the statute should not 
be specific, it would appear logical for each circuit to restrict 
where it sits as follows: · 
1st Circuit: Denver, Grand Junction, Durango, and (pos-
sibly Glenwood Springs and Steamboat Springs) 
2nd Circuit: Denver, Brighton, Boulder, and Fort Collins 
3rd Circuit: Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Littleton, Greeley, 
and (possibly Alamosa) 
Jud es and Other Personnel. The nine judges of the inter-
mediat~"7ourt three in each circuit) should have eight year 
terms.filu' The salary for intermediate court judges should be 
halfway between that of Supreme Court justices and district court 
judges. The presiding judge of each circuit would be appointed 
by the Chief Justice and exercise authority in the same way as is 
provided for judicial district chief judges in Article VI, Sec-
tion 5 (4) of the Colorado Constitution. 
Probably there should be a provision that no more than two 
of the three judges appointed in each of the 1st and 2nd Circuits 
should be from the Denver metropolitan area. 
One clerk's office could serve the 1st and 2nd Circuits, 
with a smaller office serving the 3rd Circuit because its head-
quarters would be in a different location. 
Facilities. If this proposal is adopted, inquiry should 
be made as to the possibility of housing the 3rd Circuit in the 
new court building in Colorado Springs, which may be completed 
about the time the intermediate court would be created. 
While the two intermediate circuits headquartering in 
Denver might be able to use the Supreme Court chambers for oral 
argument under the best and most efficient scheduling conditions, 
The divisions of the Denver District Court enumerated above 
are the ones handling civil and domestic relations cases. 
Criminal appeals under this proposal would lie directly to 
the Supreme Court. 
After initial appointment and two years' service before re-
ferral to the voters on a non-competitive ballot at the 
next following general election, which would be 1974. 
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there is no available space in the Capitol for offices for the 
six judges and their law clerks and secretaries, nor is there any 
apparent space available for the clerk's office. This problem . 
(along with the other space needs of the Supreme Court and its 
various adjuncts) suggests that immediate legislative attention 
should be given to the construction of a separate judicial build-
ing and for temporary quarters during the construction period. 
Jurisdiction 
Supreme Court. All criminal cases, except those brought 
on judgments of the county court, and all habeas corpus cases 
arising out of criminal actions would be filed directly in the 
Supreme Court. In addition, Supreme Court jurisdiction would in-
clude: 1) all original proceedings; 2) all cases attacking the .. 
constitutionality of a statute or an ordinance; 3) all P.U.C. cases; 
and 4) all water cases involving priorities and ajudications. 
Any case which results in a different or conflicting opin-
ion from that rendered by another circuit- in a similar matter 
would be heard automatically by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court would also have the authority to raise any case from an in-
termediate circuit court prior to decision by that court, either 
on the Supreme Court's own motion or upon petition of an inter-
mediate circuit court. The losing party in any case before an 
intermediate circuit court could petition the Supreme Court for 
a writ of certiorari. 
Intermediate Court. The intermediate circuit courts 
would have appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments in 
civil, juvenile, probate, and mental health cases, except as re-
stricted above. In addition, the intermediate circuit courts 
would have jurisdiction 9y~r all appeals from county courts, 
both civil and criminal.2.!I . 
Appeals from Industrial Corl'lmission decisions in workmen's 
compensation and unemployment compensation cases would also lie 
to the intermediate court, bypassing district court review. All 
other agency review cases would continue to be taken to the dis-
trict court, with appeal lying to the intermediate court, except 
in P.U.C. cases (as already indicated). The intermediate court 
would have no original jurisdiction. 
Additional Provisions. The Supreme Court would have the 
authority: 
1) to transfer to the intermediate court any case within 
the intermediate court's jurisdiction, even if filed in the Su-
preme Court; and 
ID' The district courts and the Superior Court of the City and 
County of Denver would no longer have appellate jurisdiction. 
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2) to transfer cases among circuits to equalize caseload, 
regardless of circuit boundaries. 
These provisions would provide considerable flexibility 
in the handling of appellate cases. Further. it would eliminate 
the necessity of refiling an appellate case if docketed in the 
wrong c2~7t initially, nor would a case be dismissed for this reason.g 
It would also be possible for the Supreme Court to trans-
fer to the intermediate court appropriate cases already filed in 
the Supreme Court prior to the creation of the intermediate court. 
This procedure would provide an immediate workload for the inter-
mediate court and greatly assist in the reduction of the backlog. 
Type of Opinions. The intermediate court should write 
brief memorandum opinions of two of three pages in all cases 
where possible. In those instances where longer opinions are re-
quired, their publication could be determined perhaps by a com-
mittee composed of the three presiding judges of the tD\ermediate 
circuit court and three members of the Supreme Court.W' 
Plan A: Estimated Caseloads 
Supreme Court 
As of January 1, 1970, it is estimated that the annual 
filing rate in the Colorado Supreme Court will be approximately 
680 cases. The estimated backlog as of that date will be 950 
case~, of which approximately 50 percent, or 475 will be at is-
sue. Approximately 85 percent, or 400, of the cases at issue 
will be civil. 
Total Appellate Filings 
Assuming that: 1) county court appeals will be taken to 
the intermediate court; and 2} initial judicial review of work-
men's compensation and unemployment compensation cases will be 
in the intermediate court, the total estimated appellate cases 
which will be filed in 1970 is 1,000, broken down as follows: 
In this connection, there should also be a provision that 
any case filed in an intermediate court which should have 
been filed in the Supreme Court would automatically be 
transferred ·to the Supreme Court. 
As an alternative, all regular full-length opinions could 




County Court Appeals 





Division Between Supreme Court and 
Intermediate Circuit Courts 
Supreme Court. Of these 1,000 cases, approximately 350 
will be in the Supreme Court: 
All criminal and habeas corpus arising 135-150 
out of criminal actions 
Original Proceeding's 150 
All cases attacking the constitutionality 
of a statute or ordinance; water cases 
concerning priorities or ajudications; 
P.U.C. cases (from district court); 
cases in which circuits differ; cases 
transferred from circuits; granting of 
certiorari 50-65 
Total 350 
Intermediate Courts. This will leave~j/balance of 650 









Division of Backlog. Experience in other states which 
have recently created intermediate courts indicates that it will 
be several months before a sufficient number of cases are at is-
sue for an intermediate court to become fully operative. It 
would be possible, however, for the intermediate court to begin 
work immediately by transferring cases from the backlog on the 
Supreme Court civil docket that are within the jurisdiction of 
the intermediate court. 
Based on the data contained in the June 6, 1968 memorandum 
to the Legislative Council Cormnittee on Appellate Courts. 
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There are several ways in which this might be done, for 
example: 
1) transfer only those cases which are at issue; 
2) transfer all civil cases, whether at issue or not; or 
3) transfer only those cases which are at issue a speci-
fied length of time (i.e., 12 months) or longer. 
The first alternative is recommended, as it would provide 
a more efficient means of docket control during the formative 
period of the intermediate court. It would also provide fewer 
cases for the Supreme Court to screen to determine if they are 
within the jurisdiction of the intermediate court. It is likely 
(statistically) that 350-375 of the estimated number of civil 
cases at issue on January 1, 1970 would fall within the juris-
diction of the intermediate court. Transfer of these cases would 
give each intermediate circuit court an immediate oral argument 
docket of approximately 115-125 cases. As the other cases on the 
Supreme Court civil docket become at issue, they could be as-
signed, either to the proper circuit or to any other circuit (un-
der the Supreme Court transfer authority) as deemed necessary to 
keep caseloads equalized and avoid the problem of one circuit be-
coming unduly overburdened or behind the other two. 
Plan A: Budget 
The annual initial cost of operating three three-judge in-
termediate appellate circuit courts is estimated to be between 
$425,000 and $475,000, the most important varying factor being 
the salary to be paid the intermediate,~gpellate judges. The de-
tails of this estimate are as follows:~ 
Judges, Clerks, Secretaries 
Judicial salaries (including PERA and 
Health Insurance) $215,000-$250,000 
Nine law clerks (at Supreme Court rates 
of $7,920 per year) 72,000 
Nine secretaries (Grade 16, ~tep 2 or 
$469 per month plus 
PERA and Health In-
surance) 
Sub Total 




Denver Clerk's Office 
Clerk (Grade 30, Step 1 or Grade 29, 
Step 2) 
Assistant Clerk (Grade 20, Step 1) 
Two Deputy Clerks (Grade 14, Step 1) 8 
Intermediate Clerk-Steno (Grade 12, 
Step 2) 
(PERA and Health Insurance on above) 
Sub Total 
a. One could also serve as bailiff. 
General Operating Expenses (based on 
Supreme Court budget} 
Travel 
Sub Total 
Sub Total - Denver Office 
Colorado Springs Clerk's Office 
Clerk (Grade 22, Step 1) 
Deputy Clerk (Grade 15, Step 1) 
Clerk-Bailiff (Grade 12, Step 2) 
Intermediate Clerk-Steno (Grade 12, 
. Step 2} 
(PERA and Health Insurance on above) 



























* This total does not include any provision for an intermediate 
court reporter, which would add another $12,000 or so. It also 
assumes that the Colorado Springs based circuit would use the El 
Paso District Court law library. In which event, it might be 
-68-
necessary to provide at least one-half of a librarian's salary 
($5,000) and also to include library additions as part of initial 
capital outlay. The salary grades and number of employees are an 
educated guess and will be checked further with our personnel of-
ficer. 
Initial Capital Outlay. It is very difficult to estimate 
initial capital outlay costs. According to purchasing office es-
timates, it costs about $1,000 per official or employee to outfit 
an executive office and approximately $700 per employee to outfit 
other offices. On this basis, the initial capital outlay cost 
would be approximately $30,000 to $35,000. This estimate assumes 
that space is made available without rental in Denver. It also 
does not include possible rental of space in the new El Paso 
County Hall of Justice, nor does it include library additions 
which may be required. If $10,000-$15,000 is added for this pur-
pose, total initial capital outlay would be approximately $45,000. 
Plan B 
Under Plan B, county court appeals would remain in the 
district court with certiorari to the Supreme Court. All other 
jurisdictional provisions would be the same as in Plan A, with 
the exception of circuit boundaries. Consequently, only two 
three-man divisions would be needed initially. Both divisions 
would be based in Denver, but would have the authority to sit in 
other locations. Through proper administrative control, trans-
fer of cases between divisions would eliminate the likelihood of 
both divisions sitting in the same out-state location, e.g., 
Grand Junction, within a few weeks of each other. 
Caseload 
By eliminating county court appeals (which 
with the district court), the estimated appellate 











As 350 of these will be in the supre~e Court (see Page 6~, 
it would leave a remainder of approximately 430 cases for the two 
intermediate appellate jurisdictions. It should be recognized, 
however, that the anticipated increase in the annual filing 
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rat~W will require one and maybe two.additional intermediate 
appellate divisions during the next decade to keep up with the 
workload. · 
Supreme Court RecornmendJll:pn 
The Supreme Court recommends Pl,n B over Plan A for sev-
eral reasons. 
1) Plan B would cost approximately $150,000 less per year 
to operate than Plan A, and the initial capital outlay expense 
would be reduced by at least one-third. There would also be no 
need for library additions and the partial salary of a librarian, 
because both additions would be housed in Denver. 
2) .There would be greater flexibilitr if geographic cir-
cuits are not required; yet, attorneys and 1 tigants would have 
the convenience of having their causes heard in or closer to· 
their home communities. 
3) County Court appeals have not ret become a burden on 
district courts. By handling these appea sin the same way as 
now provided, litigants would not be discouraged from taking ap-
peals in minor cases because of a possible increase in the cost 
of per.fecting the appeal. Also, the possibilitr of the inter-
mediate court's docket becoming clogged with re atively minor 
matters would be avoided. 
4) Appointments to the intermediate court would be con-
sidered on a statewide basis, similar to Supreme Court appoint-
ments, thus providing for the appointment of the best qualified 
men regardless of place of residence • 
.§§7 More than 800 by l975, and more than 900 by 1979. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF JURISDICTION OF INTERMEDIATE 
APPELLATE COURTS 
Alabama 
The Court of Appeals (intermediate court) of Alabama is 
composed of three judges possessing the same qualifications of 
the supreme court judges. They serve for.~ term of six years 
and are paid an annual salary of $19,500 • .!t 
The Court of Appeals has final appellate jurisdiction of 
all suits at law where the amount involved does not exceed 
$1,000, and of all misdemeanors, bastardy, habeas corpus, and 
felooi.es where the punishment has been fixed at 20 years or bn-
der.Y The court has original jurisdiction of quo warranto and 
mandamus in relation to matters over which it has appellate jur-
idsiction. The court also has authority to issue writs of in-
junction, habeas corpus, and such other remedial and original 
writs as are necessary to give it a general superintendence and 
control of jurisdiction inferior to ~t and in matters over which 
it has final appellate jurisdiction.V The judges each have au':' 
thority to issv~ writs of certiorari and supersedeas to all in,._ 
ferior courts.Y > 
The Court of Appeals may approve the constitutionality.of 
a statute. But when it entertains the view that a statute is un-
constitutionl, and the law has not been struck down previously 
by the Supreme Court, the case is submitted to the Supreme Court,· 
which court's decision controls the Court of Appeals in this as 
in all matters. A Court of Appeals' decision upholding an as-
sailed statute, and the question not previously having been de-
dided by the Suprem:,court, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
upon writ of error.,§, · 
Appeals to the Court of Appeals are taken in'the same man-
ner and with the effect and subject to the limitations and·re-
strictions provided by law with respect to appeals to the Supreme 
Court, and the rules and regulations obtaining with respect to · 
applications for re.heJ;ings in the Supreme Court also apply to 
th~ Court of Appeals • .21 
!/ "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts,•·51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968), and Code of Ala., Tit. 
13 § 29 (1958, Supp. 1967). 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 86 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 89 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 91 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 98 






Deel s.ions of the Supreme Court control the Court of Ap-
peals, and the former court has general superintendency_qver the 
latter. The Supreme Court makes rules for both courts.11 Cases 
improp3;1y submitted to one court are transferred to the other 
court.Y Cases pending in the Court of Appeals may be transferred 
to the Supreme Court wnen advisable or necessary for the prompt 
dispatch of business.j/ Whenever the members of the Court of Ap-
peals are unable to reach a unanimous decision, any one member 
may certify the.point of law to the s~2;eme Court, and the Su-
preme Court must decide the question.J.!V . · · 
Arizona 
In 1964, Arizona created a Court of Appeals, a single 
court of record divided into two divisions, each division having 
three judges who serve_ a six-year_ term from the date ?~ 
1
elec-
tion.ll/ The annual salary of each judge is $22,500.w 
The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of habeas 
corpus and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings 
originating in or permitted by law to be appealed from the super-
ior court, except criminal actions involving crimes punishable by 
death or life imprisonment. The Court also has jurisdiction to 
issue writs of certiorari to review awards of the industrial com-
mission. In addition, jurisdiction to issue injunctions, writs 
of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and 
other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise ~~/its 
appellate jurisdiction is granted to the Court of Appeals.~ 
Appellate procedure to the Court of Appeals is the same as· 
the procedure for appeals to the Supreme Court and within the same 
time limits.· If the case is not brought within the.p;oper court · 
or division, it is transferred to the proper place.~ Also, the 
Supreme Court'may transfer to the Court of Appeals for decision a 
case or appeal pending before the Supreme Court, if the case or 
appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. 
Section 12-120.24, Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1967 Supp.) provides 
for a rehearing review by the Supreme Court. Because of its 
length and importance it is quoted in full. 
Code of Ala., Tit. l3 § 95 (1958) •. 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 I 96 (1958). 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 102 (1958). 
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 88 (1958). 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.01 (B) (1967 Supp.). 
Legislation adopted in 1968 session. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 12-120.21 (1967 Supp.). 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. i 12-120.22 (1967 Supp.). 
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A party against whom a decision has been 
rendered in the court of appeals may file in such 
court a motion for rehearing after the rendition 
of the decision, setting forth with particularity 
the reasons why he believes the decision errone-
ous. The opposite party may file his response to 
such motion. If the motion is denied, and the 
party against whom the decision has been rendered 
desires a further review by the supreme courti he 
shall serve upon the opposite party and file with 
the clerk of the division a statement that he de-
sires such review. The clerk of the division 
shall thereupon transmit the record in the case 
to the clerk of the supreme court. The supreme 
court shall either Qrant or deny the request for 
review. No further briefs or oral argument shall 
be filed or had unless the supreme court so di-
rects. If no request for review by the supreme 
court has been filed, or upon the receipt from 
the clerk of the supreme court of notification 
that the request for review has been denied, the 
clerk of the division shall· issue the mandate of 
the court of appeals.~ 
California 
The state of California .is presently divided into five ap-
pellate districts, in each of which is a District Court of Appeal, 
consisti~2
1
of a division or several divisions having three judges. 
in each.!§, The Legislature may create and establish additional 
Distri~\ Court of Appeal and divisions thereof as it deems neces-
sary.!1/ At the present time, there is a total of 39 judges, as 
shown in the following table: · 
No. of No. of Total 
Appellate Divisions Judges in No. of 
Dist. No. in District Division Judges 
1 4 3 12 
2 5 3 15 
3 1 3 3 
4 2 3 6 
l 1 3 3 
TOTAL 5 13 39 
r z. ev. Stat. - 0.24 (1967 Supp.). 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. 5, p. 3488 (1968). 
Calif. Const. Art. VI,§ 4a. 
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These judges are appointed by the Governor with the approval of 
the Commission on Judicial Appointments. Ther serve a term of 
12 years and run for re-election on a nonpart san t,a].lot on their 
record. They receive an annual salary of $30,000.!§/ and this 
will go up to $36,216 on September 1, 1968. 
The District Courts of Appeal have jurisdiction in all 
cases in law appealed from the superior courts {trial courts of 
general jurisdiction). These classes of cases do not include 
those appealed directly to the highest court, the Supreme Court.!21 
The District Courts of Appeal also have jµrisdiction in all cases 
of forcible or unlawful entry or detainer; in proceedings in in-
solvency; in actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; in proceed-
ings of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, usurpation of .office, 
removal from office, contesting elections, eminent domain, and 
in such other special proceedings as may be provided by law. The 
courts' jurisdiction also extends, on questions of law alone, to 
all criminal cases presented by indictment or information, except 
where judgment of death has been rendered.W 
The District Courts of Appeal also have appellate juris-
diction in all cases, matters, and proceedings pending before the 
Supreme Court which the Supreme Court orders·transferreg_\o a 
District Court of Appeal for hearing and determination.W The 
~upreme Court can order any cause pending before a District Court 
of Appeal to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court can also,,~7ansfer cases between intermediate courts and divisions thereof.~ . 
The District Courts of Appeal have the power to issue units 
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus and all other · 
writs necessary or_Q;oper to the complete exercise of their appel-
late jurisdiction.~ In addition, the District Courts of Appeal 
have appellate jurisdiction on appeal in certain cases_wtthin the 
original jurisdiction of municipal and justice courts.W · · 
State Court s,stems, 1966, The Council of State Governments 
(1966); and" udicial"sa!aries in Major Trial.and Appellate 
Courts," 51. 3. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). · 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. 5, p. 3489 (1968). 
Calif~ Const. Art. VI§ 4b. 
Calif. Const. Art. VI§ 4c. 
Ibid. 
~f. Const. Art. VI§ 4b. 
Calif. Const. Art. VI§ 4e. 
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Florida 
The state of Florida is presently divided into four appel-
late districts, in each of which there is a District Court of Ap-
peal, consisting of three or more judges. In the first three 
districts, there are five judges in each district, and in the 
fourth ~t}trict there is just three judges, making a total of 18 
judges.~ The Legislature may provide for more judges or may 
reduce the number in any district to not less than three.W The 
judges serve fo~~~ term of six years and are paid an annual sal-
ary of $28,000.& · 
The jurisdiction of the District Courts of Appeal includes 
appeals as of-right from the trial courts in each appellate dis-
trict, and from final orders or decrees of"cou-nty judge's courts 
pertaining to probate matters or to estates and interests of 
minors and incompetents, excepting those from which appeals may 
be taken directly to the Supreme Court or case~,..in which the cir-
cuit courts have final appellate jurisdiction.~ _ 
The District Courts of Appeal have such powers of direct 
review of administrative action as may be provided by law. Rule 
4.1 states that all appellate review of the rulings of any com-
mission or board shall be by certiorari~ The statute relating 
to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act and 
the statutes relating to review by certiorari of final adminis-
trative orders of certain regulatory boards should be consulted 
in the preparation of certiorari proceedings, as well as the ap-
propriate governing statute, relating to the particular agency 
or board, to determine the appropriate court wherein review will 
lie. The scope of review under certiorari is narrowly limited 
to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted 
without or in excess of its authority or whether it departed from 
the essential requirements of law in entering the order sought to 
be reviewed. Before an administrative order may be reviewed by 
certiorari, such order must be quasi-judicial in character, rath-
er than purely executive in character • .The District Courts of 
Appeal specifically have jurisdiction to review industrial com-
mission orders and decisions as to workmen's compensation claims. 
District Courts of Appeal may issue writs of habeas corpus, man-
damus, certiorari, prohibition, and quo warranto and all writs 
necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdic-
tion.W 
2W Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3500 (1968). 
~/ Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 5. · 
"If/ "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). 
~ -Fla. Const-.-Art. 5, __ §_5_ (3) 
W Ibid.· • 
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Georgia 
The state of Georgia has one Court of Appeals which is di-
vide.d into three divisions, .consisting of three elected judgei_in 
each division, making a total of nine appellate court judges.W 
They serx, /a term of six years and receive an anm..ial salary of 
$26,500.~ · 
The intermediate Court of Appeals has jurisdiction for the 
trial and correction of errors in law or equity from the superior 
courts and city courts of Atlanta and Savannah, in all cases in 
which jurisdiction is not conferred on the Supreme.Court. The 
Supre'!!e Cour~_ has jurisdictie>_n, denied to the intermediate court, 
in the following matters: cases involving constitutional ques-
tions; land titles in equity cases; validity or construction of 
wills; capital felonies; habeas corpus cases; extraordinary rem-
edies; divorce and alimoney; and in all cases certified to it by 
the Court of Appeals.W · 
The Court of Appeals can certify cases for determination 
by the Supreme Court if the intermediate court is divided and may 
certify cases to the court of last resort for instructions as to 
a proper action. The Supreme Court can review and determine, by 
certiorari or otherwise, cases certified to it from the Court of 
Appeals. In actual practice, it appears that most matters are 
funneled to the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Couri_~ffords 
double appeal by means of certiorari or certification.~ · 
Precedents of the Supreme Court govern the intermediate 
court, which can be compelled to obey orders of the. highest. 
court. Cases improperly appealed are tran~f~rred to the correct 
tribunal under rules of the Supreme Court.~ 
Illinois 
The Appellate Court of Illinois is organized in five Ju-
dicial Districts. The court consists of 24 judges, 12 selected 
from the F!!'~t District and three from each of the·other four 
districts.W Thei~ selection (election at general election) and 
30 w Ga. Code Ann. § 24-350 et seq. (1958, Supp. 1965). Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3503 (1958, Supp. 1965); "Judicial Sal-
aries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 J. Amer.- Jud. 
Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). . 
·. In~ermediate·~~pellate Courts, Kentucky Legislative Research 
Commission, Informational Bulletin No. 12, p. 7 (Jan. 1956)~ 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3504 ( 1968) • ' 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3504 (1968). 
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3501 et seq. \1958, Supp. 1965). 
Ill. Const. Art. VI, § 6. 
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terms (ten years) are the same as for the Supreme Court judges.36/ 
They receive an annual salary of $35,00o.W· 
In all cases, other than thos~ appealable directly to the 
Supreme Court, appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court 
(trial court) lie as a matter of right to the Appellate Court in 
the district in which the Circuit Court is l.ocated, except that 
after a trial on the merits in a ~rj,minal case, no appeal shall 
lie from a judgment of acquittal • .i.liV' The Appellate Court.has 
such original jurisdiction as may be necessary for complete de-
.. termination of any cause on review. The Appellate Court also 
has such powers of ~!7ect review of administrative action as may be provided by law.;!2, Any final d.ecision, order, judgment or 
decree of the Circuit Court entered in an action to review a de-
cision of an administrative agency may be reviewed by the Appel-
late Court and Supreme Court. 
Appeals to the Supreme Court from Appellate Court lie as a 
matter of right only {a) in cases in which a constitutional ques-
tion arises for the first time in and as a result of the action 
of the Appellate Court, and (b) upon the certification by the Ap• 
pellate Court that a case decided by it involves a question of 
such importance that it should be decided by the Supreme Courin/ 
Appeals in all other cases are by leave of the Supreme Court • .1Qr 
Indiana 
The Appellate Court of Indiana is composed of eight judges, 
serving a term of four years. The judges usually sit in two di-
visions, except that the court may sit en bane for the considera-
tion of impo~~ant cases.ill The judges receive an annual salary 
of $22,500.W 
The Appellate Court has jurisdiction in all appealable 
cases, not given exclusively to the Supreme Court.~ It has no 
jurisdiction of appeals in criminal cases.W The court's jur-
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3512 (1968). 
State Court Systems 1966, The Council oi State Governments 
{ 1966) ; "Judicial Salaries in Maj or Trial and Appellate 
Courts, 11 51 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968}. 
Ill. Const. Art. VI, § 7. . 
Ibid.; and see Administrative Review Act, Ill. Stat. Ann. 
~110, § 264 {Smith-Hurd 1967). 
Ill. Const. Art. VI, § 5. 
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4-202 (Burns, 1966 Supp.) 
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 {Feb. 1968). 
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4-214 (Burns, 1966 Supp.) 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3514 {1968). 
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isdlctional amount in civil cases is the same as that of the su-
preme Court. No appeal .in civil cases lies to either court unless 
the amount.1.n controversy. excluding interest and costs, exceeds 
$50, except in cases involving the validity of a franchise or or-
dinance; ~he construction·or constitutionality of a statute; or a 
constitutionally guaranteed right. tn these instances the case 
mar· be apP.ealed to the Supreme Court, regardless of the amount. in-
vo ved.~ These cases go directly to the Supreme Court for the · 
purpose of presenting the question only. . · · 
Appeals in criminal pro~ecutions, condemnation proceed-
ings, election contests, cases of mandate, prohibition and quo 
w~rranto, habeas corpus. oroceedinas to establish drains, change 
or improve watercourses, establish.gravel roads, establish or va-
cate public highways, contempt proceedings, actions involving 
members of the bar, various interlocutory orders, probate matters, 
and child custody cases are taken to the Supreme Court. All other 
appealable cases are taken to the Appellate Court.~ Misdemeanor 
cases may be appealed to either court.W · 
If the three judges of a div\sion of the Appellate Court do 
not agree, the case is submitted to the entire court. If f6ur do 
not then concur, the case is transferred to the Supreme Court.1§.7 
Rules of the Appellate Court are the same as those of the Supreme 
Court. A judge in vacation or recess hes the same a_uthori ty in 
regard to writs as does a Supreme Court judge. Appeals are taken 
to the intermediate court in the same manner, with the same ef-
fect, and subject to the same limitations and restrictions, as 
appeals taken to the Supreme Court.12/ 
Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in cases determined by · 
it is final with two· exceptions: First, if two judges of any di-
vision are of the opinion that a ruling precedent of the Supreme 
Court is erroneous, upon written reasons therefor, the case is 
transferred to the Supreme Court. Second, within 30 days after a 
petition for rehearing is overruled in the Appellate Court, ap-
plication may be made to the·supreme Court· on the basis that the 
intermediate court's ruling contravened a precedent of the Supreme 
. Court or that a new question of law is involved and has been de-
cided erroneously~n 1The Supreme Court has discretion in granting such application • ...ll.V 
45 Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4-213 Burns, 1946 Rep.). 
~ Ind. Stat. Ann. 
§ 4-214 rurns, 1966 Supp.). 
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4-212 Burns, 1946 Rep.~. 
~ Ind. Stat. Ann. §_4-209 Burns, 1946 Rep •• 
~ Ibid. (Burns, 1946 Rep.). !ncr. Stat. Ann. § 4-215 
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· Appeals to tht wrong court at@ transferred to the proper 
court and stand as if so originllly filed. Cases are distribut-
ed among divisions in the o:rder of iYbmission and may be trans-
ferred between division, ta eq~allzt the caseload. The Supreme 
Court may transfer to itetlf th~ old~st cases pending in the Ap-
pellate Court if a disparity ln ~aseload exists between the two 
courts. Cases pending in thi A.ppollate Court appealable to the 
Supreme Court as a matter of r!ght on the basis of the amount in 
contro~f'.)sy are transferrod by the Supreme Court to its own cal-
endar .21.t 
Louisiana 
The state of Louisiana is presently divided into four 
appellate circuits, each of which has a Court of Appeal. Each 
circuit is subdivided into three districts.W There are six 
judges in the First Circuit (Baton Rouge), three judges in the 
Second Circuit (Shreveport), five judges in the Third Circuit 
(Lake Charles), and eight 'judg~~ in the Fourth Circuit (New Or-
leans), a total of 22 judges.W Provision is made for increas-
ing the number of judges upon the recommendation of the Judicial 
Council and approval of two-thirds of each house of the legisla-
ture. The Supreme Court can assign district court judges to the 
Courts of Appeal if the docket of any of them becomes congest-
ed.W Judges are elected and serve a term of twelve Y,ears.~ 
They are currently paid an annual salary of $24,000.~ 
The jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal extends only to 
appellate cases of which the Louisiana Supreme Court is not given 
appellate jurisdiction. These cases include: (1) all matters 
appealed from the Family and Juvenile Courts, except the criminal 
prosecutions against persons other than juveniles; (2) all civil 
and probate matters of which the District Courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction; and (3) all civil matters involving more than $100, 
exclusive of interest, of which the District Courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction.21/ No appeal lies to the Courts of Appeal in 
criminal cases. 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over: (1) 






Ind. Stat. Ann. s 4-127, 4-218 (Burns, 1946, Ref.). 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 20, 21 (1921, as amended • 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. v, p. 3530 (1968)·; 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 21 (1921, as amended). 
Ibid. 
ra:-const. Art. VII, § 19 (1921, as amended). 
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). · 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 29 (1921, as amended). 
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cal improvement assessment, toll or impost levied by the state or 
by any municipality, board or subdivision of the state is con-
tested; (2) cases in which an ordinance of a municipality, board 
or subdivision of the state or a law of the state has been de-
clared unconstitutional; (3f cases in which orders of the P.U.C. 
are in contest; (4) cases involving election contests, but only 
if the election district from which the suit or contest arises 
does not lie wholly within a Court of Appeal circuit; and (5) 
criminal cases in which the penalty of death or imprisonment at 
hard labor may be imposed, or in which a fine exceeding $300 or 
imprisonment exceeding six months has actually been imposed.2fv' 
Control of and general supervisory jurisdiction over all 
inferior courts is vested in the Supreme Court.22/ It has the 
authority to assign district judges to the Courts of Appeal if 
the docket becomes congested.2Q/ The Supreme Court can require 
by writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case to be certified 
from the Courts of Appeal to it for review if the application 
for review is made within 30 days after a rehearing is refused 
by the Court of Appeal. Where the application is based solely 
upon the ground that the decision of the question of law in-
volved is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court or 
another Court of Appeal upon a question not yet decided by the 
Supreme Court, then the application shall be granted as a mat-
ter of right.2!/ · 
Each Court of Appeal has the power to certify to the Su-
preme Court any question of law arising in any case pending 
before it which, for its proper decision, requires the instruc-
tion of that court •. The Supreme Court may either give its in-
structions on the question certified to it, which shall be 
binding upon the Court of Appeal in such case, or it may require 
that the whole record be sent up for.its consideration, in which 
case the whole matter in controversy is decided in the same man-
ner as if it had been on appeal directly to the Supreme Court.22/ 
App~~l.s to the Courts of Appeal may be on both the law 
and facts,W and all cases are to be tried on the original rec-
ord,·pleadings, and evidence.W The rules of practice regulat-
ing appeals to and proceedings in the Supreme Court shall apply 





La. Const. Art. VII, § 10 (1921, as amended). 
Ibid. 
ra:-const. Art. VII, § 12 (1921, as amended). 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 11 (1921, as amended); La. Rev. Stat. 
of 1950, Tit. 13, § 4450 (1962 Cumulative Supp.). 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 25 (1921, as amended); La. Rev. Stat. 
of 1950, Tit. 13, § 4449 (1962 Cumulative Supp.). 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 29 (1921, as amended). 
La. Const. Art. VII, § 27 (1921, as amended). 
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they· may be applicable.W Concurrence of two appellate court 
judges is necessary for a decision. No specific provision ex-
ists for review by the Supreme Court when the three court of 
appeals judges cannot reach a decision. If the court is dead-
locked, a district,j4dge or qualified lawyer may be appointed to 
serve temporarily.22/ 
Maryland 
In 1966, the Maryland legislature created an intermediate 
court of appeals, known as the Court of Special Appeals. The. 
court is composed of five judges, elected by the qualified vot-
ers, who serve a term of 15 years.fill They currently receive an 
annual salary of $27,500 . .§!V 
The Court of Special Appeals ha~ appellate jurisdiction 
coextensive with the limits of the state and includes direct ap-
peals from the circuit courts of the counties (trial courts) and 
from the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in all criminal cases 
where the sentence is other than death, which appeals are sub-
ject to further appeal to the Court of Appeals.Q.2/ 
Four of the judges constitute a quorum, and the concur-
rence of a majority of the entire court shall be necessary for 
the decision of any cause. There is no provision which author-
izes the court to sit in one or more panels or divisions.1Q/ • 
The Maryland General Assembly may provide by law for additional 
judges as it deems necessary.ll/ 
Michigan 
The Court of Appeals of Michigan was created in 1965 and 
is composed of nine judges who serve for six-year terms.W The 
court sits in divisions of three judges each, except as otherwise 
directed by the Supreme Court, and a majority of the judges as-






ra:-const. Art. VII. § 26 (1921, as amended). 
Md. Code Ann. 26-130 (1957, Rep. Vol. 1966); Acts of 1966, 
ch. 11, § 1. 
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). 
Op. cit. note 67, supra.; Md. Code Ann. 5-21A (1957, Rep. 
Vol. 1968). 
Md. Code Ann. 26-130 (1957, Rep. Vol. 1966). 
Md. Code Ann. 26-131 (1957, Rep. Vol. 1966). · 
Mich. Stat. Anh. § 27A.301 (1962,Cum. Supp. 1968); Pub. Acts 
1964, No. 281, as amended by Pub. Acts, 1966, No. 306. 
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eases and transacting business.W The current annual salary for 
the judges is $32,500.W 
The administration of the Court of Appeals is under the 
control of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court may transfer 
judges to the Court of Appeals to act as temporary judges to re-
place disabled or ~Jsqualified judges or to enlarge the court to 
not more than 12, if the business of the court is deemed by the 
Supreme Court to warrant it.12/ 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on appeals from: 
(1) all final judgments from the recorder's court, superior 
court, circuit courts, and court of claims; (2) all final judg-
ments from justice courts, police courts, municipal courts, pro-
bate courts, common pleas courts, or other court inferior to the 
circuit courts, which on appeal are not triable de novo (all ap-
peals from final judgements from the aforementioned courts which 
are triable de novo shall continue to be taken to the circuit 
courts); and (3) such other judgments or_;l)terlocutory orders as 
the Supreme Court may by rule determine.1w' All appeals pursuant 
to the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction are a matter of right. All 
other appeals permitted by statute or by Supreme Court rule are 
by right or by leave as provided by statute or Supreme Court 
rule.1:1./ · · 
The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction " ••• to is-
sue prerogative and remedial writs or orders as provided by rules 
of the Supreme Court, and has authority to issue any writs, di-
rectives and mandates that it judges necessary and expedient to 
effectuate its determination of cases brought before it. 111.§/ 
The decisions on appeal to the Court of Appeals are final, 
except as provided by Supreme Court rule.12/ Appeals may be 
taken to the Supreme Court prior to a decision by the Court of 
Appeals on leave granted by the Supreme Court upon a showing by 
petitioner of any one of the grounds listed below and by the ap-
pellant showing a meritorious basis for the appeal. Petitioner 
must show that (1) the subject matter of the appeal involves a 
substantial question as to the validity of an act of the legis-
lature, (2) the subject matter of the appeal has significant 
public interest and involves a suit brought by or against the 
state or an agency or subdivision thereof or by or against offi-
cers of the state or an agency or subdivision in their official 
w Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.~ll (1962, Cum. Supp. 1968~-
111 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.304 (1962l Cum. Supp. 1968. 
~ Mich. Stat. Ann. 0§ 27A.305-306 1962, Cum. Supp. 1968). ]§I_ Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.308 !1962, Cum. Supp. 1968l, 
111. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.309 1962, Cum. Supp. 1968 • 
IB Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.311 1962, Cum. Supp. 1968 • '!JI Mich. Stat. Ann. § 2"?/\. 314 ( 1962, Cum. Supp. 1968 • 
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capacity, (3) the subject matter of the appeal involves legal 
principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the 
state, or (4) delay in final adju~!sation of the litigation is 
likely to cause substanti~l harm.~ 
Appeals on interlocutory or final decisions of the Court 
of Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court only upon applica-
tion and leave granted by the Supreme Court on a showing of a 
meritorious basis for appeal and any one of the following grounds: 
(1) the subject matter of the appeal involves legal principles of 
major significance to the jurisprudence of the state; (2) the de-
cision of the Court of Appeals is clearly erroneous and will cause 
material injustice; (3) the decision is in conflict with decisions 
of the Supreme Court or other Court .of Appeals decisions; or (4) 
the appellant would suffer substantial harm by awaiting final 
judgment before taking appea!.~hen appealing an interlocutory or-
der of the Court of Appeals.!ll/ 
Miss~ 
In Missouri the three Courts of Appeals are composed of 
three judges each,§.V a total of nine judges, who are appointed 
by the Governor for 12-year terms.W The current~~qnual salary 
for the judges of the Courts of Appeal is $25,000.~ . 
Each separate Court of Appeals has final appellate juris-
diction in its district of all cases from circuit courts and in-
ferior courts of record and control over these courts, except in 
those cases in which direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court.~ 
The Courts of Appeals have superintending control over all in-
ferior courts within the court's jurisdiction, and the Courts of 
Appeals may issue and determine original remedial writs.§.£/ The 
rules of practice for the Courts of Appeals are promulgated and 
established by the Supreme Court.§1/ 
The Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in 
all cases involving: (1) the construction of the Constitution. 
of the United State or Missouri; (2J the validity of a statute 
or treaty of the United States; (3) any authority exercised un-
der the laws of the United States; (4) the construction of Mis-
souri reye~ue laws; (5) title to any office; (6) title to real 
Mich. General Court Rules of 1963, Rule 852.1 (1968 Cum. 
Supp.). 
Mich. Gen. Court Rules of 1963, Rule 853.l (1968 Cum. Supp.). 
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 13. 
Missouri Const. Art. 5, §§ 23, 29. 
Missouri Stat. Ann. § 477:130. 
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 13. 
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 4. 
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 5. 
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estate; (7) civil cases where the state or its political subdi-
visions or officers are a party; (a) felonies; (9) cases where 
the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs. exceed~_\he sum of 
$7,500; and (10) all other cases provided by law.filV Appeals in 
these cases lie directly to the Supreme Court. 
A case before any Court of Appeals is transferred to the 
Supreme Court when any member of the Court of Appeals dissents 
from the majority opinion and certifies that he deems the deci-
sion contrary to a previous Supreme Court decision or a Court of 
Appeals decision, or upon order of the Supreme Court or a, Court 
of Appeals because of the general interest or importance of the 
question involved • .a.2/ 
New·Jersev 
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey 
was established by the Constitution of New Jersey • .2Q/ There is 
no statutory or constitutional provision for the number of judges 
to be assigned to the Appellate Division; however,.there is pro-
vision for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to assign 
judges to particular divisions of the Superior Court.!ll/ The 
current number of judges assigned to the Appellate Division is 
twelve,W and their annual salary is $27,000.:U/ 
Appeals in all causes may be taken to the Appellate Divi-
sion from: (1) the Law and Chancery Divisions of the Superior 
Court; (2) the county courts: (3) civil causes determined by the 
county district courts; (4) causes determined by juvenile and 
domestic courts, except bastardy proc~edings; (5) causes deter-
mined by the criminal judicial district courts; (6) causes deter-
mined in statutory proceedings and decisions of state agencies, 
except those of the Workmen's Compensation Division and the Wage 
Collection Section of the Wage and Hour Bureau of the Department 
of Labor and Industry; and (7) in such other causes as may be 
provided by law • .2i/ Appeals may be taken on interlocutory order 
or judgment or interlocutory decision or action of any state ad-
ministrative agency • .2.2/ Appeals may also be taken from judgments 
.@/ M!ssouri Const. Art. 5, § 3. 
89/ Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 10. 
?jo/ N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 3, para. 3. 
ID N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 7, para. 2. 
W "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). 1 
93/ Ibid. " gt· N.T. Const. Art. 6, § 5, para. 2; the Revision of the Rules :! 
Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Rule 2:2-2 
(1958). , 
~ The Revision of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State 
of N.J., Rule 2:2-3 (1958). 
-84-
nisi in matrimonial causes,.2.§/ and in criminal causes in lieu of 
prerogative writ.2if The Appellate Division may exercise such 
original jurisdiction as may be necessary for the complete deter-
mination of any cause on review • .filV 
A direct appeal of right may be made to the Supreme Court 
in capital cases. All other appeals are channeled to the Appel-
late Division. Appeal as of right lies to the Supreme Court if 
there is a dissent in the Appellate Division or if the cause in-
volves a question arising under the United States or New Jersey 
constitutions. Appeal also may be allowed on certification of 
the Supreme Court to the Superior Court and other inferior 
courts .2,2/ 
The Supreme Court may also at its discretion grant appeal 
from the Appellate Division. Factors considered in granting this 
discretionary appeal include cases where:' (1) the Appellate Divi-
sion has decided a question of substantive law not previously de-
termined by the court of last resort (Supreme Court), and decided 
it probably not in accord with other Supreme Court decisions; (2) 
the decision conflicts with another decision of the Appellate Di-
vision; (3) the judges concur in the result, but cannot agree on 
a common ground of decision; (4) the Appellate Division has de-
cided an important question of procedural law not previously de-
cided by the Supreme Court, or has departed so far from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings (or sanctioned 
such departure by a lower court) as to call for the exercise of 
the Supreme Court's supervision; or (5) the Appellate Division 
has decided a question of substance relating to the construction 
or application of a statute, which has not been but should be 
settled by the Supreme Court.100/ 
New York 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the inter-
mediate appellate court in New York, and the Court of Appeals is 
the highest court. There is an Appellate Division for each of 
the four judicial departments of the state. The First and Second 
Appellate Divisions are allowed to split into "Appellate Terms", 
terms are thus similar to the three-man divisions or sessions of 
other states.101/ 
Ibid., Rule 2:2-2. 
Ibid., Rule 2:2-4. 
N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 5, para. 3. 
N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 5, para. 1. 
Intermediate Appellate Courts, Kentucky Legislative Research 
Commission, Informational Bulletin No. 12, p. 11 (Jan. 1956). 
N.Y. Judiciary Law, Art. 3. 
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The Constitution of New York specifically provides for 
twenty-four justices elected to the Supreme Court to·be assigned 
by the governor to the App~llate Division. The governor may also 
assign additional justices as the need arises.to?/ The current 
number of.justices assigned to the Appellate D vision is 26, and 
they receive an annual salary of $33,500 to $40,000.103/ Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court are elected for fourteen years.104/ 
Most appeals are taken to one 
Notable exceptions are direct appeal 
Court of Appeals in capital cases or 
the constitutionality of a statute. 
appeals: 
of the Appellate Divisions. 
from the +.r.ial r.ourt to the 
where the sole question is 
The Appellate Divisions hear 
1. from any fi'nal or interlocutory judgment 
except one entered subsequent to an order of the 
appellate division which disposes of all the is-
sues in the action; or 
2. from an order not specified in subdivision 
(b), where the motion it decided was made upon no-
tice and it: 
(i) grants, refuses, continues or modi-
fies a provisional remedy; or 
(ii) settles, grants or refuses an ap-
plication to resettle a transcript or state-
ment on appeal; or 
(iii) grants or refuses a new trial; 
except where specific questions of fact 
arising upon the issues in an action triable 
by the court have been tried by a jury, pur-
suant to an order for that purpose, and the. 
order grants or refuses a new trial upon the 
merits; or 
(iv) involves some part of the merits; 
or 
(v) affects a substantial right; or 
(vi) in effect determines the action and 
prevents a judgment from which an appeal might 
be taken; or 
N.Y. onst. Art. 6, ~ 4. 
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts, 11 51 
J. Amer Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). 
N.Y, Const. Art. 6, § 4. 
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(vii) determines a statutory pro-· 
vision of the state to be unconstitutional, 
and the determination appears from the 
reasons given for the decision or is nee~ 
essarily implied in the decision; or 
3. from an order, where the motion it decided 
was made upon notice, refusing to vacate or modify 
a prior order, if the prior order would have been 
appealable as of right under paragraph two had it 
decided a motion made upon notice.105/ · 
Orders are not appealable ~o the Appellate Division as of 
right where it: 
1. is made in a proceeding against a body or 
officer pursuant to article 78; or 
2. requires or refuses to require a more def-
inite statement in a pleading; or 
3. orders or refuses to order that scandal-
ous or prejudicial matter be stricken from a 
pleading.106/ 
An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division from any 
order which is not appealable as of right in an action originat-
ing in the supreme court or a county court by permission of the 
judge who made the order granted before application to a justice 
of the appellate division; or by permission. of a justice of the 
appellate division in the department to which the appeal c.ould 
be taken, upon refusal by the judge who made the order or upon 
direct application.107/ . 
The Appellate Divisions also hear appeals from the supreme 
courts and county courts when these sit as intermediate appellate 
courts. Appeals from the supreme courts and surrogates' courts 
may be reviewed on questions of fact or law.IO~/ In addition, an 
appeal may be taken to the.Appellate Division rom any judgment 
or order of a court of original instance other than the supreme 
court or a county court.109/ 
F N.Y. Civil Practice Laws and Rules, § 5701. Ibid. fill Ibid. 
(c),{d). 
~ N.Y. Civil Practice Laws and Rules, 
§ 5702--§ 5501 
IQ2/ N.Y. Civil Practice Laws· and Rules, § 5703. 
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The Appellate Divisions have original jurisdiction in cer-
tain cases, e.g., admission to or removal from practice;llO/ pe-
titions directed against a justice of the Supreme Court, a judge 
of the county courts or the courts of general sessions;ill/ and 
trial of issue of law on submission of agreed statementof 
facts.112/ 
Appeals as of right are taken to the Court of Appeals in: 
(1) criminal cases where· the judgment is death; (2) civil causes 
from a judgment or order of final decision of the Appellate Divi-
sion involving the construction of the constitution of the United 
States or r~ew York; ( 3) civil causes where an Appellate Division 
justice dissents or where judgment or order is one of reversal or 
modification; (4) cases where the only question arises under the 
constitution of the United States or New York; (5) cases where an 
order of the Appellate Division granting a new trial or new hear-
ing was entered and the appellant stipulates that, upon affirm-
ance, judgment absolute or final order shall be entered against 
him: (6) causes where the Appellate Division certifies that a 
question of law should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals; (7) 
and causes in which the Court of Appeals determines that a ques-
tion of law should be reviewed.113/ 
Review by the Court of Appeals is limited to questions of 
law except on judgment of death or when the Appellate Division 
reverses or modifies a lower court on new findings of fact. The 
right of appeal does not depend on the amount in controversy. 
The legislature has the power to abolish appeal based on dissent, 
reversal, or modification in the Appellate Division. In this 
event, certification by either court becomes the basis of ap-
peal.114/ 
The Appellate Divisions have the power to promulgate rules 
and supervise the administration and operation of the courts in 
their department.115/ 
New Mexico 
Pursuant to chapter 28 of the Laws of 1966, Sections 16-7-
1 through 16-7-14, N.M. Stat. Ann., 1953.Comp. (P. Supp.), the 
Court of Appeals was created and commenced operations on April 1, 
• y. Judiciary Law, § 90. 
ill/ N.Y. Civil Practice Laws and Rules, § 506. 
~ N.Y. Civil Practice Laws and Rules, 
§ 322. 
HY; N.Y. Const. Art. 6, § 7. Ibid. 
11t N.Y. Judiciary Law, § 216. 
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1966.ll~/ The Court of Appeal:, · .. : composed of four judges elected 
fore gt-year terms at an annual salary of $18,500.1177 
The Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court be-
tween the district courts and the Supreme Court. Under New Mexico 
law prior to creation of the court of appeals, every final judg-
ment of a district court could be appealed as a matter of right to 
the Supreme Court. Now, certain statutorily-defined cases (N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 16•7-8, 1953 Comp.) must be appealed to the Court of 
Appeals, and there is no absolute right of appeal from this court 
to the Supreme Court. Application may be made to the Supreme 
Court for a Writ of Certiorari for review of the final action of 
the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court may either grant or 
deny the Writ. 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals includes review on 
appeals from: 
A. any civil action which includes a count in 
which one or more of the parties seeks damages on 
an issue based on tort, including but not limited 
to products liability action; 
B. all actions under the Wor~men's Compensa-
tion Act l59-10-l to 59-10-317, the ~ew Mexico 
Occupational Disease Disablement Law ~9-11-1 to 
59-ll-4Y, the Subsequent Injury Act l59-10-126 to 
59-10-13§/ and the Federal Employers Liability Act; 
C. criminal actions except those in which a 
judgment of the district court imposes a sentence 
of death or life imprisonment; 
D. post-conviction remedy proceedings except 
where the sentence involved is death or life im-
prisonment; 
E. actions for violation of municipal or 
county ordinances where a fine or imprisonment is 
imposed; 
F. decisions of those administrative agen-
cies of the state where direct review is provided 
by law; and 
11.§7 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office 
of the Courts, State of New Mexico (1967). 
117/ N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 16-7-1, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.). 
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G. decisions in any other action as may be 
provided by law.118/ 
The Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction, but it 
"may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to issue all 
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdic-
tion."lt9/ The method of appeal to the Court of Appeals of New 
Mexico s the same as it is for the Supreme Court of New Mexi-
co,120/ and the rules of practice and procedure of the Supreme 
Court are the same for the Court of Appeals.121/ 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review by writ of 
certiorari to the Court of Appeals any matter in which the Court 
of Appeals decision~ (1) conflicts with a Supr~m~ Court deci-
sion; (2) conflicts with a decision of the Court of Appeals; (3) 
involves a "significant question of law" arising under the New 
Mexico or United States Constitution; or (4) "involves an issue 
of substantial public interest that should be determined by the 
Supreme Court."122/ The Court of Appeals may request the !:iupreme 
Court to consider cases which it has not decided and which it de-
termines to be described by categories 3 and 4 above.123/ 
When neces$ary the Chief Justice of 
designate any justice of the Supreme Court 
to act as a judge of the Court of Appeals. 
Court of Appeals may be assigned to sit as 
Supreme Court Justice. 
North Carolina 
the Supreme Court may 
or any district judge 
Also a judge of the 
a district judge or a 
In North Carolina the Court of Appeals, which was created 
in 1967, is composed of six judges who are elected for eight-year 
terms. The number of judges will increase to nine in 1969.124/ 
They receive an annual salary of $24,000.125/ 
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals respectively 
"have jurisdiction to review upon appeal decisions of the lower 
courts and administrative agencies, and upon matters of law or 
legal inference ••• "126/ Appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-8, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.). 
N.M. Const. Art. VI, § 29. 
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 16-7-9, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.). 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-2, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.). 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-14, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.). 
Ibid. 
Geri:- Stat. of N.C., § 7A-16. 
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968). 
Gen. Stat. of N.C., § 7A-26. 
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on criminal causes involving a life imprisonment or death penalty 
sentence.127/ Specifically appeal lies of right to the Court of 
Appeals: 
1. From any final judgment of a superior 
court Cexcept any judgment which includes a sen-
tence of death or life imprisonment7 or one en-
tered in a post-conviction proceed!ng, including 
any final judgment entered upon review of a de-
cision of an administrative agency; 
2. From any final judgment of a district 
court in a civil action; 
3. From any interlocutory order or judg-
ment of a superior court or district court in a 
civil action or proceeding which: 
(a) Affects a substantial right, or 
(b) In effect determines the action 
and prevents a judgment from which appeal 
might be taken, or 
(c) Discontinues the action; or 
(d) Grants or refuses a new trial.128/ 
Also, appeals from the decisions of the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission and the North Carolina Industrial Commission 
lie of right directly to the Court of Appeals.129/ Decisions of 
the Court of Appeals rendered upon review of post conviction pro-
ceedings are final and are not subject to review.130/ 
Any decision of the Court of Appeals which: (1) involves 
a "substantial" question arising under the Constitution of the 
United States or North Carolina; (2) in which there is a dissent; 
(3) or which involves a review of a rate-making decision by the 
North Carolina Utilities Commission; can be appealed as of right 
to the Supreme Court.l3l/ In addition, the Supreme Court exer-
cises discretionary rev ew over appeals to the Court of Appeals, 
except in causes involving the North Carolina Utilities Commis-
sion, other than a rate-making decision, and the North Carolina 
~ 
Gen. stat. of N.C., § 7A-27. 
Gen. Stat. of N .C., § 7A-27. 
Ht Gen. Stat. of N .C., § 7A-29. Bf Gen. Stat. of N.C., § 7A-28. Gen. Stat. of N .C., § 7A-30. 
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Industrial Commission, and in cases reviewing a post conviction 
proceeding, in which case no review is allowed.132/ 
The Court of Appeals has power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus and prerogative writs, including mandamus, prohibition, 
certiorari, and supersedeas, in the aid of the·court's jurisdic-
tion or to supervise and control proceedings of trial courts and 
of the Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission.133/ 
In Ohio, there is a separate Court of Appeals in each of 
the ten judicial districts; eight districts have three judges; 
two districts have six and four judges respectively.li4/ The 
judges are elected for six-year terms at an annual sa ary of 
$27,000.135/ . 
The Courts of Appeals have original jurisdiction, as does 
the Supreme Court, in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, pro-
hibition, and procedendo. These courts have jurisdiction to re-
view, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final 
orders of boards, commissions, officers, tribunals, and courts of 
record inferior to the Courts of Appeals within their respective 
districts. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over 
constitutional questions, felony cases, cases in which the Courts 
of Appeals have original jurisdiction, and cases of public or 
great general interest in which the Supreme Court may direct any 
Court of Ppp '.?als to certify its records.. Concurrence of a bare 
majority of the three appellate judge$ is necessary, except that 
no judgment of any court of record entered on the verdict of a 
jury can b_e set aside ~~~e_pt by concurrence of all three judges 
of a Court of Appeals.~ 
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred by Section 6 of 
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the Courts of Appeals have 
the following jurisdiction: (1) Upon en appeal on questions of 
law to review, affirm, modifr, reverse, set aside judgments or 
final orders of courts infer or to the Court of Appeals, includ-
ing findings of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent, 
neglected or dependent, for prejudicial error committed by such 
lower court; (21 Upon an appeal on questions of law and fact the 
court of appeals, in cases arising in courts of record inferior 
Gen. Stat. of N.C., § 7A-31. 
Gen. Stat. of N.C., § 7A-25. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §§ 2501.01-2501.012 (Page 1954). 
Legislation adopted in 1968 session. 
Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 6. 
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to the court of appeals within the district, shall weigh the evi-
dence and render such judgment or decree as the trial court could 
and should have rendered upon the original trial of the case, in 
the following classes of actions, seeking as a primary and para-
mount relief: 
(1) The construction or enforcement of a 
trust, including the enforcement or establishment 
of constructive or resulting trusts: 
(2) The establishment or enforcement of 
equitable estates arising from the conversion of 
property; 
(3) The foreclosure of mortgages and mar-
shalling of liens, including statutory liens; 
(4) The appointment, removal, and control 






The restraint of commission of torts: 
The reformation and cancellation of in-
in writing; 
The restraint of actions or judgments 
(8) The quieting of title to property, the 
partition of property, and the registration of 
land titles; 
(9) The specific performance of contracts, 
or the restraint of the breach thereof: 
(10) Injunction, accounting, subrogation, 
or interpleader.137/ 
In cases not listed above, Courts of Appeals have jurisdic-
tion to proceed as in an appeal on questions of law only.lJB/ In 
addition, the Courts of Appeals may issue writs of superse eas in 
any case, and all other writs not specifically prohibited or pro-
vided for by statute which are necessary to enforce the adminis-
tration of justice. 
The Courts of Appeals promulgate their own rules of proce-
dure, subject to alteration and amendment by the Supreme Court.139/ 
1~7/ Ohio Rev. Code Ann. , § 2501. 02 (page 1954, Supp.. 1966) . 
l38/ Ibid. 
m,t Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2501.08 (Page 1954). 
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The Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals may assign a judge of 
the Court of .Appeals to a district court.14r The Chief Justice. 
of the Supreme Court may assign any judge o the Court of Appeals 
to any county to hold court and shall determine the disability.or 
disqualification of any judge of the Court of Appeals-141/ 
Oklahoma 
In Oklahoma, appellate jurisdiction is divided between two 
courts; the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in all civil 
cases at law and equity; the Criminal Court of Appeals has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all criminal cases appealed from courts of 
record .142/ · . · . · 
The Court of Criminal Appeals is composed of three judges 
elected for six-year terms and who receive the same annual salary 
as Supreme Court Justices ($22,500).143/ 
The Court of Criminal Appeals may issue writs of habeas 
corpus and other such writs as may be necessary to exercise its 
jurisdiction.144/ · 
In addition the Court of Criminal Appeals may prescribe its 
own rules, and ascertain matters of fact upon affidavit or other• 
wise as may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.145/ 
Pennsylvania 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania is composed of seven 
judges elected for ten-year terms.146/ The annual salary of the 
President judge of the Superior Court is $36,000; the annual sal-
ary of the associate judges is $35,500~147/ The Superior Court 
has the power to grant every lawful writ pursuant to the exercise 
of .its jurisdiction.148/ · 
The Superior Court has no original jurisdiction, except in 
actions of mandamus and prohibition to inferior courts where such 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2501.14 (Page 1954). 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.,§ 2501.12 (Page 1954). 
Okla. Const. Art. 7, § 2. 
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 31, § 285 (1962); and Okla. Session 
Laws 1967, ch. 128. 
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. 
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41 (1962). 
§ 42 (1962). 
§ 111 (Purdon's 1962). 
§ 830.25 (Purdon's 1962). 
§ 123 (Purdon's 1962). 
-94-
actions are ancillary to Superior Court appellate proceedings, 
and the Superior court may issue writs of habeas corpus under 
similar conditions.149/ 
The Superior Court has exclusive and final appellate jur-
isdiction of all appeals in the following classes of cases: 
1. All proceedings of any kind from court of 
quarter sessions of the peace, oyer and terminer 
and general jail deliveryi except c~ses involving 
right to public office, and felonious homicide. 
Appeals are by right to the Superior Court, but it 
shall not operate as supe~iedeas unless allowed by 
the court or judge thereof, who has power to admit 
to bail and to make an order of supersedeas and 
other writs.150/ 
2. All actions and proceedings at law in 
courts of common pleas and in the county courts 
of Allegheny County and Philadelphia County and 
all similar courts, if the subject of controversy 
be either money, chattels, real or personal, or 
the possession of or title to real property, and 
if the amount or value thereof in controversy is 
not greater than $10,000, exclusive of costs.151/ 
3. All actions arising from proceedings and 
orders of any commission or state agency, unless 
specifically excluded by law, and all orders of 
courts of common pleas, or court of quarter ses-
sions of the peace and oyer and terminer involving 
summary proceedings before aldermen, magistrates 
or justices of the peace.152/ 
4. Appeals from orders, judgment, or sen-
tence of the Allegheny County Court, or the 
Municipal Court of Philadelphia, or any similar 
courts, not provided by law to be taken to court 
of common pleas or court of quarter sessions of 
the peace of the particular county, shall be 
taken to the Superior Court, and shall not be 
appealable to the Supreme Court.153/ 
17 Penn. Stat. 
17 Penn. Stat. 
17 Penn. Stat. 
17 Penn. Stat. 






§ 181 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 19671. 
§ 182 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967. 
§ 184 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967 • 
§ 184.1 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967). 
§ 187 (Purdon's 1962). 
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· 5. Appeals or P,Ac,,dings from divorce and 
joint appeals by lab9r claimants shall be taken 
to the Superior Court.~ 
In the following cases appeal is under the sole jurisd1c-
tio.n of the Supreme Court: 
(l) Felonious homicide; 
(2) The right to public office; 
(3) Petitions, orders and decrees arising 
out of or within the jurisdiction of the orphans' 
court; 
(4) Actions and proceedings in equity; 
(5) Civil actions arising under the provi-
sions of the act known as the "Banking Code," and 
under the provisions of the act known as the 
"Banking Code of 1965," and under the provisions 
of the act known as the "Department of Banking 
Code," and under the provisions of the act known 
as the "Building and Loan Code," and all amend-
ments to said acts; 
(6) Matters relating to actions and orders 
of the Department of Revenue arising under the 
provisions of the act known as "The Fiscal Code", 
as amended; 
(7) Appeals from orders of the courts of 
common pleas and courts of quarter sessions of 
the peace involving or arising out of acts, 
ordinances, regulations or orders relating to 
zoning; 
(8) Direct criminal contempt in lower 
courts, and other contempt proceedings in lower 
courts relating to orders, judgments, decisions 
and decrees which are appealable directly to the 
Supreme Court; 
(9) Disbarment from the practice of law; 
(10) Suspension from the practice of law; 
I@' 17 Penn. Stat. Ann.§ 191.3 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967). 
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(11) Suspension of a district attorney by 
an Attorney General or by a court.155/ 
(12) In actions of personal injury to a 
wife or child brought by husband and wife or 
child and parent, if more than one judgment is 
entered, and if any is greater than $10,000, 
exclusive of costs.156/ 
The Superior Court may deny any appeal for want of due 
prosecution and it may affirm, reverse, amend or modify, any judg-
ment or decree as it may think and determine just, or return the 
record to the inferior court for further proceedings.lii/ The 
Superior Court may allow an appeal over which it norma y has jur-
isdiction to be taken directly to the Supreme Court.158/ 
Tennessee 
Tennessee has two intermediate appellate courts, the Court 
of Appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Ap-
peals of Tennessee is composed of nine judges who are elected for 
an eight-year term.151/ Judges of the Court of Appeals receive 
$17,500 per annum.160 The Court of Criminal Appeals is composed 
of three judges who, after 1968, will be elected for eight-year 
terms.1§1/ Salaries of judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals 
are to e the same as the judges of the Court of Appeals, 
$17,500.162/ 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is appellate only 
and extends to all civil cases, except cases involving: the con-· 
stitutionality of a statute or city ordinance which is the sole 
determinative question in litigation; the right to hold public 
office; workmen's compensation; state revenue; mandamus in the 
nature of quo warranto; ouster; habeas corpus in cases where the 
relater is being held under a criminal accusation or a rendition 
warrant issued by the Governor of the state; and excepting cases 
which have been determined finally in the lower court on demurrer 
or other method involving a review or determination of the facts 
or in which all the facts have been stipulated.163/ 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 191.4 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967). 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 191.2 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967). 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 192 (Purdon's 1962). · 
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 190 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967). 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 401, 403 (1956). 
8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 2303 (1956). 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 442, 443 (1956, Supp. 1967). 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 445 (1956, Supp. 1967); $20,000 as of 
1970. 
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 408 (1956). 
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. The Court of Appeals ~~! power to grant writs of error, 
certiorari, and supersedeas.~ The court may and does sit in 
sections of three and is a court of. record. The presiding 
judge of the court has the power to assign and reassign judges 
and sections. Concurrence of two judges is necessary in the sec-
tion, five is necessary en bane, _and four if two sections -sit to-
gether.135/ The state is divided into three grand divisions with 
three ju ges elected from each. Cases are taken directly to the 
Court of Appeals in the division within which the case arpse. A 
case may be transferred to another grand division ·if a member re-
siding in the first division is disqualified and th- transfer i~ 
approved by two judges of the initial division. There is also a 
tr~nsfer of jurisdiction to the Supreme Co.urt or Court of Appeals 
when a case is taken to the wrong court. · 
The ju~isdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals is appel-
late only and extends to all criminal cases~ both felony and mis-
demeanor. The court also has jurisdiction:over all cases arising 
under any post conviction procedure statute and c.ases involving . 
or attacking the validity of a final conviction or judgment in a 
criminal case. The court does not .have jurisdiction of any case 
in which the sole question for determination•invo1ves the·consti• 
tutionality of a statute or municipal ordinance.166/ 
The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. ·It hears 
all appeals and writs of error from the circuit, crim~nal, and 
chancery courts in cases where jurisdiction has· not been given to 
the Court of Appeals. Supreme Court review"of cases finally de-
termined by the Court of Appeals is by certiorari granted by the 
Supreme Court or any judge thereof .167/ . · 
Texas 
Texas has two intermediate appellate courts, the Court of 
Criminal-Appeals and the Courts of Civil Appeals. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals consists of three judges elected for six-year 
terms.168/ The current annual salary for the judges of the Court 
of Criminal Appeals is the same as for Supreme Court justices, 
$27,000.169/ There are 14 separate Courts of Civil Appeals, and 
enn. Code Ann. 
Tenn. Code Ann. 
Tenn. CodP. Ann. 
Tenn. Code Ann. 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. 
5, § 4 . . 
nJudicial Salaries 
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 
§ 410 !1956). 
§ 413 1956). . 
§ 448 1956~ Supp. 1967). 
§ 452 19561. 
St. Art. 1801 (1964); Texas Const. Art. 
in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 
241 (Feb. 1968). 
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each court is composed of three judges elected for six-year 
terms.170/ They receive an annual salary of $24,000.171/ 
The Constitution of Texas grants the Court of Criminal 
Appeals appellate jurisdiction over all criminal causes with the 
proviso that exceptions and regulations may be prescribed by 
law.ll2/ The Court and the judges have the power to issue writs 
of ha eas corpus and other writs necessary to enforce the Court's 
jurisdiction.173/ The Court also has the power, by affidavit or 
otherwise, the ascertain matters of fact in cases pending before 
it .174/ 
The Courts of Civil Appeals have appellate jurisdiction 
over all civil cases in which the district courts and county 
courts have jurisdiction. Decisions of the Civil Courts of Ap-
peal are conclusive as to findings of fact.175/ Jurisdiction is 
final, except for those classes of cases wherein additional ap-
peal to the Supreme Court is reserved. 
Article 1821, as quoted below, describes the cases which 
cannot be appealed from Court of Civil Appeals, and in which it 
has final jurisdiction. 
Article 1821. Except as herein otherwise 
provided, the judgments of the Courts of Civil 
Appeals shall be conclusive on the law and facts, 
nor shall a writ of error be allowed thereto from 
the Supreme Court in the following cases, to wit: 
1. Any civil case appealed from the County 
Court or from a District Court, when, under the 
Constitution a County Court would have had orig-
inal or appellate jurisdiction to try it, except 
in probate matters, and in cases involving the 
Revenue Laws of the State or the validity or con-
struction of a Statute. 
2. All cases of slander. 
3. All cases of divorce. 
4. All cases of contested elections of 
every character other than for State officers, 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1817 (1964). 
SP.e nnte 169, supra. 
Teias Const. Art. 5, § 5. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Texas Const. Art. 5, § 6; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1819, 
1820 (1964). 
-99-
excep:t where the validity of a Statute is ques-
tioned by the decision. 
5. In all appeals from interlocutory orders 
appointing receivers or trustees, or such other 
interlocutory appeals as may be allowed by law. 
6. In all other cases as to law and facts 
except where appellate jurisdiction is given to 
the Supreme Court and not made final in said 
Courts of Civil Appeals. 
It is provid,ed,. however, that nothing con-
tained herein shall be construed to deprive the 
Supreme Court of jurisdiction of any case brought 
to the Court of ~ivil Appeals from an appealable 
judgment of the trial court in which the judges 
of the Courts of Civil Appeals may disagree upon 
any question of law material to the decision, or 
in which one of the Courts of Civil Appeals holds 
· differently from a prior decision of another 
Court of Civil Appeals or of the Supreme Court 
upon a question of law, as provided for in Subdi-
visions (1) and (2) of Article 1728.176/ · 
The Supreme Cou+t has appellate Jurisdiction on all ques-
tions of law over.the following cases brought on appeal to the 
Courts of Civil Appeal~: · 
1. · Cases in which judges of the Courts of 
Civil Appeals mjay disagree upon any question of 
law material to the decision. 
2 •. Cases jn which a Court of Civil Appeals 
renders a decision different from another Court 
of Civil Appeafs, or of the Supreme Court, upon 
any question of law material to a decision of the 
case. 
3. Cases :J_nvolving the construction or va-
lidity of statutes necessary to a determination 
of th~ case. · · 
4. Cases involving state revenues. 
5. Cases in which the Railroad Commission 
is a party. 
1W' Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1821 (1964). 
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6. Cases in which it is made to appear that 
an error of substantive law has been committed by 
a Court of Civil Appeals which affects the judq-
ment, excluding cases over which judgment of 
courts of civil appeals i~ final ll821 above).177/ 
All of the above causes of which the Supreme Court has ap,-
pellate jurisdiction may be transferred to the Supreme Court by 
writ of error or by certificate from the Court of Appeals.178/ 
The state legislature has the power by statute to author-
ize direct appeals to the Supreme Court on order of any trial 
cour~ granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunc-
tion on the question of constitutionality of a statute or on the 
validity or invalidity of any administrative order issued pursu-
ant to statute.179/ 
The Supreme Court promulgates rules for all courts.180/ 
The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to issue mandamus and 
other mandatory or compulsory writs to officers of the state,181/ 
but the Court of Appeals may issue mandamus and other compulsory 
or mandatory writs on officers of political parties.182/ The 
Supreme Court may transfer causes within the Courts of Civil Ap-
peals to equalize dockets.183/ 
The Supreme Court can issue writs of procedendo, certio-
rari and all writs of quo warranto or mandamus to the Courts of 
Civil Appeals or a judge thereof.184/ · 
Courts of Civil Appeals have the power to determine, by 
affidavit or otherwise, matters of fact as may be necessary to 
exercise their jurisdiction,185/ and to issue writs of mandamus 
and all other writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.186/ 
In addition, the Courts of Civil Appeals may mandamus judges of 
district courts to proceed to trial and judgment in a cause re-
turnable as the nature of the case may require.187/ 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1728 (1964). 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1729 (1964). 
Texas Const. Art. 5, § 3b; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1729 
( 1964) • 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1731 (1964). 
Vernon's Ana. Civ. St. Art. 1735 (1964). 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1735a, (1964). 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1738 !1964l. 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1733 1964 • 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1822 1964 • 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1823 (1964 • 
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1824 (1964 • 
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Finally, the Courts of Civil Appeals can certify questions 
on an issue of law to ·the Supreme Court, but the Courts of Civil 
Appealc;,..i;e bound to.conformance with the judgment of the Supreme. 
Court.1&§/ The Supreme Court may review final judgments of 
Courts
1
of/Civil Appeals upon writ of error when good cause can be 
shown. 69 · 
ernon s u es of Civil Proc., Rule 461 










Court Jud es 
-------------------------Judge completing questionnaire __________________ _ 
1. Do you think that more extensive use of outside and retired 
judges would aid the Supreme Court in its attempt to reduce 
the current backlog of cases? 
2. Do you think that increasing the number of judges in the 
Supreme Court from seven to nine would be effective in reduc-
ing the backlog? 
3. Do you think that an enlarged court, with possibly 12 judges, 
sitting in separate criminal and civil divisions, would alle-
viate the backlog problem? 
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4. Do you think that the prevailing method of appellate review 
should be changed, such as by limiting the right of appeal or 
by changing the method from writ of error to writ of certio-
rari? Do you foresee any problems (constitutiohal problems) 
if the method of appellate review were changed? Do you think 
such a change would effectively reduce the Supreme Court back-
log? 
5. Do you think that an intermediate appellate court between the 
trial courts and the Supreme Court should be established? 
6. Assuming that an intermediate court of appeals is established, 
what do you think should be the division of jurisdiction be-
tween the intermediate court and the Supreme Court, if any? 
Do you think the intermediate court should be one court with 
jurisdiction coextensive with the entire state; one court with 
several separate divisions, each division having jurisdiction 
over a particular ge09raphical region of the state; or two ~r 
more separate courts of appeals, each court having jurisdic-( 
tion over a particular district of the state? How many judges 
do you think an intermediate appellate court should have? 
What qualifications should the judges have and what salary 
should they be paid? 
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7. Assuming that an intermediate appellate court is established, 
do you think that county court appeals should go to the in-
termediate court or continue to go to the district ·courts? 
Do county court appeals present any problems in the district 
courts? 
8. Assuming that an intermediate appellate court is established, 
do you think that it should be granted jurisdiction to review 
administrative decisions (workmen's compensation, unemployment 
compensation, Public Utilities orders and decisions, etc.J 
rather than having the district courts review such decisions? 
Does the review of administrative decisions present any prob-
lems or crowding of the docket in the district courts? 
9. Do you have any other comments regarding possible solutions 
to the Supreme Court backlog problem? 
Please use additional sheets as needed. Send your reply tG: 
Mr. Lyle C. Kyle, Director 
Colorado Legislative Council 
Room 341, State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
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